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Introduction 
 
I begin with a deliberate misreading. In a song in the Masque of Beauty (1608), the poet 
and playwright Ben Jonson wrote, “It was for Beauty that the World was made” (l.243). In his 
text, Jonson gave the line this gloss: “An agreeing opinion, both with Diuines and Philosophers, 
that the great Artificer in loue with his owne Idæa, did, therefore, frame the world” (n.p.). While 
Jonson’s gloss gestures toward the Neoplatonic philosophies that inform the song, I am going to 
interpret this statement to mean, quite simply, that for the early moderns it was because of beauty 
that the world came to be. 
 Across the Continent during the early modern period, the topic of beauty was at the heart 
of philosophical and theological discourses such as Renaissance Humanism and Christian 
Neoplatonism. As I argue in Chapter 1, beauty was an intrinsic part of ideas related to the 
formation and formulation of the human self and of one’s perception of whatever was beyond 
this self—the other. Ideas about beauty were frequently used to define and explain relationships: 
between subject and sovereign, between human beings and their environment, and, perhaps most 
significantly, between the human and the divine. Because beauty was integral to defining human 
subjectivity, experience and relationships, it became, perhaps inadvertently, a critical way 
through which early modern culture approached a perennial question that confronts human life—
what is it to be? Any attempt to address this question—through formulations of selfhood and 
being, for instance—also invariably involves an attempt to address how the self relates to, or is 
different from, any notion of the other. This dissertation, then, conceives of beauty as a way to 
advance conversations about the experience of otherness in early modern studies. 
In showing how an attention to beauty can be lead us to a better understanding of our 
relationship with the other, this study is positioned against the kind of resistance to beauty and 
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claims for its ideological perversion and oppression that saturate many critical discourses. As the 
contemporary philosopher Alexander Nehamas explains:  
Beauty is the most discredited philosophical notion—so discredited that I could 
not even find an entry for it in the index of the many books in the philosophy of 
art I consulted in order to find it discredited. Even if I believe that beauty is more 
than the charm of a lovely face, the seductive grace of a Mapplethorpe 
photograph, the symmetry of the sonata form, the tight construction of a sonnet, 
even if it is, in the most general terms, aesthetic value, I am not spared. For it is 
the judgment of aesthetic value itself—the judgment of taste—that is 
embarrassing.… The aesthetic judgment collapses into an instrument of political 
oppression or into an implement of moral edification. In either case, beauty 
disappears. It is either the seductive mask of evil or the attractive face of 
goodness. (“An Essay on Beauty and Judgement,” n.p.)1 
 
Elaine Scarry, whose work on beauty I discuss later, too, also addresses the peculiar position in 
which beauty is placed in academic discourse:  
The sublime (an aesthetic of power) rejects beauty on the grounds that it is 
diminutive, dismissible, not powerful enough. The political rejects beauty on the 
grounds that it is too powerful, a power expressed both in its ability to visit harm 
on objects looked at and also in its capacity to so overwhelm our attention that we 
cannot free our eyes from it long enough to look at injustice. Berated for its 
power, beauty is simultaneously belittled for its powerlessness. (85) 
 
Either way you look at it, the topic of beauty invariably faces resistance in academic discourse. 
As Heather Dubrow notes about much of the criticism in the field of early modern studies, any 
discussion of form or “pronouncements on Truth and Beauty” clash with topics of “sex, religion, 
and of course, above all, politics”(59). The last book written specifically about beauty and 
                                                
1The complete quotation: 
It is embarrassing ideologically, if to be able to judge aesthetically you must be educated and learned and 
if, as Pierre Bourdieu claims, “it is because they are linked either to a bourgeois origin or to the quasi-
bourgeois mode of existence presupposed by prolonged schooling, or (most often) to both of these 
combined, that educational qualifications come to be seen as a guarantee of the capacity to adopt the 
aesthetic disposition.” And it is embarrassing morally, if, as Martha Nussbaum asserts, the aesthetic and the 
moral coincide, if “the activities of imagination and emotion that the involved reader performs during the 
time of reading are not just instrumental to moral conduct, they are also examples of moral conduct, in the 
sense that they are examples of the type of emotional and imaginative activity that good ethical conduct 
involves” and if, when a work of art is marred by what she calls “ethical deficiencies,” “we may… decide 
to read [it] for historical interest or for rhetorical and grammatical interest. (n.p.)  
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Shakespeare was John Vyvyan’s Shakespeare and Platonic Beauty (1961), which reads 
Neoplatonism, Plato, and Ficino in relation to four Shakespearean plays. Since then, the topic of 
beauty has been relegated to the far corners of early modern scholarship. 
Part of what I want to suggest in this dissertation is that Shakespeare is a philosopher of 
beauty. At its most basic level, this study examines what happens when we look at beauty as 
seriously as early modern thinkers did. What happens when we understand beauty as opening up 
a liminal space for exploration of selfhood and knowledge? Considering that man is, as Hamlet 
says, “the beauty of the world” (2.2.308), I am hopeful that my examination of beauty and 
Shakespeare will contribute to contemporary scholarship by enhancing our understanding of 
selfhood and otherness, and will also address the issue of how the self engages with the other—
an issue that is at the crux of ethics. An analysis of beauty in this context enables us to articulate 
clearly the relation between beauty and ethics. Perhaps it is no coincidence that both the words 
“beauty” and “ethics,” in the specific meanings that I examine, came to be used in English during 
the same period.2   
                                                
2 According to the Oxford English Dictionary: 
 
Ethics  
 
1586: As an adjective (now understood as “ethical”) and 
defined as “relating to morals,” first used in 1586 in 
Sidney’s Apology for Poetry (sig. D1). 
 
1589: “Of an author or literary work: Treating of moral 
questions, and of ethics as a science,” first used in 
Geroge Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie. 
 
1602: “The science of morals; the department of study 
concerned with the principles of human duty,” first used 
in William Warner’s in Albions England.  
 
Beauty 
 
1483: “A beautiful person or thing; esp. a beautiful 
woman,” was first used in William Caxton’s 1483 
translation of Jacobus de Voragine’s The Golden 
Legend, also incidentally one of the first books Caxton 
printed in the English language. 
 
1563:  “A beautiful feature or trait; an embellishment, 
ornament, grace, charm,” first used in John Shute’s The 
First and Chief Grounds of Architecture. 
 
1667: “The abstract quality” personified, first used in 
John Milton’s Paradise Lost 
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This dissertation is then an act of re-visioning: it reconstructs the place of beauty in early 
modern studies, Shakespeare in particular, through the lens of philosophy and contemporary 
theory, and redefines a scope for the topic of beauty and ethics in current critical thought. By 
showing why beauty matters, I hope to fill a gap in current scholarship on the topic of beauty; in 
arguing for beauty’s relevance in topics about gender, religion, and politics in the early modern 
period, I wish to contribute to the discussion of our dominant cultural and ethical imperative of 
responsibility to the other.  
As I explain in the ensuing chapters, the concept of ethics and responsibility to the other 
that I use for my argument is derived from the works of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Ken 
Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti, while critiquing the critical methodologies in early modern 
literary studies, remind us that “every effort to turn ethics into a principle of thought and action is 
essentially religious … it is this Levinasian ethical/religious strain of twentieth-century 
phenomenology that underwrites much of early modern studies’ critical interest in alterity” 
(178). Jackson and Marotti show how the still dominant critical mode of New Historicism in 
early modern studies, while it seeks to address questions about alterity (otherness), has largely 
ignored the aporia between the self and the other. This aporia, as I elaborate later, emerges from 
the impossible demand of the other—impossible, because even as the other demands a response 
and engagement, the alterity of the other cannot be accessed. New Historicism has also largely 
hindered the critical discussion of topics such as beauty, often treating beauty (much like 
religion) as an ideological mist that occludes our access to material culture; this reinforces the 
prejudice that Scarry and Nehamas discuss in academic discourse against the topic of beauty. 
Given the dominant presence of Neoplatonism and the pervasive emphasis on beauty in early 
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modern literature, to see beauty as divorced from the central issue of ethics and otherness in the 
humanities is reductive and akin to a kind of violence. 
In the early modern period, the humanists who disseminated Neoplatonic ideals of 
physical and spiritual perfection saw physical beauty as an outward sign of inner beauty. 
Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499)—who is largely credited with having syncretized Christianity and 
Platonic thought through his examination of love and its goal and source, beauty—had a marked 
influence on the positive perception of beauty across the Continent through his writings. Another 
dominant influence was the Florentine Academy, a group of scholars Ficino led under the 
patronage of Cosimi de’Medici that discussed Neoplatonic ideas and translated the writings of 
Plato and Plotinus into Latin. Ficino sees beauty as a reflection of goodness and love, and 
actually coined the term “Platonic love” to refer to Plato’s notion of spiritual love. Beauty for 
Ficino is “the characteristic of the thing which makes it seem to reveal in some measure the 
secret of unity that binds the whole world together” (Jayne qtd. in Raffini 32). Ficino’s 
translation of and commentary on Plato’s writings in Latin were two of the most influential texts 
that helped disseminate Neoplatonic thought in Europe.3 Christine Raffini contends that Ficino’s 
“theories on love and beauty determined attitudes throughout the Renaissance and beyond” (32) 
and that along with Ficino, the writings of Pietro Bembo and Baldassare Castiglione also reveal 
the philosophical, aesthetic, and political ramification of Renaissance Platonism.  
Castiglione’s widely circulated 1528 courtesy book, Il Libro del Cortegiano (translated in 
English as The Book of The Courtier by Thomas Hoby in 1561), further disseminated ideas on 
beauty through the prism of Christianized Neoplatonism. As I later elaborate in Chapter 1, Book 
IV in particular discusses the soul’s ascent on the ladder of love to a divine and universal Beauty 
                                                
3 Ficino’s Commentary of Plato’s Symposium was published in 1484 and the Italian translation was published in 
1544. Prior to 1544 the spread of Ficino’s notion of “Platonic love” was due to dialogues written by other authors in 
vernacular Italian. 
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that is ignited first and foremost by the contemplation of physical, earthly beauty; the love of 
beauty is also therefore, a love of goodness. Among several other treatises on beauty that were 
influenced by Neoplatonism are Agnolo Firenzuola’s popular 1548 On the Beauty of Women—
that belongs to the defense of women genre and is discussed in detail in Chapter 1—and 
Thomasso Buoni’s Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections, translated from Italian to 
English in 1606, a work that, as I discuss in Chapter 3 in detail, while mostly in the Neoplatonic 
vein, added extensive elaborations and speculations about the nature of beauty and its 
relationship to grace and art.  
Ficino’s views influenced a great many artists too—Botticelli, Titian, Michelangelo, 
Dürer—4 who created artworks that in turn inspired more writings; this interplay is reflected in 
my discussion of some of their works in the ensuing chapters. In addition to art, discourses on 
beauty, for and against, traversed a broad spectrum of topics and literary genres: social 
guidebooks and conduct manuals, cosmetic recipe books, defense of women, religious sermons, 
philosophical treatises, theological tracts, and medical and anatomical manuals. As is evident 
from Figure 1, these discourses were understood as being connected even in the late 17th-century.  
 
                                                
4 Sandro Botticelli (c.1445-1510) was a Florentine painter who worked under the patronage of Lorenzo de' Medici 
who in turn had Ficino for a tutor. Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475-1564) was one of the most important artists at 
Lorenzo’s court. Titian or Tiziano Vecellio (c.1488-1576) was a major artist of Venetian school. Albrecht Dürer 
(1471-1528) was a German artist and theorist from Nuremberg who was regarded as the most important figure of the 
Northern Renaissance.  
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Figure 1: Illustration to Richard Blomes The Gentlemans Recreation  (1686)  
 
 
This illustration has inscriptions mapping the various parts of philosophy and liberal arts: at the 
bottom are various emblematic figures, with Venus and Cupid toward the right. In this map, 
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stemming from Philosophy comes the “Nature of things,” incorporeal and corporeal, and the 
body (animate or natural), the humane and ethics, divine and theology, painting, poetry, and so 
forth. And while beauty is not explicitly mentioned anywhere within this map, as I show in 
Chapter 1, it occupies a seminal place in all these discourses of the humanities and facilitates 
relationships between them. The image of Venus that appears at the bottom of this oval—with 
her arms outstretched upward toward a source of light—indicates how Venus came to be 
understood as being symbolic of beauty’s importance in the process of knowing and humanistic 
inquiry.  
Early modern literature abounds in references to beauty; verse after verse is written in the 
praise of the perfection of beauty.  As Ben Jonson’s Lovel sings in The New Inn:  
It was a Beauty that I saw 
So pure, so perfect, as the frame 
Of all the Universe was lame, 
To that one Figure could I draw, 
Or give least line of it a law! 
 
A Skein of Silk without a Knot! 
A fair March made without a Halt! 
A curious Form without a Fault! 
A printed book without a blot. 
All beauty, and without a spot.  
(4.4. 4-13) 
 
For Lovel, beauty is blameless, free of fault, pure, and perfect. As we see in detail in Chapter 1, 
however, definitions and descriptions of beauty were not always this positive. Almost a century 
prior to Jonson’s play, in Everyman, for instance, Beauty (an allegorical representation of 
beauty) is someone who will be of not use to Everyman:  
O all thing faileth, save God alone;  
Beauty, Strength, and Discretion; 
For when Death bloweth his blast,  
9 
   
They all run from me full fast. 
Beauty is superficial and fades away; unlike Good Deeds, it is not constant. The early modern 
period, then, was a time when beauty was celebrated, but also a time when, as Ann Korhonen 
reminds us, the most often repeated beauty percept in early modern literature was from the 1560 
Geneva Bible (Sirach 9:8): “Turne awaye thine eye from a beautiful woman, and loke not vpon 
others beautie: for manie haue perished by the beauitie of women: for thorow it loue is kindled as 
a fyre” (343).  
According to the OED, in this period beauty was defined as “Such combined perfection 
of form and charm of colouring as affords keen pleasure to the sense of sight:  a. in the human 
face or figure. b. of other objects.” Partly due to the revival of classical thought, writers mostly 
tended to view beauty in Aristotelian as well as Platonic terms: following Aristotle, beauty was 
defined as a kind of symmetry and proportion of form and harmony; following Plato, beauty was 
perceived as a material means to a spiritual end and enlightenment. In both approaches, beauty 
manifests itself in physical form, often the human body.5 Nonetheless, contrary associations 
consistently emerge in various early modern discourses on beauty, such as: beauty is visible, 
especially in the physical form of women, yet beauty is manifested in grace and virtue (or 
conversely, only that which is virtuous is beautiful); beauty can be attained materially, through 
art and cosmetics, yet beauty is innate and natural (or only that which is natural is beautiful); 
beauty (both natural and artificial) is misleading and corrupts, yet beauty is divine (and that the 
divine is always beautiful); and, finally, much as human beings aspire toward beauty, in both 
body and mind, beauty always remains elusive and ineffable.  
                                                
5 Plotinus later adds to Plato and describes beauty as more than just a formal property; in addition to beauty being 
symmetry, it is something that necessarily “irradiates” and moves the onlooker. As theologian Edward Farley 
summarizes, beauty “is the intelligibility of things played out or split over into the animating power of the world 
and, specifically, to the animated or ensouled human being. Beauty is not, then, mere order or pattern but is an 
ensouled or enlivened intelligibility whose origin is the beyond-being or One.” (20) 
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We need to keep in mind that these varying and sometimes contradictory associations 
were not viewed as being problematic or indeed, even as contradictions, by early modern 
thinkers. Beauty encompassed a wide variety of associations and this inclusiveness appears to 
define the very nature of what beauty meant in the early modern period. I read Shakespeare as 
one such thinker who appears to be less interested in selecting and positing a singular definition 
of beauty than in constantly exploring possibilities of representing and engaging with beauty in 
its complexity. His works then can be read as a process of thinking through these very 
possibilities and complexities of beauty.  
My methodology is influenced by several approaches, most of which work against 
historicist approaches. Joel Altman’s The Tudor Play of Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the 
Development of Elizabethan Drama (1978) embodies one such approach: by applying two modes 
of rhetorical inquiry—the demonstrative and the explorative—Altman reads Elizabethan plays 
not simply as raising questions but literally as questions “or rather fictional realizations of 
questions”(2-3). Following Altman’s lead, I tend to read the plays “as media of intellectual and 
emotional exploration for minds that were accustomed to examine the many sides of a given 
theme,” all the while keeping in mind his assertion that “the experience of the play was the 
thing” (author’s italics 6). The necessary overlap between rhetoric and the “experience” of the 
aesthetic in this kind of a rhetorical formalistic reading allows for a space to explore a concept 
such as beauty. Philosophical Shakespeares (2000), a collection that argues for a rapprochement 
between philosophy and Shakespeare criticism from various perspectives, and Richard Halpern’s 
trans-historical approach in Shakespeare Among the Moderns (1997), which uses the method of 
“historical allegory” to read topographies of contemporary issues in Shakespearean plays, are 
also works and approaches that influence my argument here. Finally, it is Julia Lupton’s 
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approach of thinking with Shakespeare that has influenced the way I read and think about 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries. Lupton’s approach is especially evident in her latest work, 
Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life, where she reads Shakespeare through 
the political theories of Hannah Ardent and other theorists and philosophers to examine the 
relation between politics and life. For Lupton, Shakespeare’s plays are trans-historical, open-
ended texts that can shape contemporary thinking about ethics, life, and our humanity.   
In Chapter 1, “Beauty, Becoming and the Want to Be in the Early Modern Period,” I 
analyze a range of genres—conduct manuals, emblem books, cosmetic recipe books, religious 
treatises, defenses of women, poetry, philosophical writings—to address the various 
connotations of beauty and its contradictions in the early modern period. I examine these 
definitions and interpretations of beauty to argue that an in-depth engagement with beauty was 
essential to developing ideas about selfhood and subjectivity. In addition to delineating the socio-
cultural and theoretical context for my discussion of beauty in the early modern period, this 
chapter establishes how beauty became a critical way through which early moderns understood 
their culture understood itself and attempted its self-definition.   
In Chapter 2, “O Beauty, till now I never knew thee!”: The Call of Beauty and Other 
Ethical Experiences in All is True,”  I turn to the crucial relationship between beauty and other 
linked ethical experiences and the way this relationship is played out in one of the last plays by 
Shakespeare,6 Henry VIII or All is True. Drawing from contemporary philosophers, I contend 
that an ethical demand is placed not only on the characters within the play but also on the 
audience through the aesthetic. Consequently, I proceed to read this late history play as an 
aesthetic exploration of an ethical demand. I start by considering the moment when Henry first 
                                                
6 John Fletcher, who succeeded Shakespeare as chief playwright for the king’s Men, collaborated with Shakespeare 
on this play. Henry VIII is included in the First Folio. 
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meets Anne and declares her beauty as an ethical moment. Stemming from this, I reinterpret 
other quasi-religious or supernatural moments—such as Henry’s “prick of conscience” at 
Blackfriars, Katharine’s vision, and Cranmer’s prophecy—as corroborating the call of beauty. 
By juxtaposing and tracing similarities between the experience of beauty, the religious, and the 
supernatural, I argue that all of these experiences are, in their spatio-temporal form, experiences 
with otherness and thus, as I later explain, ethical moments. This discussion sheds light on the 
similarities underlying the phenomenological aspect of beauty and ethics, seeing and knowing, 
and the complex experience of otherness.  
In Chapter 3, “With what’s unreal thou coactive art”: The Problem and Possibilities of 
Beauty in The Winter’s Tale,” I examine what a response to beauty entails. I juxtapose specific 
moments of engagement with beauty in the play with Robert Greene’s 1588 prose romance 
Pandosto: The Triumph of Time (one of the sources for Shakespeare’s play), Book VI of 
Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1596), and David Garrick’s 1756 adaptation The winter's 
tale, or Florizel and Perdita. A dramatic pastoral, altered from Shakspeare. I analyze these texts 
primarily because they contain instances that parallel and diverge from the Shakespearean 
moments in interesting and illuminating ways. Along with these texts, Thommaso Buoni’s 
Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections helps establish a literary and philosophical 
context for my discussion of beauty, grace, and art. In this chapter, I consider Florizel’s wish to 
see Perdita’s beauty “move still, still so”—his impulse to make the experience of beauty 
infinitely present and available—as a critical moment that reveals the paradoxes of responding to 
beauty. Contrary to what critics have said about Florizel redeeming the destructive effects of 
Leontes’ enraged mind, his infamous “affection” speech in particular, I argue that far from 
remedying Leontes’ mistakes, Florizel is inadvertently repeating them. Working through similar 
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moments of complex engagements with beauty leads me to conclude that the play does not end 
with the resolution of a romance but in a suspended repetitive movement of violence, a 
movement that displays the complexity not just of Shakespeare’s art, but of this thought.  
Chapter 4, “The Other of Beauty Manifested: Beauty, Identity, and Otherness in Othello 
and Omkara,” explores the nature of what I refer to as the other of beauty or the possible 
converse of beauty to see what that reveals about beauty itself. I discuss Othello in relation to 
Vishal Bhardwaj’s Hindi cinematic adaptation Omkara to examine the intimate relationship of 
the other of beauty with color, race, and particularly in the case of the film, caste and deformity. 
The film adaptation helps us reassess some of the critical issues at stake in the play and we 
observe that the other of beauty (variously perceived as blackness, unattractiveness and cultural 
otherness, which are often synonymous) gets manifested as a distinct marker of the marginalized 
other which is invariably juxtaposed against various paragons of beauty and goodness in the 
respective works. While the marginalized other of beauty is set in sharp contrast with beauty, it is 
nonetheless contingent upon beauty itself and vice-versa. For instance, in Othello, beauty is life 
affirming and divine, represented through Desdemona as the Virgin Mary and also as Venus 
Anadyomene when she arrives at the shores of Cyprus—Venus rising from the waves and 
representing cosmic order. But it also exists in an intersubjective relationship with ugliness: 
Iago’s statement that  “there is a daily beauty in Cassio’s life that makes me ugly” (5.1.19-12) 
reflects not only his negation of vitality but also suggests a relationship of correspondence 
between beauty, identity, and selfhood. The idea that beauty and its other are interchangeable 
and often mutually reinforcing raises interesting questions about the relation that lies at the heart 
of ethics—between the marginalized and dominant other.  
14 
   
By opening up the discussion of beauty and ethics in a non-European contemporary 
context in the last chapter, I emphasize the significance of this theme and its relevance of 
Shakespeare’s thinking—both of which enable a better understanding our present human 
condition and draw attention to our dominant ethical imperative of respect to the other.  
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Chapter 1  
Beauty, Becoming and the Want to Be in the Early Modern 
Period 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine various definitions of beauty in early modern writings to argue 
that beauty was intrinsic to ideas about the formation and formulation of the human self. I begin 
with an examination of early modern ideals of beauty or the “what” of beauty, and the 
participants in that discourse, that is, the “who” of beauty. This is followed by an analysis of the 
difference between artificially created beauty through cosmetics and—its ostensible opposite—
the natural beauty of the body. After discussing how both natural and artificial beauty were 
disparaged and feared, I look at those philosophical discourses that upheld beauty, especially 
female beauty, as being integrally linked to notions of the divine, love, and knowledge. In 
addition to delineating the cultural and theoretical context for my discussion of beauty in the 
early modern period, this chapter establishes how beauty became a critical way through which 
early modern culture approached the perennial question that confronts human life—what is it to 
be? 
Physical Beauty and Looking Beautiful: Ideal(s) of Beauty in the Early Modern 
Period 
Early modern literature abounds in references to the beauty of the human body, women in 
particular, and as we will see, beauty becomes a way of defining female identity. As Ann 
Krohonen contends, “All early modern beauty texts affirmed that human beauty resided 
overwhelmingly in women” (342). The literary conventions and imagery used to depict female 
beauty are deployed even when the beauty of male figures is described. In Shakespeare’s Venus 
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and Adonis for instance, Adonis is described as having features that surpass those of Venus 
herself: he is “Thrice-fairer” than Venus, “the field’s chief flower, sweet above compare, / Stain 
to all nymphs, more lovely than a man” (7-9). It seems only reasonable therefore to begin my 
discussion of beauty with an attempt to address a single question: what was the beautiful 
woman?  
The 1536 guidebook El Costume delle Donne (owned by 19th-century Italian librarian, 
Salomone Morpurgo) is often cited for its list of thirty-three “beauties that women ought to 
have…eleven are the part, but each extend into three” (24-26, my translation): 
  3- long; the hair, the hands and the legs 
3- tiny; the teeth, the ears and the breasts 
3- large; the forehead, the torso and the hips 
3- narrow; the waist, the knees and that which nature has placed where it is all 
soft. 
3- big, but in good proportion; the buttocks, the arms and the thighs 
3- fine; the eyebrows, the fingers and the lips 
3- round; the neck, the arms, and the rump 
3- small; the mouth, the chin and the feet 
3- white; the teeth, the chest and the hands 
3- red; the cheeks, the lips and the nipples 
3- black; eyelashes, the eyes and that which you know.1 
 
This description occurs in a pastoral eclogue; a shepherd named Philibbo lists these “beauties” 
during an extended and detailed dialogue he has with his fellow shepherd, Dinarco. These 
“beauties” are qualities that women “ought” to have and are thus necessary conditions that 
inform a notion of ideal womanhood. These thirty-three attributes follow a certain hierarchical 
order: for instance, of the three attributes listed under the “part” or category “long,” Philibbo 
says that firstly, the hair should be long; secondly, the hands; and finally, the legs. The other ten 
categories follow the same pattern. It is worth noting that apart from the last three categories that 
                                                
1 See Appendix A for the full dialogue in original Italian. 
  17 
   
talk about color—white, red, and black—the rest, in line with Aristotle, are concerned with shape 
and proportion. 
 In most other descriptions of beauty, however, color is given equal, if not more 
importance, especially in reference to the skin and hair. The classical Renaissance ideal of 
beauty, that of the Petrarchan mistress—with ivory skin, golden hair, among other features—
tends to be the one most widely circulated through and between various early modern literary 
genres and other visual arts across the Continent. According to Sylvia Ferino-Pagden: 
[…]Venetian painters created idealized portraits in accord with the canon of 
female beauty formulated in poetic and literary tracts: blond locks, broad, smooth 
forehead; wonderfully balanced, arched eyebrows; starlike eyes; well-formed 
cheeks; and so forth. These painting in turn stimulated new poems and treatises on 
female beauty and love.  (196)  
 
Sixteenth-century Italian painter, Titian, who was known for idealized portraits of women, 
comes close to some of the literary ideals of beauty in the painting Flora (c.1515). 
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Figure 2: Titian’s Flora (c.1515)  
Source: Wikimedia Commons.  <http://commons.wikimedia.org>. 
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Similar ideals are reflected in the literature of the period across the Continent, particularly 
through the blazon (blason in French) which is a prime example of a literary device deployed to 
describe beauty through its use of fragmentation and hyperbole. Clément Marot’s famous 
blazons— compiled and produced with other blazons in the 1543 Sensuient les blasons 
anatomiques du corps femenin by Charles L’Angelier—offer extensive and detailed descriptions 
of beauty and ugliness through blazons and counter blazons. This, for instance, is what a 
beautiful throat looks like: 
 
Figure 3: Depiction of Clement Marot’s blazon   
The collection contains other blazons, some from the blazon competition organized by Marot 
that Maurice Scève won; Scève’s description of “Le Sourcil,” the eyebrow that, according to 
Neoplatonists was the noblest of all body parts, came in first place. The book contains several 
such images and descriptions of various parts of the female body. 
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While the image in Flora is an approximation of the beauty of a woman’s face, it is 
Titian’s Venus Anadyomene (Venus rising from the waves) (c.1520)—also an idealized portrait 
of beauty—that conforms almost precisely to the conventional standards of the ideal body 
proportion. Venus was the perfect model for beauty; among several others, Italian Renaissance 
humanist Mario Equicola (c.1470-1525) in Libro di natura d’amore agrees that the image of the 
goddess Venus embodies beauty and perfect proportion. 
 
Figure 4: Titian’s Venus Anadyomene  (c.1520)  
Source: Wikimedia Commons.  <http://commons.wikimedia.org>. 
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   In England, too, writers used the blazon: Philip Sidney’s blazon in The Countesse of 
Pembrokes Arcadia is representative of the more widely circulated ideas about physical beauty 
and related color scheme of the body (and consequently also race) associated with that notion of 
beauty. In Sidney’s romance, Pyrocles disguised as Zelmane sings about Philoclea after seeing 
her bathe in the river as if he were describing the very image of Titian’s Venus rising from the 
waves: 
 What toong can her perfections tell  
In whose each part all pens may dwell?  
Her haire fine threeds of finest gould  
In curled knots mans thought to hold:  
But that her fore-head sayes in me  
A whiter beautie you may see.  
Whiter indeed ; more white then snow,  
Which on cold winters face doth grow.  
That doth present those euen browes, 
… 
       Her nose, her chinne pure iuorie weares:  
No purer then the pretie eares.  
So that therein appeares some blood,  
Like wine and milke that mingled stood  
… 
So good a say inuites the eye,  
A little downward to espie,  
The liuelie clusters of her brests,  
Of Venus babe the wanton nests: Like  
pomels round of Marble cleere:  
… 
 Her bellie then gladde sight doth fill,  
Iustly entitled Cupids hill.  
A hill most fitte for such a master,  
A spotlesse mine of Alablaster.  
Like Alablaster faire and sleeke,  
But soft and supple satten like.   
(150v-52 v)2 
 
The repetitive emphasis on white skin here, and in most love poetry, serves to establish 
whiteness as a dominant literary and cultural norm for beauty. While discussing how feminine 
                                                
2 Transcribed from William Ponsonbie’s 1590 edition.  
  22 
   
beauty was codified and followed a formula to which women aspired to conform, Sara F. 
Matthews Grieco contends, “The color of the eyes might vary (the French were fond of green; 
the Italians preferred black or brown), and occasional concessions might be made to dark hair; 
but the canon of feminine appearance remained essentially the same for some three hundred 
years” (58).  
This perception of beauty, nonetheless, does not remain constant. Baker reminds us that 
the deformed mistress theme—evident, for instance, in Suckling’s “The Deformed Mistress,” 
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 130 “My mistresses’ eyes are nothing like the sun,” and the trend of the 
counter blazon— reflects how the concept of beauty broadened in the seventeenth century owing 
to the influence of mannerist and baroque aesthetics: “authors rejected classical Renaissance 
ideals of the blonde, fair woman, and ostensibly explored the possibilities of ‘black’ beauty” 
(96). This perspective of an ‘other’ beauty is possibly also a result of colonial expansion and 
discovery of varied races and cultures (even though ironically, one of the results of the colonial 
enterprise was an introduction to substances such as ivory that were used to evoke figures of 
whiteness). The dominant definition of female beauty as one with ivory white skin did have a 
few challengers. Thomas Browne, who attempted to clarify some of the common fallacies of the 
age in his 1646 Pseudodoxica Epidemica or Enquries into very many received tenets and 
commonly presumed truth, supports Aristotelian views to reject the idea of beauty as being 
associated with one race or skin color over another: 
[i]f we seriously consult the definition of beauty, and exactly perpend what wise 
men determine thereof, we shall not apprehend a curse, or any deformity therein. 
For first, some place, the essence thereof in the proportion of parts, conceiving it 
to consist in a comely commensurability of the whole unto the parts, and the parts 
betweene themselves, which is the determination of the best and learned Writers. 
Now hereby the Moores are not excluded from beauty; there being no 
consideration of colours, but an apt connexion and frame of parts and whole. 
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…Aristotle in two definitions of pulchritude, and Galen in one, have made no 
mention of colour. (521) 
 
Browne’s description is much closer to the one presented by the shepherd Philobbo in El 
Costume Della Donne a century earlier. Form is more important than color, and a person of any 
race can be deemed beautiful if her body is of a certain proportion.  
While this alterative perspective had its place in the discourse of beauty, the dominant 
ideal of beauty was still a white woman, often one belonging to a specific social order. Who 
then, was this beautiful white woman? Grieco points out how cookbooks of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century show a marked preference for sugars, fats, creams, and butter over the 
earlier (fourteenth and fifteenth century) preference for acidic and sour sauces. This suggests that 
for people who could afford such ingredients, plumpness was beautiful and thinness was 
considered ugly (55). This is indicative of how class is a strong determinant in the discourse of 
beauty and its definition; it naturally followed that these classes had easier access to beauty 
because they had plentiful food and could afford using expensive cosmetics. Additionally, since 
they were wealthy enough to avoid working in under the sun, they also had fairer skin. Also, 
since literary practices themselves were the prerogative (and profession) of the upper and middle 
class, by default the discourse of beauty and the decision of what defines beauty was almost 
entirely in their hands, especially in the hands of men. 
Indeed, the literary and pictorial ideals of beauty (and ugliness) reveal much more about 
the poets and artists who create them and are active participants in the discourse of beauty. 
Representing beauty becomes a means of self-definition for the artist. As Baker argues, and as 
Elizabeth Cropper has shown in her extensive study on female beauty in renaissance portraiture, 
these dwellings and ruminations on beauty were a way for the (mostly male) artist to wield his 
creativity.  The focus on the beauty of a woman (or ugliness) is an exercise in self-conscious 
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artistry—to explore the depths and extent of one’s own creative power. The beauty of a woman 
newly (re)created through art is the ideal because, of course, the natural beauty of a woman 
leaves a lot to be desired and she can become a model of perfect form only through male art. 
Cropper’s conclusion to her influential essay “The Beauty of Woman” from the collection 
Rewriting the Renaissance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe is 
worth quoting in full: 
In the Renaissance paragone of painting and poetry, the portrayal of a beautiful 
woman is not merely an example. It is the test the poet sets the painter, and the 
primary figure for the truthfulness of the representation of beauty itself. Not all 
portraits of beautiful women were painted in direct response to the changing 
arguments of this debate, but, given the inextricability of the image of the beloved 
from the problem of the paragone, so firmly established by Petrarch, few 
paintings of women stand completely outside it. Sometimes the metaphors of 
poetry prevail, sometimes the natural colors of painting dominate…. But the 
portrait of a beautiful woman belongs to a distinct discourse from which the 
woman herself is necessarily absent. In portraying his mistress, it is the art of 
painting that the painter desires to possess, even as the poet embraces his own 
laurels. (190) 
 
As I later discuss, even as it was predominantly the male gaze and authority that constructed 
various ideals of beauty, women themselves were not merely passive objects. The interest in 
male beauty too appears to be an exercise in artistry. The young beautiful man in Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets or in A Lover’s Complaint is subject to similar artistry as women.3  
Just as for the artist, “[b]eauty was also a useful tool [for women], and women without 
others means of influencing society, deliberately made use of it. Like the sun, the throne, and the 
altar, beauty fascinated, and it was thus the center of complex strategic maneuvers” (Nahoum-
Grappe 100). Beauty made women visible and thus offered them a liminal space to be “heard.” 
Krohonen, for instance, has argued that “early modern beauty was a question of gendered power” 
(360) and was a threat to gender dynamics partly because it was irresistible, visually and 
                                                
3 It is on stage in particular, that things start getting complicated: when young boys play female roles and are being 
sung paeans about their beauty, issues of homoeroticism, cross-dressing, and gendering are involved.  
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sexually, and disrupted the notion of the self-contained man who was in control of his emotions 
and morals. She raises important question about gender politics, beauty, and visuality: 
Women were not mere objects. They had minds of their own, and even writing 
men knew that. In fact, it seemed to men that women deliberately put themselves 
in men’s ways, forcing men to look at, admire and desire them. So women were 
not innocent, but what did that mean for the women? When appearing to the gaze, 
what kind of agents were they? It is a paradox of the early modern rationale of 
beauty that the object was deemed to possess all power, while the looking subject 
was reduced to a passive receiver of the emotions and desires that the object 
provoked. (337) 
 
A lot of this interpretation of the power of beauty over the onlooker has to do with the 
preoccupation with visual experience in England during and after the Reformation that brought 
about a distrust of visual images and forceful antivisual rhetoric that I discuss later in the 
dissertation. Beauty was then an active process of communication and interpretation, and 
“inscribed both the seer and the seen with cultural meaning” (336). In analyzing the cultural 
history of typical early modern London streets (as well as Hyde Park and around Westminster) in 
relation to physical beauty, Krohonen successfully shows how women too, participated in the 
discourse of beauty.  
In addition to bodies, both male and female, places and spaces participated in the 
discourse of beauty as well. Cropper reminds us that the cultivation of beauty was a part of 
Renaissance statecraft (9); it was an attribute of collectives of people and cities too. Thomas 
Frangenberg analyzes Francesco Bocchi’s 1591 encomium (and guidebook) to the city of 
Florence, Le Bellezze della citta fi fiorenza, to show how beauty was encouraged to be a “civic 
asset” (Cropper 9): “Bocchi aims to make the notion of beauty a useful intellectual tool in the 
context of the visual exploration of the city, and in art criticism (Frangenberg 195). Robert 
Williams explains how for Bocchi beauty was not just ornamental but essential; the collective 
beautiful aspects of Florence are signs of “the city’s virtu--its power, but also its worth or 
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integrity in a spiritual or moral sense” (199). The beauty of the city implied excellence not just in 
a geographical, architectural sense, but also as a characteristic of the state of mind of its 
inhabitants and their daily conduct toward each other.  
Nowhere is the use of beauty for statecraft and power play more evident than in the 
image of Elizabeth I. While the topic of Elizabeth and beauty can itself be a full-length study, in 
this paragraph I will only briefly gesture toward some of the examples. And even though these 
examples can seem to contribute to the criticism of beauty as ideological mist, both perverse and 
powerful, they should not be sidelined the way beauty has been in academic discourse; even 
though my dissertation argues for a different approach, these critical notions still need to be 
accounted for since they do occupy a place in the discourse of beauty in the period. For instance, 
the discursive practices, both literary and visual, deployed by and surrounding the “cult of 
Elizabeth” clearly indicate the importance of beauty in Elizabeth’s (re)presentation. Roy Strong’s 
work on the cult of Elizabeth reveals how deliberately and skillfully images of Elizabeth were 
deployed in Tudor pageantry and portraiture to further political interests. Among several 
iconological references, the image of Elizabeth as beautiful Astraea symbolized constancy and 
changelessness; it also reflected Elizabeth’s personal motto Semper eadem. John Davies’ acrostic 
poem, “Hymnes of Astraea,” though it does not contain the word beauty and was written in 1599 
when Elizabeth was an aging sixty-three year old monarch, describes such constancy and 
timelessness. Elizabeth as the Virgin Queen in white-face makeup—Venetian ceruse made from 
poisonous white lead and vinegar!—was visually fashioned to evoke veneration and admiration. 
In the tradition of courtly poetry that circulated in the Elizabethan court, the Queen was also 
Venus, the goddess of beauty and later Cynthia/ Diana, the chaste moon goddess. Walter Raleigh 
and Edmund Spenser, whose poetry I discuss in Chapter 3, celebrated the Queen’s beauty. 
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Beauty was indeed ideological and political power, and a perceived lack of beauty signified a 
lack of power. It was therefore crucial that Elizabeth appeared to be beautiful at all times, in all 
her (re)presentations, even if it meant wearing poisonous cosmetics. 
Becoming Beautiful: Cosmetics or the Pursuit of Physical Beauty the Sinful Way 
The process of acquiring beauty (or beautification) or artificially created beauty occupies 
a dubious place in early modern England. Where, on the one hand, there are moral treatises and 
anti-cosmetic tracts that condemn artificial beauty as false and even sacrilegious, there are also 
plenty of manuals and handbooks that contain cosmetic recipes and methods to acquire beauty, 
all with an aim to improve oneself.  Talking about the “sociological effects of beauty and the 
economic process by which this pure, ephemeral spectacle was produced,” Veronique Nahoum-
Grappe, who has worked on the history and phenomenology of bodily identity, reminds us of 
how 
[t]here was a whole technology of beauty in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, mirrors (which in urban interiors grew larger and more numerous), 
cosmetics, and hairpieces were complemented by a variety of scientific and 
medical techniques, a wealth of objects and practices, and a major investment of 
time and effort. (96) 
 
These technologies were deployed in the construction and preservation of the human body and 
identity and coincided with the advancements in medicine, pharmacology, and anatomy.  
A good representative of this “technology of beauty” and the popularity of cosmetics is 
Thomas Jeamson’s 1665 Artificiall embellishments or arts best directions: How to Preserve 
Beauty or Procure it, an extensive manual that promotes the idea that beauty is something that 
needs to be attained for optimal functioning of the body. Jeamson details how beauty can be 
attained through elaborate recipes that cover every part of the body and every skin condition 
imaginable. In its discussion of certain maladies this work appears to be a medical manual, 
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which comes as no surprise since Jeamson had a doctor of medicine degree and was later on the 
roll of the Royal College of Physicians of London. This also points to the overlap between the 
domains of cosmetics and early modern medicine: as Edith Snook has shown, cosmetics or what 
she identifies as “beautifying physics,”4 was a part of the “medical culture of diagnosis and 
treatment shared by lay and licensed practitioners” (13). Examining the overlap between 
women’s cosmetics recipe manuscripts and men’s medical receipt collections, among other 
evidence, Snook convincingly argues that this category of knowledge shows how medicine was a 
part of a woman’s household activities and offered a domain where women could participate in 
caring for their health and experiment with medicines-cosmetics. Indeed, cosmetics were a part 
of (and also allowed women participation in) the rapid advancement of science and the 
understanding of human body and anatomy. 
 Cosmetics, therefore, helped attain not just beauty but also good health and physical 
well-being. Jeamson, in fact, describes the lack of beauty as a deformity, “a complicated misery” 
(sig. A3r), an infectious disease and a hag: 
Now to quit you Ladies from the loathsome embraces of this hideous Hagge, 
(which might there be so many Furies in Hell, would make a fourth) [deformity] I 
have published these Xosmeticks; so Beautifying, that those who use them shall 
Diana it in company. And with a radiant luster outshine their thick skind 
companions, as so many browner Nymphs. (sig. A4r) 
 
Jeamson’s solutions and recipes appear to accommodate differences in economic class, 
suggesting the use of inexpensive replacements for more costly ingredients. Along with recipes 
for beautification, Jeamson offers tips on basic hygiene as well: “Beauty is a nice and cleanly 
Dame, that loves to have the nose (though but the sink to convey filth from the braine) kept neat 
and handsome, as well as the other parts which are designed for more honorable uses” (140). 
                                                
4 Snook idenitfies “beautifying physics” as a category of knowledge and she adopts this term from the subtitle of 
Johann Wecker’s 1660 collections of cosmetic receipts, variously entitled Arts Masterpiece: Or the beautifying Part 
of Physick and Cosmeticks, or, The Beautifying Part of Physick. 
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Beauty aids social mobility, since bodies that “have not the stampt of Beauty” (sig. A4v) are not 
fit for human society. Women need beauty to become a part of human society. In addition to 
being a social guide for women, Jeamson offers women the possibility of becoming not only 
more than who they are (socially), but also a way of becoming more than what they are, i.e., 
more than merely human. For Jeamson the use of his cosmetic recipes and methods leads to this 
reward: “Ye have heard Ladies how to furnish your selves with a Beauty, so transcendent, that 
shall puzzle Rhetorick to studie Hyperbolies to express it by; so captivating, that none shall dare 
stile himself a Platonik; or at most, he onely whom your divine features shall make believe that 
ye are more than mortal” (175). Beauty can be created and these women could become someone 
else or at the least, a better version of themselves.  
This, in fact, is the very argument used by detractors of cosmetics and artificial beauty to 
condemn “beautification”—it is false and sacrilegious.5 Since humanity was created in the 
likeness of God, it followed that cosmetics and face painting alter the face of God (Grieco 561) 
and tempt men into unchristian, vulgar, and immoral behavior. These arguments against 
artificially created beauty clearly echo the puritanical argument against drama and play-acting. 
The title of Thomas Tuke’s 1616 A discourse against painting and tincturing of women Wherein 
the abominable sinnes of murther and poysoning, pride and ambition, adultery and witchcraft 
are set foorth & discouered reveals the various sinful connotations that cosmetic use could have 
(See Figure 5). 
                                                
5 See also, Phillip Stubbes’ often-reprinted The Anatomie of Abuses (1583, 1584, 1585, 1595). 
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Figure 5: Frontispiece to Thomas Tuke’s A discourse against painting and tincturing of women 
 
Under the image of the woman, continues the title Whereounto is added the Picture of a Picture, 
or, The Character of a Painted Woman, which underscores the censorious attitude toward 
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cosmetic users, “painted woman” or promiscuous women. In the text, Tuke widens his censure 
and uses the full force of scripture to warn against the dangers of cosmetic uses for both women 
and men. In particular, Tuke associates the use of cosmetics with the duplicity of Catholicism 
and Jesuits.  Citing the Bible extensively, as well as theologians such as Saint Augustine, Tuke 
equates cosmetic use with deceit and blasphemy; this ungodly exercise” defiles God’s “handy-
worke”: 
And dost thou thinke it lawfull for thee to make shewes of fauour and beauty, or 
of another complexion and temper, then thou art of, by they dawbing, painiting 
and borrowing, God and Nature, which is his Handmaid, hauing withheld beautie, 
or a louely complexion from thee? Vertue is one gift of God, and beautie is 
another: now as a man may not counterfeit vertue, being vicious so he maybe not 
counterfeit beautie, being destitute of it. … For were we thankfull to God, as 
indeed wee should be, would we loth and despise this worke vpon vs, and loue 
our owne? Would we not care how wee corrupt and mangle his with ours? If we 
were thankful to his for our complexions and fauour, how meane so euer, we 
would humble our selves before him, and not goe about to cozen the world with 
our borrowed feathers…. (13) 
 
The implication here is that any kind of fashioning of the physical body is an attempt at 
improving God’s work and is a symptom of a sacrilegious and ungrateful attitude toward God. 
Being (physical and otherwise) is predestined. In other words, whether or not one is gifted with 
beauty (or even virtue) is determined from birth; one should not attempt to change that and try to 
acquire beauty by other man-made methods. 
Tuke’s citation of the classical scholar, Thomas Farnaby (c. 1575 – 1647), underscores 
his arguments and also, perhaps unwittingly, reveals one of the reasons for the widespread 
circulation of cosmetics recipes:  
  Of face and haire-deceits. 
 They that leaue truth, do leaue the Lord 
 For God is truth, and all accord. 
But th’ natiue colour of face and haire, 
Is true and right, although not faire. 
But’s false and wrong, that’ died by art, 
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Worke of a lying, wanton hart. 
Then ‘tis a bad conclusion, 
  That followed this illusion.  
     (BV) 
 
The idea that the “native colour,” or the natural color of the face and hair is “not faire,” or that 
women and men in their natural state are not beautiful is one reason why people gravitated 
toward cosmetics for self improvement and betterment. It also suggests how ‘natural’ beauty 
itself evoked ambiguous responses. See for instance, Henry Peacham’s emblem Pulchritudo 
Faeminea (female beauty) from his emblem book Minerva Britanna: 
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Figure 6: Peacham's Pulchritudo Faeminea 
 
Even as Peacham tells us that the kind of “beautie most desir’d” is the beauty of the naked virgin 
woman that needs no art (i.e. natural beauty), the deadly effects of this kind of beauty are 
repeatedly highlighted: the dart in the emblem represents the wounds caused to the lovers who 
are moved by this beauty, the mirror warns against vanity and pride caused by this beauty, and 
the garland of lilies represents (in addition to chastity) the impermanence of this beauty and 
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transience, and the inevitable decay of the body. Peacham tells us that the dragon represents 
“loves poison”; in addition to being a symbol of all the dangers of natural beauty, such as vanity 
and pride, the dragon also represents sin, pride, vanity, and Satan.6 Natural beauty, just like 
artificially created beauty, has negative connotations. Artificial beauty is ungodly because it 
reflects discontent with and an attempt to improve upon what God gave us. But it would appear 
that what God gave us—natural beauty—is not godly or even entirely good because, it can lead 
to the worst kind of sin, and it is not perfect because it is transient.  
This idea of the transience of natural (God-given) beauty is echoed even a century later in 
Richard Allestree’s 1678 A discourse concerning the beauty of holiness. Allestree, a churchman, 
talks of the “beauty of holiness” which is a Laudian catchphrase defending church decoration 
and ceremony. But as Peter Lake has argued, “there was a distinctive Laudian concern for ‘the 
beauty of holiness’ with concomitant and equally distinctive notions of sacrilege and of the holy” 
(304). According to Allestree: “So long as man remained obedient to the Laws of his Maker, his 
holiness was untainted, and his Beauty and primitive congenitie comeliness continued; but by his 
woeful apostasy he lost that noble embellishment of his nature to all his other accomplishments, 
and is now become ugly and deformed” (sig. B4r). God-given beauty, what Allestree 
interestingly calls “noble embellishment,” is not perfect; it can alter into ugliness and is 
contingent on an individual’s devotion to religious (Christian) dictates such charity, compassion, 
and humilty. Both, ceremonial litugy and a kind of intangible and spiritual beauty are essential to 
                                                
6 For representations of the dragon as evil and Satanic, see Spenser deploy the image of the dragon in The Faerie 
Queene, Bk. I, Canto XI:8-10. Also see Milton’s description of Lucifer being transformed into a serpent in Paradise 
Lost:  
His visage drawn he felt to sharp and spare, 
His Arms clung to his Ribs, his Legs entwining 
Each other, till supplanted down he fell 
A monstrous Serpent on his Belly prone, 
Reluctant, but in vain, a greater power 
Now rul'd him, punisht in the shape he sinn'd. 
(Book X: 511-516) 
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the relationship between man and God, the human and the divine. This beauty gets tainted if man 
disregards religion. But if he follows the guidelines of religion dutifully, he can regain his lost 
spiritual beauty and thus establish a connection with the divine. This kind of beauty then defines 
the human-divine relationship and is something that can bring the human closer to the divine. A 
similar perspective on beauty as a condition for access to the divine is shared by John Collinges 
in his 1650 A lesson of self-deniall, or, the true way to desirable beauty, where he makes a strong 
case for the coterminous nature of beauty and grace; Collinges, an English Presbyterian 
theologian, advocates an entirely spiritual notion of the soul’s beauty that is a necessary 
condition for grace. Both Collinges and Allestree also use this idea of beauty as a kind of 
incentive or leverage alternately to encourage or to scare people to follow religious dictates. For 
both, beauty—whether visible or not—is nonetheless aspired toward because it is a promise for a 
futurity, a way to establish a connection with the divine, and it indicates an access to something 
more than and beyond the physical self. 
Being Beautiful and Neoplatonic beauty: Sensory Perception, Knowing, and 
Subjectivity 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, the idea of beauty as more than just the physical body 
is intrinsic to Neoplatonic thought, and one of its clearest articulations occurs in Castiglione’s 
courtesy book Il Libro del Cortegiano that further disseminated ideas on beauty through the 
prism of Christianized Neoplatonism. Book IV in particular discusses the soul’s ascent on the 
ladder of love to a divine and universal Beauty that is ignited first and foremost by the 
contemplation of physical, earthly beauty.   
Castiglione’s discussion of beauty is a part of his articulation of the ideal Courtier and 
comes at the point when Pietro Bembo (the author’s mouthpiece) is asked about whether the 
  36 
   
Courtier ought to be in love. Bembo replies that the human soul is divided into three parts: the 
senses, rational thought, and intellect; human beings have the power of choosing between the 
sensual appetite and the rational appetite and thus, they can desire beauty in either of these ways. 
The choice is between descending down to the sense or by ascending to the intellect. Bembo 
warns about sensual love saying that it is a debasement into senses and “if the soul allows itself 
to be guided by the judgment of sense, it falls into very grave errors, and judges that the body in 
which this beauty is seen is the chief cause thereof” (52). It is not so much that the senses are 
distrusted but that they are somewhat primitive and innocent, in need of guidance. Young men 
who do not have the advantage of seasoned reason let their judgments be guided by their senses. 
On the other hand, Bembo argues, older men can “come into perfect possession of beauty” 
because they are guided by rational choice (53). And because beauty is good, these men also 
come into the possession of good. 
Despite the use of the word “possession” this kind of beauty is not to be understood as 
sensual gratification or something that can physically be possessed. It is viewed thus only by a 
younger man who, upon its gratification, is left with no knowledge.7 It is the older man instigated 
by his senses first and foremost, who comes into a realization or knowledge of the mind’s 
potential when he experiences beauty: in his soul “the bridle of reason restrains the iniquity of 
the sense” (53). This man realizes that beauty cannot be contained in the corporeal and he 
bypasses emotions of anger, despair and “wrathful furors” and “by the force of his own 
imagination, makes her beauty much more beautiful than in reality it is” (66). Castiglione is 
asserting the importance of an aesthetic response—as sensory perception—to being the first step 
in the process of judgment. He emphasizes that the man “must reflect that…beauty can in no 
                                                
7 Castiglione has an interesting description of a bodily system that is similar to affective responses generated by a 
body—pores drying, bodily spirits being scattered but having no way out of the body and thus causing the souls to 
suffer painfully, “as children do when the teeth begin to come through tender gums”(66).  
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way be enjoyed, nor can the desire it arouses in our souls be satisfied through the sense of touch 
but solely through what has beauty for its true object, namely, the faculty of sight” (62). The 
ability to see and perceive is primary to the experience of beauty because the soul has to first 
receive this image of beauty and then this sensory perception is to be bypassed.  
For Castiglione, the mind progresses from considering a particular beauty to reasoning 
about the source of this beauty, and onward to universal beauty, “universal intellect,” and 
Goodness. The experience of beauty, then, becomes a moment of realizing how the mind can 
contemplate the highest beauty and highest good (and is thus self-reflexive). This moment of 
self-reflexivity where the mind can perceive itself thinking of Goodness is also a moment where 
the mind perceives itself as an aesthetic. Gradually, when the mind becomes one with the angelic 
nature, it “not only completely abandons the senses, but has no longer any need of reason’s 
discourse” (68). By turning “within himself, in order to contemplate that beauty which is seen by 
the eyes of the mind…[the soul] beholds divine beauty” but “it still does not yet enjoy that 
beauty perfectly, because it contemplates it in its own particular intellect merely, which is unable 
to comprehend vast universal beauty” (68). God then also appears to be the name given to that 
which the mind cannot fully access. For Castiglione, the contemplation of true, intelligible 
beauty leads beyond the senses to the contemplation of God but also to the realization that 
beauty’s source is immutable and inaccessible. Beauty, then, paves the way for observing 
ourselves engaged in the process of thought and aspiring toward knowledge, especially 
knowledge of what cannot be fully be thought of and accessed.8  
                                                
8 Here, I see Castiglione’s conception of love and beauty intersect with Immanuel Kant’s discussion of “the ideal of 
beauty” and his ideas on sensory and contemplative pleasure as laid out in his theorization of beauty in The Critique 
of Judgment (1790). See Appendix B for a discussion of this work.  
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Like Castiglione, several other early modern writers were deeply influenced by 
Neoplatonic ideas of beauty, even if they had different ways of articulating the centrality of 
beauty in the process of becoming an idealized self. To understand how beauty is intrinsic to a 
notion of ‘something’ beyond the physical self that cannot fully be accessed but nonetheless 
defines us as human beings, we need to turn to one of the most thorough examinations of beauty 
in the early modern period—Agnolo Firenzuola’s 1548 On the Beauty of Women, a work that 
belongs to the defense of women genre. It is a treatise that Elizabeth Cropper rightly contends “is 
probably the most complete exposition of the beauty of the ideal woman among the multitude of 
sixteenth-century treatments of the theme” (374). The First Dialogue takes place in a garden 
where Firenzuola’s mouthpiece, Celso, draws on Neoplatonic theory to define beauty in women 
and talks mostly about universal and divinely created beauty: 
[B]eauty and beautiful women, and beautiful women and beauty are worthy of praise and 
of everyone’s esteem. For a beautiful woman is the most beautiful object one can admire, 
and beauty is the greatest gift God bestowed in His human creatures. And so, through her 
virtue we direct our souls to contemplation, and through contemplation to the desire for 
heavenly things. (10-11) 
In defining beauty as having a formative impact on the human-divine relationship, the 
Neoplatonist Firenzuola is one of many who appear to be a precursor to seventeenth century 
theologians and churchmen such as Allestree and Collinges. Like them, Firenzuola begins by 
discussing more intangible aspects of beauty, more specifically, of a beautiful woman: “we will 
see what elegance (leggiadria) consists of, what is charm (vaghezza), what we mean by grace 
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(grazia) or by loveliness (venusta), what it is to have an air about you (aria) or not to have it, 
what is that quality which people call majesty (maesta) in you women” (13).9  
Additionally, Firenzuola advocates that the concept of beauty in different things is relative. 
We cannot say that certain physical attributes would be universally beautiful in everything. For 
instance, while a hairy woman would be deemed ugly, a horse without hair would appear to be 
deformed, and while a hump in a camel is “a thing of grace, for a woman, [it would be] a 
misfortune” (14). Thus, beauty above all, according to Firenzuola, is “a concord and union of 
diverse things” (14). 
A harmonious union of diverse things—such as the parts of a human body that come together 
and function perfectly and thus contribute to being—is also an aspect of beauty. While 
describing the “beauty of individual parts and their perfection,” Firenzuola suggests that “it is in 
these parts, as I mentioned before, that God has placed, with wonderful order, the preservation of 
the entire composition, for each part helps the other parts, and each part uses the strengths of the 
other parts” (21). Firenzuola proceeds to describe through diagrams why proportional parts of the 
body are beautiful. Upright carriage, “that is the shape of the entire person” is a thing of beauty 
because it separates us from animals and enables us to turn our gaze to the heavens and think 
about God. In terms of proportion, a beautiful carriage is something that can be contained in a 
square with arms and legs outstretched (22):10  
                                                
9 This idea of the interconnectedness of beauty (bellezza) and grace (grazia) also appears in other works such as in 
Benedetto Varchi’s Lezione sull’ Amore (1540) and Leone Ebreo’s  Dialoghi d’amore (1535). 
10 This is no doubt an echo of Leonardo da Vinci’s idea of proportion set forth in his Vitruvian Man (c. 1487) which 
in turn was inspired by the geometrical proportion of the human body set forth in De Architectura by Roman 
architect and writer Vitruvius (c.70 BC-15 BC). 
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Figure 7: Firenzuola’s diagram of the proportional body contained in a square 
Source: Internet Archive. < http://archive.org/> 
 
The reason why this upright, proportional carriage is beautiful is not only because it 
identifies human beings as different from animals—and consequently helps define our 
selfhood—but also because it enables an aspiration toward God and goodness. In a sense, the 
upright carriage is a way that human beings establish a relationship with the divine other who 
cannot be seen and reached, but can be aspired toward. In other words, a beautiful carriage 
serves a purpose: it helps define being and facilitates an aspiration toward becoming 
something more. Firenzuola is also concerned with the utility of other physical features: for 
instance, the mouth is used to speak and to send nourishment to the body and that is why it is 
beautiful. It enables communication and therefore relation, and enables sustenance. In 
addition to describing how a nose should appear, Firenzuola also highlights the functions of 
the nose that make it a part of a beautiful body: “breathing, smelling, and purging the brain 
through its little cavities” (28). Like the mouth, the nose serves a function that enables being 
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and living. The overarching idea here is that beauty is the proper functioning of the human 
body. Beauty enables physical being and also intimates us into an awareness of the divine 
other.  
Beauty, Being, and Otherness in Philosophy 
One of the most important issues that emerges from Firenzuola’s discussion of various parts 
of beauty is that the ideal beautiful woman does not exist: “rarely, in fact hardly ever, do all 
parts that compose perfect and balanced beauty reside in one single woman”(13). 
Nonetheless in the Second Dialogue, which takes place at the house of Mona Lampiada (on 
of the ladies participating in the dialogue), Firenzuola and the ladies attempt to put together a 
description of their imaginary woman. They talk about the various parts of the body and 
colors that accompany a beautiful body, and they all pick and select features from women 
they know to form a composite, one that does not and cannot exist. As Konrad Eisenbichler 
and Jacqueline Murray contend: 
From an intellectual consideration of conventional standards of beauty and 
proportion, the dialogue thus moves to the practical sphere of artistic creation. 
That is, it moves from a conceptualization of ideal beauty to the actualization of 
such beauty in a specific beautiful woman. Ironically, as the participants in the 
discussion move from the theoretical to the practical, they realize that the product 
of their creative process, the beautiful woman par excellence, is a chimera, a 
reality that exists only in the creative imagination, an Idea. (Introduction xx) 
 
While beauty can exist in parts of different men and women, animals and objects, ideal 
beauty that is perfect and whole—and thus also, pace Peacham’s “Pulchritudo Faeminea” 
emblem, not transient or prone to corruption—can exist only in the imagination of the artist. 
Ideal beauty, toward which one perpetually aspires and which defines the self (physical and 
otherwise), is that which cannot be.  
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Even if beauty in a human body is not a perfect combination of all of Firenzuola’s listed 
features and intangible attributes, it is nonetheless has positive connotations because it leads 
people to experience a kind of otherness outside themselves--what Firenzuola calls “a 
foretaste of heavenly things” (11). Firenzuola describes the response to beauty thus: 
One sees man forget himself for her [beautiful woman], and, looking at a face 
adorned with this heavenly grace, his limbs shudder, his hair curls, he sweats and 
shivers at the same time, not unlike one who, unexpectedly seeing something 
divine, is possessed by divine frenzy, and when he is finally himself again, adores 
it with his thoughts and reveres it with his mind, and recognizing it as something 
like a god, gives himself to it as a sacrificial victim on the altar of the beautiful 
woman’s heart. (11)  
 
This idea that an encounter with beauty somehow corresponds to “unexpectedly seeing 
something divine” is crucial and I further elaborate on the correspondence between the responses 
to beauty and the religious or quasi-religious later in Chapters 2 and 3. The bottom line for 
Firenzuola is that an encounter with beauty demands a submitting of or giving over of the self to 
this experience. Despite the attacks on beauty in the early modern period, most philosophers, 
artists and writers, viewed an encounter with beauty in similar terms—it led to a forgetting of 
oneself, no matter how fleetingly. This momentary decentering of the self in the presence of 
beauty—when man is not himself, Firenzuola tells us—is likened to the experience of 
“something like a god,” something that is beyond the self, something other. Even a brief 
encounter with this otherness results in a ceding of the self.  
The theologian Edward Farley writes about how beauty “draws the human being out of 
its immanence into self-transcendence” (51), and he rightly points out that ancient texts did not 
have an explicit term for human self-transcendence.11 The response that Firenzuola describes 
where man “gives himself to” beauty comes close to the meaning of the term self-transcendence 
                                                
11 According to the OED the earliest recorded use of the term “self-transcendence” is in 1885.  
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and it alludes to the way of an ethical engagement with a kind of otherness.  To frame these 
issues of otherness, I later look at Emmanuel Levinas for whom self-transcendence and the 
ethical are intimately linked. The question at the crux of even the more basic idea of ethics and 
human relationships is how the self relates to the other.  In an early modern context, an encounter 
with beauty necessarily brings forth the issues at stake in the ethical relationship between the self 
and the other because an encounter with beauty, following Firenzuola and others, leads to a kind 
an experience of self-transcendence. Additionally, beauty is so intertwined with notions of the 
divine other—both as something that can enable access to God and also as something that can 
possibly lead away from godliness—that any examination of beauty in the early modern period 
becomes perforce an examination of the theological nature of otherness.  
As we have seen thus far, beauty, regardless of how differently it is perceived—as a pre-
requisite for being a part of human society (Jeamson) and social mobility, as something that 
renders us human (upright carriage), as something we lack and therefore have to acquire, as 
something we are born with but is contingent on religious confirmation (Allestree), as something 
that defines and is found in our relationship with God (Collinges), as something that we should 
not acquire because that would be sacrilegious (Tuke)—informs notions of identity and also the 
self. Beauty, then, is a way early modern culture engaged in its own process of being. To clarify, 
here I use the word “being” and not self-fashioning or identity deliberately because beauty is not 
just about looking beautiful through cosmetic use or becoming beautiful by upward social 
mobility, or by conforming to religious practices or performing virtuous deeds; for early modern 
culture, beauty is also about being, or the question of what is. 
However vaguely defined, beauty is a condition of being that informs the very nature of 
human relationships and, to use Farley’s words, “nothing can ‘be’ without being, in some sense 
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and to some degree, beautiful” (17). Farley contends, “Beauty comes with being itself” and 
cogently explains the resistance to concepts of being and beauty: 
Like beauty, being is also out of favor. I use the term ‘being’ as a kind of code 
word for any referent of thinking that is not a specific object, accidental trait, or 
statistical generalization. To discern human beings not just as amalgams of 
objective features (such as hair color, weight and food preferences) but in their 
distinctive temporality is to address their very ‘being’. Again, I must acknowledge 
that some twentieth-century philosophies eschew ‘being’ as a usable or 
meaningful term because they identify it with ancient, or at least premodern (and 
therefore discredited), cosmologies and metaphysics. (16) 
 
Following philosopher and ethicist Władysław Tatarkiewicz’ influential 1972 article, “The Great 
Theory of Beauty and its Decline” published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
Farley examines Olympian cosmogonies, Pythagoras, Platonic tradition and the Christian Middle 
Ages (St. Augustine, Duns Scotus Erigena, Thomas Aquinas, to name a few), to show how it is 
impossible to isolate beauty from the ‘thinking of being.’ He also explores philosophical 
traditions on beauty and being extensively all the way up to Alfred Whitehead (1861-1947) to 
delineate beauty’s relationship with knowledge and experience—a theme I discuss in Chapter 2. 
Farley’s research indicates that beauty traverses both the material (and physical) and the non-
material or other aspects of being and culture. My focus in the rest of the dissertation is 
predominantly on the relationship between beauty and these other aspects of being. 
 To conclude this chapter, while beauty is defined and described in different and opposing 
ways in the early modern period, its importance to the cultural and literary imagination of the 
people cannot be denied. Beauty—as being, as a process of becoming, and as a relation to 
otherness—was a crucial idea for the early moderns. Engagements with beauty, however fleeting 
and often overlooked, are critical moments that offer intimations of otherness. As Veronique 
Nahoum-Grappe contends: 
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Beauty was defined in circular fashion: beauty is that which pleases, that which 
pleases is beauty. Dictionaries old and new repeated this empty definition. At the 
center of the circle was the exclamation of amazement, the breathless “Oh!” of 
immediate and overwhelming perception. … Beauty is a unique social spectacle. 
Aesthetic perception, which occurs in an instant, is its natural terrain. During the 
moment of perception everything remains in suspense. The more perfect the 
beauty, the more unreal it is. It can exist fully only in a caesura in time, in 
memory or retrospective narrative. The context in which beauty manifests itself is 
precarious and unreal. (96-7) 
 
Nahoum-Grappe underscores the elusiveness of, and the complexity of an engagement with, 
beauty. The visuality of beauty, as “spectacle” and “perception,” leads to a momentary 
suspension of time for the onlooker, a theme I develop more fully in my next chapter. As elusive 
as beauty might be, it is the “breathless “Oh!” of immediate and overwhelming perception” of 
beauty and the ensuing reflection that, I hope to show, is the moment and space of an 
engagement with an otherness beyond the self. 
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Chapter 2  
“O, beauty, till now I never knew thee!”: The Call of Beauty 
and Other Ethical Experiences in All is True  
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the call of beauty and explore what it is about the nature and 
experience of beauty that necessarily demands a response from the perceiver in Shakespeare’s 
Henry VIII or All is True.1 The first moment I analyze occurs at Wolsey’s banquet at the end of 
act 1 when Henry sees the striking Anne for the first time;2 the second, a later moment in 
dramaturgical time, is at the end of act 2 when Henry declares the “tenderness, scruple, and 
prick” of conscience that has led him to divorce Katharine. The immediate reaction of characters 
in the play and by most audiences is to perceive these two scenes as opposed to each other in 
what they present. When Henry sees Anne for the first time and declares her beauty, the common 
critical reaction is to perceive this moment at Wolsey’s banquet as one of pure lust. Anne, after 
all, was known to be a very attractive woman who just a few lines earlier had caught the amorous 
attentions of Lord Sandys (1.4.24-30). It only seems obvious to read this moment as, according 
to Wolsey’s description of Henry, “a little heated” (1.4.103). This moment, then, seems to stand 
at odds with the critical moment at Blackfriars later in the play where Henry is trying to 
legitimize his divorce after Katharine’s trial. In light of Henry’s seemingly lust-driven attraction 
for Anne in the first moment, his revelation of the great agonies of conscience in the second 
moment appears to be a sheer political ruse staged for his entire council at Blackfriars.3  Ali 
                                                
1 John Fletcher, who succeeded Shakespeare as chief playwright for the king’s Men, collaborated with Shakespeare 
on this play. Henry VIII is included in the First Folio. 
2 On the visual impact of Anne, see David Bevington’s Introduction to the play: “All the characters in the play, 
whether they stand to profit or lose by Anne’s marriage, speak admiringly of her beauty and honor. Although her 
speeches are few, her appearances are sumptuously staged, with Anne at the center of a meaningful pageant” (921). 
3 Even as Henry appears to be battling his conscience, his choice of this location is strategic:  
The most convenient place that I can think of   
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Shehzad Zaidi points out, “Coming immediately after Henry’s meeting with Anne, Henry 
appears prompted less by conscience than by a need to change bedfellows.... We cannot but feel 
that Henry’s pleasure contradicts the will of heaven” (334, 340).4 Simply put, Henry’s attempt to 
justify his divorce is often read as a public masquerade to cover his lust for Anne. Consequently, 
the audience’s belief in one moment appears to falsify the claims of the other.  
       However, Elaine Scarry and Alexander Nehamas’ philosophical work on beauty helps us 
understand that Henry's response to Anne's beauty—despite all our intuitive and impressionistic 
responses—is not pure lust, but “ethical” in a Levinasian sense; somewhat counterintutively, I 
will argue it is not all that different from his response at Blackfriars to his “conscience.” Rather 
than seeing these two moments as opposed, I argue that they are meant to comment on one 
another in that the “call” of Anne’s beauty corroborates the notion that Henry’s prick of 
conscience is legitimate and not just a cover for his lust. These moments then can be understood 
as placing an ethical call on Henry and on the audience to respond to the ethical demand of—to 
use it with the implication given to the term by Levinas—the Other.5  
My formulation of the call of beauty is derived from Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just 
(1999) and Nehamas’ Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art 
(2008). Nehamas describes beauty as “a call to look attentively at the world and see how little we 
                                                                                                                                                       
For such receipt of learning [the divorce] is Blackfriars. 
There ye shall meet about this weighty business. 
My Wolsey, see it furnished.  O my lord,  
Would it not grieve an able man to leave  
So sweet a bedfellow? But conscience, conscience! 
Oh, ‘tis a tender place, and I must leave her. (2.2.137-43) 
The Blackfriars were Dominican monasteries that had been taken over by Henry. This space is thus a reminder of 
the schism between the Church of England and the Roman Church. 
4 Zaidi examines the self-contradiction in characters in Henry VIII and reads the frustrated searches for meaning and 
knowledge in the play as resulting in a “spiritual void” that nonetheless affirms the power of kingship. Interestingly, 
he points out that the word “conscience” is used more frequently here than in any other Shakespearean play and also 
that this play contains the most number of false oaths. 
5 In Levinasian thought the other is distinct from the capitalized Other. In the original French, Levinas uses two 
terms: autre (the common usage of the word other) and autrui (which is the capitalized Other). Hereafter, I follow 
Levinas’ usage and capitalize when I refer to the specific philosophical notion of the Other. 
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see” (131). For Nehamas, beauty is a promise for a future unknown and uncertain: “Beauty 
always remains a bit of a mystery, forever a step beyond anything I can say about it, more like 
something calling me without showing exactly what it is calling me to” (78). For Scarry, too, 
beauty is a “call,” “directing our attention toward, what is absent”  (109), but she goes a step 
further in arguing that beauty makes us pause and actually causes a radical “decentering” of the 
self: “we willingly cede our ground to the thing that stands before us” (111). While analyzing 
how beauty figures in perception and ethics, Scarry suggests that this “experience of Beauty” 
inspires in people “the aspiration to political, social, and economic equality” partly because 
beauty is a “compact” or “contract” (90). I am not suggesting a direct parity between beauty—in 
this case, Anne’s beauty—and goodness or justice.  I contend that this moment, when Henry 
experiences beauty, directs out attention to several other possibilities of reinterpreting the play, 
and provokes us to reconsider the notion of ethics as it broadly understood; this moment then 
becomes, to rephrase Nehamas’ description of beauty, a call to see how little we really can see. 
When Henry meets Anne, his disguise as a masquer is that of a shepherd. The moment 
that he sees Anne and approaches her, he declares, “The fairest hand I ever touched! O beauty, / 
Till now I never knew thee!” (1.4.76-7).  Henry comes to know of Anne’s beauty simultaneously 
as he touches her: this is the coming into the knowledge of the aesthetic experience of beauty. 
This encounter with beauty is a striking moment that does not paralyze Henry; rather, it activates 
a realization of something beyond Anne’s singular beauty.  As Scarry points out:  
Something beautiful fills the mind yet invites the search for something beyond 
itself, something larger or something of the same scale with which it needs to be 
brought into relation. Beauty, according its critics, causes us to gape and suspend 
all thought … But simultaneously what is beautiful prompts the mind to move 
chronologically back in the search for precedents and parallels, to move forward 
into new acts of creation, to move conceptually over, to bring things into relation, 
and does all this with a kind of urgency as though one’s life depended on it. (29-
30) 
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 For Henry, Anne’s beauty is unparalleled and he has never seen and ‘known’ such fairness and 
beauty. The unprecedented nature of Anne’s beauty calls on Henry’s attention not just for itself 
but to something beyond its particularity and beyond his self. As I explain later, this experience 
of beauty instigates the response that sets the foundation of an entire history in motion leading up 
to the ascension of James I. 
   This instant is fleeting. This sudden revelation of beauty, much like the later “prick” of 
conscience, comes accompanied with a moment of tactile experience, an embodied response. 
Henry sees, touches, realizes, and declares almost all at the same time; it is an instant synesthetic 
response in the presence of beauty. It is as Scarry describes, “A visual event may reproduce itself 
in the realm of touch...This crisscrossing of the senses may happen in any direction ... So, too, an 
act of touch may reproduce itself as an acoustical event or even an abstract idea, the way 
whenever Augustine touches something smooth, he begins to think of music and of God” (4). 
Music plays, Henry and Anne dance, and Henry is then unmasked by Wolsey and revealed to be 
king. It is then that Henry gives into desire for her and kisses her.  
Within the scheme of the play, this meeting of Henry and Anne is crucial. Whatever 
sexual provocation Shakespeare uses to engage his audience, the union of Henry and Anne must 
be more than sexual. Their newborn daughter’s reign is going to herald a new order for the 
nation and the world. To use Scarry’s words about an encounter with beauty, “[it] move[s] 
forward into new acts of creation” (30). Everything in the play leads up to the birth of Elizabeth 
at the end and Henry’s encounter with Anne’s beauty is crucial for the future of England. As 
Scarry contends, “The beautiful thing seems—is—incomparable, unprecedented; and that sense 
of being without precedent conveys a sense of the “newness” or “newborness” of the entire 
world” (22). It is this possibility of the “entire world”—yet unknown to Henry—that he opens 
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himself up to in responding to the call of beauty. In doing so, as I elaborate next, Henry is also 
opening himself to what Levinas would understand as the ethical call of the Other. 
The Prick of Conscience and the Other 
 I read Nehamas’ description of beauty “as the emblem of what we lack” (76) and 
Scarry’s call for a philosophical attention to beauty as an engagement with Levinas’ conception 
of the ethical. Levinas, in Totality and Infinity: A Essay on Exteriority (1969), explains the 
ethical as the “calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other. The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is 
precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics” (43).6 When 
Levinas talks about “ethics,” he is not talking about what we would normally understand as 
ethics, the study of right and wrong. Levinas is primarily interested in ontology, the study of 
Being or what is. He is particularly fascinated by the thought of an “Other” that cannot be known 
or identified, but that nonetheless “grounds” Being. Levinas describes ethics as the “first 
philosophy,” one that precedes ontology or epistemology because it is the (non)ground on which 
any notion of the self, the subject or the Same is constructed (“Ethics” 76). There must be a 
“totality” of Being and something “Other” than Being. Levinas seeks to address that Otherness 
by reference to our responsiveness to others, our ethics. But, again, this responsiveness is not a 
predetermined sense that we must do right by other people; that understanding presupposes a self 
that could choose to do the right thing or not. Rather, for Levinas, the ethical encounter with the 
Other, with alterity, is what constitutes the subject or the self.7 “The ethical,” then, for Levinas, is 
                                                
6 For a concise explanation of the ethical and the Other, and for the interest in Levinas and Derrida in early modern 
studies, see Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti’s “The Turn to Religion in Early Modern English Studies” 
(especially 176-79). 
7 The terms alterity, exteriority, separateness, strangeness, irreducibility and transcendence of the Other are more or 
less synonymous in this philosophical framework. It is worth repeating that in Levinasian thought the other is 
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the responsibility of the self to this Other; it is the desire for a nonviolent engagement between 
the self and the Other.  
 This philosophical paradigm of Levinasian ethics, and the corresponding call of beauty 
and Henry’s response of openness to beauty’s otherness in the play, help us better understand the 
second moment when an ethical demand from the Levinasian Other is placed on Henry— the 
“prick” of conscience that Henry experiences and his attempt to “rectify” his conscience. 8 In act 
2, at Blackfriars, Henry reveals why and how he came about to believe that his union with 
Katharine, his deceased brother’s widow, is unlawful. Henry says that the first time he ever 
doubted this marriage—the moment his “conscience first received a tenderness, / scruple, and 
prick” (2.4.168-69)—was when the Bishop asked him if his daughter was legitimate. Through 
faulty reasoning Henry comes to the conclusion that since Katharine gave birth to children who 
either died or were female then surely this was a sign that their union was not legitimate. Henry 
responds to the realization of his illegitimate marriage as if it shook the very center of his being: 
     This respite shook  
The bosom of my conscience, entered me, 
Yea, with a spitting power, and made to tremble 
The region of my breast, which forced such way 
That many mazed considerings did throng 
And pressed in with this caution. (2.4.179-84) 
 
His reaction is in the form of an affective, embodied response first and foremost, just as it was 
when he encountered the call of beauty. It is as if he is physically moved. The word “spitting” 
means “piercing” and the suggestion seems to be that this “respite,” this act of looking back, 
                                                                                                                                                       
distinct from the Other—l’Autre or its personalized form Autrui. The Other, and this is important, can never be 
incorporated into the Same. It is singular and unique.  
8 On the significance of conscience, see Walter Cohen who contends: 
The notion of conscience, which is far more prominent here than in Holinshed’s Chronicles and 
which Protestants used against the papacy to repudiate blind adherence to any human doctrinal 
authority, is deployed by the playwrights to judge Catholics and Protestants alike. This 
impartiality may be more the work of Shakespeare than of Fletcher; in any case, the overall result 
is the characteristic national reconciliation of Shakespeare’s history plays. (1389) 
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entered his heart by cutting it open. This respite lodged itself in his heart and gave rise to 
conflicting and confusing thoughts, and this is how he was alerted to the situation. In his 
annotations, R.A. Foakes suggests that the meaning of the word “spitting” is also “transfixed” 
(86). Taking this into account, this moment of cutting open can also be understood as a moment 
that gripped or struck Henry with awe. This prick of conscience made a cut in his heart that 
caused him to physically tremble with the awareness of something—an Otherness—beyond him. 
 But in order to consider this interpretation we need to suspend our critical knowingness, 
our sense that we have access to the most base sexual motives of the King. We must consider 
that all the motives presented by Shakespeare are legitimate. We must consider, in short, that all 
may be true. Or, to look at this another way, we must also consider that Henry’s response to 
Anne—while hurtful to Katharine and our sense of marital fidelity or companionate marriage— 
might be what is necessary. 
Tellingly, this Levinasian call of Otherness embodied in Henry’s response to Anne’s 
beauty puts Henry at odds with normal everyday ethics. His response to Anne, of course, results 
in marital infidelity. In short, in responding to the “Otherness” of beauty he is compromising the 
more tangible other, Katharine. Levinas, following Søren Kirkegaard, frequently turns to the 
story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22 to explicate this tension, the way in which the call of 
the absolute “Other” might contradict the demands of the immediate other. 
 In Genesis 22 Abraham is commanded by God to sacrifice his only son, Isaac, on Mount 
Moriah. Abraham sets out to perform this deed without questioning God’s command and without 
telling anyone else about it. Kierkegaard has famously used this Biblical narrative to expound his 
notion of faithfulness and absolute duty to God, in Fear and Trembling.  In setting out to kill his 
own son, Abraham is in clear violation of all moral codes and everyday ethics. But in doing so, 
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he is also responding to the otherness of God with absolute faith and submission. His actions are 
thus religious even though they are a violation of communal ethics and morality. Abraham’s 
breaking with normal, everyday ethics, for Kirkegaard, actually marks his encounter with the 
absolute Other.  
This is not to say that Abraham is unethical. An unethical act is circumscribed within our 
normal, everyday understanding of ethics, if only by negation. Abraham’s break with ethics is 
total, complete, and points to something even beyond ethics. This, again, is what Levinas often 
refers to as “the ethical”. The unseen presence of the Other calls on Henry to respond not to the 
particularities of Katharine’s situation but to this even greater responsibility. This responsibility 
is to affirm openness to the possibility of the unknown, which in the play, as I mentioned earlier, 
is the event of Elizabeth’s birth that is yet unknown to Henry. We already know that this moment 
has to occur if Elizabeth I is to be born and if history is to be validated.  
       This moment, then, is similar to the earlier moment in the play when Henry is playing 
the role of the shepherd when he meets Anne. Here too, Henry is performing himself at this 
moment in theatrical time (in act 2, scene 4) as he reveals and describes the moment when he 
first doubted that his marriage to Katharine was illegitimate. He addresses his audience (his court 
and the audience of the play) thus: “I will be bold with time and your attention; / Then mark th’ 
inducement” (2.4.166-67). His performance is itself already placing a call on the attention of the 
audience. This moment that he is performing has already occurred, but not within the space of 
dramaturgical time. It then also inhabits an impossible instant, much like, as I explain, the 
revelation of beauty Henry has experienced. The temporal placement or rather the atemporal 
placement of this moment is important. I suggest that the playwrights deliberately complicate the 
audience’s understanding of time at this moment, asking them to reconsider which came first—
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the call of beauty or the call of conscience—and what the relationship between the two moments 
is. Is Henry merely putting on a performance where he appears to be fraught by the agonies of 
his conscience while in fact he made his decision the moment he came into Anne’s presence? Or 
does the call of beauty lead to the call of conscience or does the call of the conscience open him 
up to the Otherness facilitated by beauty? When Chamberlain is asked about the cause of the 
King’s “sad thoughts and troubles,” he replies, “It seems the marriage with his brother’s wife / 
Has crept too near his conscience” (2.2.16-7). To this Suffolk adds, “No, his conscience / Has 
crept too near another lady” (2.2.18-9). Even though audiences take Henry’s lust to be the more 
probable cause, such conjecturing is implicitly annulled because when Henry says that he will be 
“bold with time,” he is demanding that the rules and constraints of time be rendered void. In 
other words, he is placing this performance of the call on his conscience in the realm of the 
timeless. His audience cannot argue about the timing of this moment—whether it occurred 
before or after the call of beauty— because it is located in temporal groundlessness, an 
impossible instant. 
       Henry even challenges the court and the audience, “Prove but our marriage lawful” and 
he will live with Katharine as his queen forever (2.4.222). Coming at the end of his speech that 
has placed a call on his listeners to believe in what he is saying, this very statement carries within 
it an injunction. Even though Henry appears to be violating his lawful marriage, the audience is 
called on to believe that “all is true,” that it is in fact to a paradoxical demand to which Henry is 
submitting. He may be violating the marital contract; that is true. But it is also true that he is 
called to do so by something other than pure lust. This is in a sense the law of the Other, like 
God in Abraham’s story the “law” as other makes little sense—it is Other. It is important to 
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remember here that the “Other is not another self, but is constituted by alterity” (Davis 31).9      
 Paradoxically, in opening himself up to the possibility created by the demand of the 
Other, Henry is really foreclosing the possibility of any negation of his divorce. Any attempt to 
interrogate, rationalize or even understand Henry’s performance will be futile. The only response 
to this is can be openness to the Other: as Henry says, “The sharp thorny points / Of my alleged 
reasons, drives this forward” (222-23). This throws light on the paradoxical nature of the 
Levinasian Other. How can that which is incapable of being seen or heard or touched, be 
articulated? It has no form, cannot be rendered visible and is outside our understanding of time 
and space. The moment an attempt is made to render this visible even if to negate it, it ceases to 
be the Other and becomes a version of the Same. How, then, is it possible to talk about and 
approach the Other? Here, I am following Jacques Derrida’s critique of Levinas where he 
contends that this formulation of the Other is inescapably in the language of the Same.10  In other 
words, speaking of the Other or even calling it transcendent is doing violence to it because we 
are thinking of it in terms of the Same, or what we already know. The aporia between the self 
and the other emerges from this impossible demand of the other—impossible, because even as 
the Other demands a response and engagement, the alterity of the other cannot be realized. We 
can only respect this aporia and respond with openness to the impossibility of ever knowing the 
Other.  
All is True: Veracity and Vision 
                                                
9 In Levinasian thought the “other” is distinct from the “Other”—l’Autre or its personalized form Autrui. The Other, 
and this is important, can never be incorporated into the Same. 
10 For a critique and deconstructive reading of Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, see Jacques Derrida’s 1967 “Violence 
and Metaphysics.” Levinas’ subsequent Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence responds to Derrida and uses 
different terminology to explicate the meaning of the subject and his notion of transcendence. Nonetheless, the 
issues raised by Derrida persist. For a concise overview of Derrida’s and Levinas’ responses to each other on the 
topic of ethics and Otherness, see Colin Davis’ Levinas: An Introduction. 
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The Prologue gives instructions to the audience: “think ye see / The very persons of our 
noble story / As they were living.” The playing out of this history is to be experienced as if in the 
present tense. Indeed, this is Shakespeare’s only history play that is actually set in early modern 
England, so close to Shakespeare’s own time. Douglas Bruster and Robert Weinmann describe 
the Prologue in the play as “an index of representational meaning, a breviary of ‘things now / 
That wear a weighty and serious brow’ (1-2) [….] it is appropriately consigned the task of 
(re)presenting what in ‘truth’ is rendered in the play” (115). The Prologue posits the possibility 
of access to “truth”:  
Such as give 
Their money out of hope they may believe,  
May here find truth too…. 
 …………………………………………….. 
For, gentle hearers, know 
 To rank our chosen truth which such a show [merry, bawdy plays] 
 As fool and fight is, beside forfeiting  
Our own brains and the opinions that we bring 
To make that only true we now intend, 
Will leave us never an understanding friend.  
(7-22 italics mine) 
 
The use of “our chosen truth” seems to legitimize the ensuing performance and attests to the 
veracity of this version of history.11  
Here, it is relevant to consider that the alternate and original title of Henry VIII proclaims 
All is True. I suggest, quite simply, that this is to be taken literally and that everything presented 
in the play is to be believed as true. The title carries in itself an injunction to its audience to 
believe the veracity of what they witness.12 In particular, the claim that “All is True” reminds an 
                                                
11 The phrase “chosen truth” is laden and has almost Biblical overtones. It is reminder perhaps that the chosen, 
authorized edition of the Bible—the Bible of the Church of England (King James Bible)—has been published, and 
also possibly harks back to the fact that the play is about a king under whose reign the first authorized edition of the 
Bible was published (the Great Bible based on Tyndale’s translation, also called Cromwell’s Bible).  
12 In addition to claims of truth, the Prologue, reinforcing the original title, also contains repeated emphasis on 
seeing and sight (“noble scenes as draw the eye to flow”) in relation to access to this chosen truth, whatever it might 
be. And indeed, the play has spectacular “masquelike stage effects in the opulent manner of court entertainment” 
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audience to accept contradictions as such. That is, the seeming contradiction of Henry’s 
conscience versus his lust is not a matter to be adjudicated by an audience but one that should be 
accepted as “true.” Here I am responding in part to Anston Bosman’s prediction that the 
restoration of the alternative title of the play by the editors of Oxford Shakespeare in 1986, 
promises to “inspire anew the play’s critical tradition” (459). Critical scholarship on the play had 
previously argued mostly over the authorship and genre question. While I am not arguing over 
the authorship question,13 I want to address the issue of genre in suggesting that we perceive the 
play differently: as belonging to a type that can be seen as contiguous if not an entirely different 
genre—the religious play.14  In this I would like to distance myself from Howard Felperin who 
has discussed the play as “a Christian history play” (231) since his characterization conflates the 
religious with doctrinal associations and consequently elides other possibilities of the religious. 
Of course, matters of religion and history are important in the play. This is the only play of 
Shakespeare that deals with the reign of a monarch who changed Christendom by installing the 
Anglican Church and incorporates, most agree, a distinctly Christian vision. I am arguing, 
however, for the presence of the religious sans doctrine, as a philosophical aporia—an aesthetic 
experience that is both within and beyond phenomenal world—that the playwright confronts 
                                                                                                                                                       
from the masque at Wolsey’s banquet to Katharine’s elaborate vision and her “pageantlike trial” (Bevington 920) to 
the coronation of Anne and the baptism of Elizabeth. This play has more stage directions that any other 
Shakespearean play. These are reminders of Tudor pageantry and stage/statecraft. The scenes move like tableaus 
even at the risk of seeming episodic. Even the characters themselves are actively engaged in their own performance, 
from Henry who plays the role of a shepherd at the banquet and performs the agonies of his conscience at 
Blackfriars, to Buckingham who performs Christ-like forgiveness before his demise or even Wolsey who performs 
several roles, the aggressive consul and the blameless teacher to Cromwell as he bids farewell. For an in depth 
examination of performativity of characters, see Robert Weimann’s ideas on “double voiced” performances, the 
practice of personation, and actor-characters in “The Actor-Character in “Secretly Open” Action: Doubly Encoded 
Personation on Shakespeare’s Stage”  
13 John Margeson astutely points out that the disregard or pushing back of the authorship question “has strengthened 
the very sensible view that Henry VIII has a dramatic integrity of its own, a unified conception behind its apparent 
diversity of action which can be revealed effectively in stage performances” (25). 
14 For the use of the term “religious play,” see Ken Jackson who, using a different theoretical framework, has 
suggested that The Winter’s Tale be read as a religious play (192). (“ ‘Grace to boot’: St. Paul, Messianic time, and 
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” 192-210.) 
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with his craft in All is True. Instead of seeing the play, as Felperin suggests, as a “metaphysical 
drama being enacted before men’s eyes” (233), I propose we see the play as an ethical drama in 
which audience participates, a drama that carries in itself a demand that all that is presented on 
stage is indeed, true.15  
Additionally, this discussion is aimed at addressing Bosman’s insightful question: “What 
becomes possible when we take ‘a new play, called All is true’ as seriously as the Globe 
audience evidently did?” (459). Bosman accepts the combination of generic elements in the play 
and offers an in depth discussion on the truth claims of history and romance to examine how the 
play dramatizes “the essential limitations of knowledge of ‘truth’” (462).  Importantly, Bosman 
draws our attention to the correlation between truth and vision, seeing and believing, and 
explores the centrality of “modes of vision” (470) and the sensory apprehension of truth. The 
next part of this chapter seeks to expand Bosman’s arguments by exploring the possibility of 
access to truth and beauty by examining a correlation between vision and ethics, and arguing for 
the affinity between the power of the aesthetic and the ethical demand. This chapter is then 
positioned against critics such as J.C Maxwell and Clifford Leech who view the play as 
directionless and inconclusive.16 A continuous engagement and struggle with ethics give the play 
direction and structure, leading up to the momentous event of the birth of Elizabeth and the 
ensuing prophecy.17 For the characters and audience this truth of the play goes against historical 
realities and rationality. Henry’s speech at Blackfrairs for instance, presents specious arguments 
                                                
15 Felperin describes the play as a metaphysical drama to argue that it “most resembles the romances” (233). He 
goes on to argue, “whatever claim to truth Henry VIII may have resides…in the eternal relevance of the great 
Christian myth upon which it rests” (246). 
16 Two of the significant things they points out in their criticism is that Maxwell “finds a lack of ‘momentousness’ in 
the way the events are presented” and Leech believes that Cranmer’s prophesy at the end is “a mere dream when set 
against the realities of the life presented in the play and the well known history of subsequent years” (25). 
17 Here I partly with Leggatt’s view that Cranmer’s prophesy is “not a mere appendage; it has a structural function 
drawing together images and ideas from earlier scenes and providing a culminations for the argument” (qdt. in 
Margeston 29). But not so much as it reveals, according to Leggatt, a providential order in the disorderly world of 
history. 
  59 
   
and appears contrary to what is known. The audience is well aware that this is a king who freed 
himself from the dictates of the Church of Rome; the audience knows that nothing will bind him. 
Yet this rationality has to be put aside and the performance to be believed in. It this possibility of 
belief in the impossible that All is True presents and demands. As I explain, all these instances 
and prophecy at the end of the play are an aesthetic demand placed on the audience, not too 
dissimilar from the demand that Henry has faced, and not far from the statue scene in The 
Winter’s Tale that I discuss in the next chapter.  
Katharine’s Vision as Beauty and Alterity  
This aesthetic demand that is placed on the audience is best understood in relation to the 
Catholic Katharine’s vision that occurs in act 4 scene 2. Vision works on two levels in this scene: 
as the dream sequence or revelation that Katharine experiences or sees while asleep, and as a 
commentary on sight itself and that it is that what can be seen. Juxtaposing the vision and sight, 
and its relationship to knowing (and knowledge) enables us to examine closely the aesthetic 
demand placed on the audience. Furthermore, I will uncover how reading seemingly morally 
ambiguous moments in the play (the call of beauty and the call of conscience) as ethical, that is, 
again, ethical in the Levinasian framework of being open to the other yet to come, reveals similar 
religious or “Christian” moments in the play as fraught with ambiguity. The other religious 
moment in question is the Protestant Cranmer’s prophesy at the end of the play, discussed later. 
To be more specific, these Levinasian ethical moments—the call of beauty and the call of 
conscience—enable us to look beyond doctrinal (and supernatural categories) and attest to the 
ethical nature of Katharine’s vision. Again, these two are elaborately staged events: Katharine’s 
vision, though very intimate and personal to her, is splendid and lavishly orchestrated, and 
Cranmer’s prophesy is part of an opulent state event, Elizabeth’s regal baptism.  
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To begin with Katharine’s vision then, it is often been read as a specifically “Christian” 
vision. G. Wilson Knight has called it Katharine’s “vision of Paradise” (270); Arthur F. Marotti 
refers to it as “the Catholic modality of the mystical dream or vision” (225); Walter Cohen calls 
it a “spiritual coronation” (1390). Frances Yates summarizes it thus: “The good dying Catholic 
[Katharine] sees the heavenly vision. And the good Protestant, Cranmer, is seized with the spirit 
of prophecy. It would seem that, beyond all earthly jars Shakespeare envisaged a union of the 
good.… The theophanies in Henry VIII reveal a mystical experience in which the religious 
discords of the past are reconciled” (78). Indeed, in a play that deals with the schism in 
Christendom, this “Christian” vision does seem to be reinforcing both: Henry’s gesture to 
universalize this new Anglican religion, and Jacobean irenicism. I propose—counter this 
tradition and in light of the two ethical moments discussed earlier—that the vision is not wholly 
Christian; that is, rather than solve Christian contradictions or universalize the ‘new’ religion, the 
vision exposes them as linked to the Levinasian ethical, thereby traversing traditional categories. 
This does not make the vision either less Catholic or more supernatural (for that is not even the 
point); rather it makes the general category of the supernatural appear to exist in a quasi-religious 
space—a space that equally defies the term “supernatural” and any attachment to the 
superstitious or the doctrinal.18 Even with Katharine's vision, the supernatural cannot be fully 
separated from the religious; this suggests that the categories themselves need rethinking.  
                                                
18 Phantasms or visions can be understood to be a placeholder for all things in the realm of the “transnatural” or the 
supernatural, just as “phantasmic apparatus” can be understood to be the means or manifestations of the 
supernatural. See Ioan P. Couliano’s Eros and Magic in the Renaissance where he contends: “the Reformation leads 
to a total censorship of the imaginary, since phantasms are none other than idols conceived by the inner 
sense...Renaissance culture was a culture of the phantasmic. It lent tremendous weight to the phantasms evoked by 
inner sense and had developed to the utmost the human faculty of working actively upon and with phantasms. It had 
created a whole dialectic of Eros in which phantasms, which at first foisted themselves upon inner sense, ended by 
being manipulated at will. It had a firm belief in the power of phantasms, which were transmitted by the phantasmic 
apparatus of the transmittor [sic!] to that of the receiver. It also believed that inner sense was preeminently the locale 
for manifestations of transnatural forces-demons and the gods” (193-94).  
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It is important to note that Katharine’s vision occurs after she has forgiven Wolsey. As 
she says during her conversation with Griffith, “Whom [Wolsey] I most hated living, thou 
[Griffith] hast made me, / With they religious truth and modesty, / Now in his ashes honor. Peace 
be with him! (4.2.73-5). She then falls asleep to “sad music” and the vision occurs. The stage 
directions are detailed and worth quoting in full: 
The vision. Enter, solemnly tripping one after another, six personages, clad in white 
robes, wearing on their heads garlands of bays, and golden vizards on their faces; 
branches of bays or palm in their hands. They first congee unto her, then dance; and, at 
certain changes, the first two hold a spare garland over her head; at which the other four 
make reverent curtsies; then the two that held the garland deliver the same to the other 
next two, who observe the same order in their changes, and holding the garland over her 
head: which done, they deliver the same garland to the last two, who likewise observe the 
same order: at which, as it were by inspiration, she makes in her sleep signs of rejoicing, 
and holdeth up her hands to heaven: and so in their dancing vanish, carrying the garland 
with them. The music continues. [82.1-82.17 editor’s numbering] 
 
It is a beautiful, detailed vision. Henry Fuseli’s Queen Katharine’s Dream (exhibited 1781), 
which was based on the vision in the play, captures these details and is an interesting 
representation that helps us understand some key issues at stake in interpreting the vision.19  
                                                
19 In Fuseli’s depiction, Katharine is lying in a manner that is reminiscent of the reclining nudes of the Renaissance, 
her posture and the setting recalls Titian’s Venus Urbino (c.1538) in particular. See Appendix C for details. 
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Figure 8: Henry Fuseli Queen Katharine’s Dream 
Source: Tate Britain. <http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-britain/exhibition/gothic-nightmares-fuseli-
blake-and-romantic-imagination/gothic-4>. 
 
Much like Henry’s affective and embodied response to the call of beauty and the call of 
conscience, Katharine’s response to this beautiful vision, to this experience of otherness, is 
physical: as the stage directions tell us, she raises both her hands up and appears to make signs of 
rejoicing.20 She is an aesthetic spectacle, much like the vision that she is witnessing along with 
the audience. Her raised hand is a symbol of acceptance (of her fate), aspiration (toward 
heavenliness and beauty) and also ascent (to sainthood) and openness to otherness (the 
strangeness of the vision). For that brief moment, she is partaking in her own beatific vision. 
                                                
20 Another instance of an embodied response within the play is represented as a narrated miracle through the 
collective body of the women at Anne’s coronation. See Appendix D. 
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Owing to her charity and forgiveness toward her wrongdoers, the old, dying Katharine is a 
symbol of grace. In early modern thought, as I have explained in Chapter 1, grace was closely 
linked with beauty.21 Through her grace and beatific vision, Katharine is also a symbol of beauty. 
In this, she is much like Hermione in The Winter’s Tale, who, as I discuss in detail in the 
following chapter, is identified with grace and also beauty throughout the play.  
More importantly, perhaps, what is interesting about this vision is that the lines between 
the dream and the dreamer, or the vision and the person experiencing the vision (Katharine), 
become blurred. As Katharine becomes her own vision, there is a crisscrossing of subjectivity. 
What, then, does this aesthetic spectacle mean for the audience? Perhaps the audience sees 
Katharine dreaming up a vision. Or perhaps the audience is participatory and experiencing a 
vision themselves, thereby making themselves a part of its otherness or making this otherness 
much like them. Either way this raises the important issue of the impossibility of seeing and 
experiencing this vision of otherness and any alterity for that matter. 
The personages themselves represent an irreducibility or an otherness that cannot be 
encountered directly: they are not alive, they not dead, they are not human, they are not things. 
Though the image is not Botticelli’s Primavera, the three pairs of celestial figures that dance 
around with garlands do evoke the image of the Three Graces. Perhaps the three pairs are to 
remind us of the Greek Charities or the Roman Graces, and aptly so since Katharine is repeatedly 
linked to grace. Fuseli depicts the personages much like the ways the Graces were depicted 
during the early modern period. Juxtaposing Fuseli’s work with the play, particularly his 
depiction of the faces of these personages, draws immediate attention to the vizard-wearing, 
                                                
21 For instance, Thommaso Buoni in Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections describes “grace” as a 
“celestial beam” that is essential to “perfect” beauty. Buoni suggests “if to bodily Beauty, there be added that grace, 
which manifesteth it selfe in all the motions both of the bodie and of the minde, it presently worketh in every man an 
opinion, of perfect Beauty” (sigs. D3r-D4V).  
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hidden faces of the dramaturgical vision. Perhaps the masks suggest that Katharine (and the 
audience) still has a while to go before she can have a face to face encounter with such divinity.  
Even in her this vision of heavenliness, where she is seemingly conferred a kind of sainthood, 
Katharine cannot entirely see this otherness. The vision then signals to the impossibility of 
reducing to visual form or rendering effable this kind of alterity. 
Impossible Economy of Giving  
Katharine is, indeed, much like these inaccessible personages. She is symbolically and 
politically dead. After her divorce, the title of the Queen is taken away from her and she becomes 
Dowager Princess of Wales; as she says to Wolsey, “Ye turn me into nothing” (3.1.114).  Yet it 
is this status of nothingness that makes her paradoxically very powerful because it puts her in the 
realm of the inaccessible and the irreducible. Her nothingness threatens to remain an irresolvable 
paradoxical presence or phantom that can become a potential threat to the course of this history; 
it can challenge the righteousness of the reign of Henry VIII, the proclamation of the Anglican 
Church, the future reign of Elizabeth I and thus also that of James I. Within the play the apparent 
solution to overcome her nothingness and curious inaccessibility is to make her perform gestures 
of Christian charity and forgiveness, and to reward her Christianness with the gift of this 
vision.22 By giving a promise of sainthood—and thus taking away her nothingness—the vision 
seems to resolve the injustice faced by her (and others) in the play. While linking the root of 
beauty to fairness and justice, Scarry points out in her essay, “Injury is the opposite of beauty” 
(n.p.). This beatific vision then can be understood as a way in which Katharine’s injuries are 
addressed and her predicament is justified. The audience, too, is expected to overlook the 
                                                
22 In attempting charity she is attempting to forgive all that was done unto her. By making her perform this gesture 
she can be laid to rest completely. Knight suggests, “She has to conquer even righteous anger…so she learns to 
transcend her own, personal, cause; and, from a wider view her casting off, so apparently unjust, is, as the drama 
unfolds, necessary. Christian charity is thus found to be no more than is dictated by widest reason. So Katharine 
wins the vision of Paradise “ (293-94).  
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iniquities and accept this vision as recompense for Katharine (and perhaps themselves) and as 
reinforcing Henry’s decisions.  
In this moment, then, Katharine’s gestures of Christian charity are similar to the attempts 
at charity and forgiveness performed by others in the play, namely Buckingham and Wosley. As 
Bevington points out, “All these characters stoically exemplify the art of holy dying. One after 
another, they forgive their enemies and regret such sins as they have committed, and yet they 
also prophesy that God’s retribution will light on offenders’ heads” (921). In other words, even 
though they try to forgive, this forgiving is not complete. Buckingham, for instance, “heartily” 
(2.1.65) forgives. While forgiving Lovell, he says, paraphrasing The Lord’s Prayer, “I as free 
forgive you, / As I would be forgiven. I forgive all” (2.1.82-3). Nonetheless, it does not appear 
that he has truly forgiven everyone. He recounts how those who served and loved him caused his 
downfall, what he describes as “a most unnatural and faithless service!” (2.1.23). His parting 
words reveal his inability to fully perform this gesture of charity: 
       All good people, 
Pray for me! I must now forsake ye. The last hour 
Of my long weary life is come upon me. 
Farewell! And when you would say something that is sad, 
Speak how I fell. I have done; and God forgive me! (2.1. 131-35) 
 
It is as if in return for his forgiveness, he is asking people pray for him and recount his fall. This 
compromises his gesture of charity and his gesture remains merely an attempted forgiveness. 
Wolsey, too, is incapable of performing forgiveness. He claims, “I know myself now, and I feel 
within me / A peace above all earthly dignities, / A still and quiet conscience” (3.2.379-81). But 
he still talks about retribution on his enemies and holds on to resentment against the king to the 
very end: he says, “Had I but served my God with half of the zeal / I served my king, he would 
not in mine age / Have left me naked to mine enemies” (3.2.456-58). These repeated attempts at 
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charity underscore that no one can forgive (or give) as perfectly as Christ. Each attempts, to use 
Bevington’s words, “the art of holy dying,” but fails in performing gestures of complete 
forgiveness. True forgiving, an act of complete giving, is then, impossible, and the inequities still 
remain unresolved.  
Just like these failed attempts at Christian charity and giving remind us of the 
impossibility of some kind of pure giving, Katharine’s vision too, rather than smoothing out 
contradictions, occasions a calling into question of its own paradoxical position. To this end, it is 
only peripheral that in a play that is concerned with the foundations of a future Protestant nation, 
this vision is dreamt by a Catholic (and a Spanish one!) and that it deploys Catholic modalities 
like sainthood, idolatry, and perhaps even martyrdom. More importantly, it is a vision, a 
phantasm that is witnessed only by her when she is dreaming. She wakes up and asks, “No? Saw 
you not, even now, a blessed troop / Invite me to a banquet; whose bright faces / Cast thousand 
beams upon me, like the sun” (86-88)? She has just witnessed that which cannot be seen. The 
vision’s rhetorical power thus stems not from its being “Christian” but from the dramaturgical 
and philosophical paradox on which it rests—the space and time or more appropriately the 
absence of space and time in which it occurs, its invisible presence and thus, also, the curious 
sphere of the being and nothingness that it traverses as is suggested by the personages.  
Katharine’s inaccessible nothingness is replaced with this vision that itself alludes to an 
irreducible gap. Neither Katharine nor the audience can see the personages face to face. It is a 
curiously aneconomic exchange—nothing for nothing, phantasm for phantasm. The sheer 
impossibility of such a moment can be understood as placing a call on Katharine and on the 
audience to respond—not only to the paradoxical nature of the vision and the aesthetic but, more 
importantly, to the ethical demand of otherness. Much like the corresponding moments in the 
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play that have been discussed earlier, this dream vision becomes the moment of a cut or, as 
Henry might say, a  “prick”—a rupture that calls on the audience to open to unquestionable 
belief—suggesting once again, openness to the something that cannot be defined or articulated 
and is yet unknown. Not only does the vision become a space for articulating the supernatural as 
an approximate religion without religion, it also (re)defines belief as neither wholly religious nor 
wholly supernatural but as being open to the possibility of the experience of alterity.23 It is as if 
Levinas wrote for Katharine’s vision: 
The face in which the other—the absolutely other—presents himself does not 
negate the Same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the 
thaumaturgic supernatural. It remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it 
remains terrestrial. This presentation is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of 
offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it. As nonviolence it 
nonetheless maintains the plurality of the Same and the Other. It is peace.” (TI, 
203, italics mine). 
Katharine confirms her peace when she speaks to Griffith about the six personages she sees: 
They promised me eternal happiness; / And brought me garlands, Griffith, which I feel / I am not 
worthy yet to wear: I shall, assuredly” (4.2.89-91). It is a promise for an almost Messianic 
moment yet to come. That moment in future will be when Katharine can see the personages face 
to face rather than seeing them in a dream as they appear at this moment, with their faces 
covered with golden vizards. But within the play, the event that is yet to come is the birth of 
Elizabeth I and the event yet to come for the audience is the ascension of Elizabeth. It is for this 
moment that all will have to be perceived as ethical and true. 
Truth Event and its Declaration  
                                                
23 Katharine’s vision suggests the complex relationship between seeing and knowing, and religious revelation and 
knowledge. See Appendix E for an extended discussion on the nature of religious experience in relation to Saint 
Paul’s conversion of the road to Damascus.  
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This idea of a Messianic future when all will be just is finally also reinforced at the end of 
the play at Elizabeth’s baptism ceremony. It is here that Cranmer, believing himself to be the 
mouthpiece of God, unravels his prophecy: 24 
For heaven now bids me; and the words I utter 
Let none think flattery, for they’ll find ’em truth.  
This royal infant-heaven still move about her!— 
           Though in her cradle, yet now promises 
           Upon this land a thousand blessings, 
          Which time shall bring to ripeness: she shall be— 
  But few now living can behold that goodness- 
A pattern for all princes living with her, 
And all that shall succeed. (5.5.16-24) 
 
This prophecy is “truth” just as Elizabeth is “goodness” itself. It is also a suggestion to James I 
that Elizabeth’s reign is a pattern to be emulated. He then goes on the say that “Truth shall nurse 
her, / Holy and heavenly thought still counsel her” (29-30). The veracity of this prophecy is 
highlighted again. The historical figure of Henry does not concern Cranmer; he ignores the 
specificities of Henry’s reign. In the play there is no discussion of why and how everything has 
come to this moment. There is no justification of Henry’s rulings about Buckingham and 
Katharine or even his break from the Roman church.  
And then comes the declaration of this event’s “ultimate goal”—“God shall be truly 
known” (37).25   This is the profound truth of the event. Nothing else matters. The birth of 
Elizabeth is a historical fact; that is unquestionable. But the play’s treatment of this event lends it 
a fabulous texture, or what Alain Badiou calls in reference to the Resurrection of Christ, “a 
fabulous element [point fabuleux]” (4). It appears to be miraculous and sudden. Elizabeth’s birth 
occurs in 1533, the same year that Henry was excommunicated by the Pope. That and the very 
fact that she is a female causes a rupture in the established order of things. One of the reasons 
                                                
24 Louis Montrose concludes The Subject of Elizabeth by describing this speech as “the most rhetorically opulent 
version” of Henry Hooke’s sermon shortly after James I’s accession (252).  
25 Bevington glosses the line “God shall be truly known” to mean “True religion shall prevail” (963). 
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Henry gives for divorcing Katharine is that she gave birth to children that either died or were 
female. Going by that paradigm, Elizabeth as a female should be comparable to a dead child who 
cannot possibly be a real heir to the throne. At this time there is no assignable cause as to why 
she should be proclaimed as the future monarch at that moment.  
The birth of Elizabeth is caught between time and non-time in a sense since it has already 
taken place and yet in dramaturgical time it is happening in the present. In fact, even within the 
dramaturgical time, it is positioned between two moments of what can be called irregular time—
between Katharine’s prophetic vision and Cranmer’s prophesy for the future. This accentuates 
the enigma of the event. Additionally, we need to remember that not only were the playwrights 
writing a history of the king who was responsible for the break from the Church of Rome, they 
were writing during a time that, under the regime of the Stuart king, was becoming one of 
intense religious factionalism and politics.  It makes good sense to have a prophecy incorporated 
as a part of the defining moment of Elizabeth’s birth. Sharon L. Jansen Jaech sheds light on 
political prophecies:  
Political prophesies flourished in England from early in the twelfth century until 
quite late in the seventeenth, but Henry VIII’s disputes with Rome in the 1530s let 
loose a torrent of prophecies aimed at washing away both the king and the 
Reformation […] Given the uneasy state of Henry’s realm in the 1532, any piece 
that predicted the arrival of a young conqueror who would once again unite all 
England was bound to have been quite popular among various disaffected and 
rebellious parties. (296, 298) 
 
Nonetheless, the playwrights are still faced with the problem of an authentic translation of 
Elizabeth’s birth and the prophecy. One way of being faithful to the event, so much as it is 
possible to be faithful to it in its retelling, is the construction of this play as a space that is at once 
past, present and future. It is at once a space and a non-space, and outside time even as it is 
deeply set in its temporalities.  
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Knowledge of truth and the ethical is located in a prophecy in the past, in an atemporal 
space that cannot be known.  The play effectively stages and performs this philosophical 
conundrum beginning with the call of beauty and the call of the conscience, as well as 
Katharine’s vision and Cranmer’s prophesy, all of which occur in complex atemporal spaces and 
point to something Other. And while the Other cannot be known, the philosophical aporia itself 
can be staged and represented. 
Unrepresentable and Inaccessible Beauty and Truth 
There is one powerful image that lingers as a symbol for this multivalent representation 
and also embodies the philosophical aporia in the play. As we recall, Cranmer’s declaration is a 
call to faith, a call to an openness of the truth event that has paradoxically emerged out of 
nothing. This aporia is conveyed in the paradoxical image of the phoenix in Cranmer’s prophecy: 
         as when 
  The bird of wonder dies, the maiden phoenix, 
  Her ashes new create another heir, 
  As great in admiration as herself; 
  So shall she leave her blessedness to one, 
  When heaven shall call her from this cloud of darkness, 
  Who from the sacred ashes of her honour 
  Shall star-like rise, as great in fame as she was, 
  And so stand fix'd.  
(5.4.39-47) 
 
Paul Dean accurately suggests that the “phoenix inhabits both time and eternity and is both an 
individual creature and a part of an endless cycle of regenerations” (188). The phoenix ceases to 
exist and begins to exist in an impossible instant. It is reduced to nothingness in the same moment 
that it comes to life. For Dean this is “Shakespeare’s last word on a problem with which he had 
been grappling throughout his career: the problem of the accommodation of the open, expansive 
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moment of history within the closed, concentrated, and intensified movement of drama” (188).26  
He sees Shakespeare as fascinated with technical experimentation and as an artist “ever in search 
of self-renewal.” Indeed, it also seems that the reason that Shakespeare is fascinated with these 
issues is because of a larger philosophical awareness that it is impossible to ever write or even 
think about something that is obviously in the realm of the inaccessible. It is shocking that Dean 
claims, ““Henry VIII, unlike it precursors, refuses to be drawn into extensive discussions of 
ethical, political, and religious controversies” (178). These issues are addressed in a dramatic 
way. Evidently, Shakespeare is thinking about and grappling with that which cannot be thought of 
or that which cannot be grasped—be it history, ethics, or a notion of the religious.  
This final image of the phoenix that is presented to us in the play may be understood in 
light of a poem composed by Shakespeare that also sheds light on the nature of beauty and ethics 
that I elaborate later in the next chapter. Though this poem is popularly called “The Phoenix and 
the Turtle,” Colin Burrow corrects that assumption refers to it by its first line “Let the bird of 
loudest lay.”27 The poem is about the last rites of the phoenix and the turtledove. The phoenix 
was a symbol of Christ’s Resurrection and of eternal life. The phoenix also stood for chastity and 
was an appropriate symbol for Elizabeth I; as is visually evident in the Phoenix Portrait painted 
by Nicholas Hilliard, she was routinely associated with the phoenix. While there have been 
several interpretations of the poem, varying from it being an allegory of succession, to an 
allegorical depiction of Elizabeth as phoenix and the turtledove to be the Earl of Essex, following 
Burrows, I read it specifically as a mediation on an abstract idea.  
                                                
26 Cranmer’s prophecy echoes Henry Hooke’s sermon at Whitehall in 1604. Louis Montrose reads the preacher’s 
description of the phoenix as an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt “to appropriate the Elizabethan political 
imaginary for a new Jacobean mythopoeia: the half-century long quest to provide for a masculine succession to an 
unmarried queen is resolved when King James arises from Queen Elizabeth’s ashes” (252).  
27 The poem first appeared in Robert Chester’s quarto collection of poems, Love’s Martyr: Or, Rosalins Complaint 
(1601). Burrow tells us that the incorrect title has been in use since 1807 and has no connection with Shakespeare. 
(82) 
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Here the anthem doth commence. 
Love and constancy is dead; 
Phoenix and the turtle fled 
In a mutual flame from hence. 
So they loved, as love in twain 
Had the essence but in one, 
Two distincts, division none; 
Number there in love was slain. 
Hearts remote, yet not asunder; 
Distance, and no space was seen 
'Twixt the turtle and his queen: 
But in them it were a wonder. 
So between them love did shine, 
That the turtle saw his right 
Flaming in the phoenix' sight; 
Either was the other's mine.  
Property was thus appalled, 
That the self was not the same; 
Single nature's double name 
Neither two nor one was called.  
(21-40, my italics) 
 
Bevington explains the relationship between the phoenix and the turtle thus: “Their spiritual 
union becomes a mystical oneness in whose presence Reason stands virtually speechless. Baffled 
human discourse must resort to paradox in order to explain how two beings become one essence” 
(1698). While there is nothing in Henry VIII about two beings becoming one essence, I mention 
this is in part because it points to the complexity of delineating the relationship between the self 
and the Other, a relationship that lies at the heart of ethics that I will analyze in the following 
chapter on The Winter’s Tale.   
With regards to Henry VIII, it is important to note that the phoenix in the poem stands for 
love and Beauty, and the turtledove for constancy and Truth. The Threnos contains the following 
lines, “Truth may seem, but cannot be; / Beauty brag, but ‘tis not she: / Truth and Beauty buried 
be” (62-64). Burrows glosses the lines thus: “Beauty may boast of being beautiful, but she does 
not represent the reality of beauty” (377). Truth, similarly, may appear to be so, but sight or 
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vision cannot adequately capture the idea. Both Beauty and Truth that were previously manifested 
in the presence of the phoenix and the turtledove, are always only an approximation of “real” 
beauty and truth. Every representation falls short. Just as for Nehamas, “Beauty is forever a step 
beyond what we can say about it,” similarly for Shakespeare, truth and beauty by their very 
nature are Other and forever inaccessible. Finally with the image of the dying Phoenix, the play 
might possibly be suggesting that for a vanishing moment, in an image that is not and in a dying 
that is a living, it is here that liminal access to truth lies for “God shall be truly known.” Its 
ephemeral yet eternal beauty makes us aware of how little we can actually see.  
The play at least comes to an approximation of this notion of the Other. Eventually, the 
audience is not faced with the issue of responding to (rejecting or accepting) what is represented. 
More appropriately, the audience is faced with the issue of responding to what Shakespeare is not 
presenting. The play suggests that the only way this can be approached is by getting pricked, 
much like Henry has been, by “sharp thorny points”; in Levinasian terms, the approach is one of 
complete openness and giving over to the Other.  
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Chapter 3 
“With what’s unreal thou coactive art”: The Problem and 
Possibilities of Beauty in The Winter’s Tale 
  
In this chapter, I focus on a specific aspect—the response to beauty—primarily in relation 
to Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale.1 In continuation of the themes form Chapters 1 and 2, I also 
examine beauty in the play to explore further the relationships among a range of discourses: 
Neoplatonism, Protestant grace, and the Levinasian “ethical.” Furthermore, I read specific 
moments of engagement with beauty in the play in tandem with Robert Greene’s 1588 prose 
romance Pandosto: The Triumph of Time, Book VI of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene 
(1596), and David Garrick’s 1756 adaptation The winter's tale, or Florizel and Perdita. A 
dramatic pastoral, altered from Shakspeare. Along with these texts, I use Thommaso Buoni’s 
Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections, translated from Italian to English in 1606, to 
establish a literary and philosophical context for my discussion of beauty, grace and art. 
I begin by juxtaposing two seemingly different responses to beauty in one of the longest 
scenes in all of Shakespeare: the sheep-shearing scene, act 4 scene 4 of The Winter’s Tale. I 
consider Florizel’s wish to see Perdita’s beauty “move still, still so”—his impulse to make the 
experience of beauty infinitely present and available—and Polixenes’ desire to see her “beauty 
scratched” as critical moments that reveal the paradoxes of responding to beauty. On the face of 
it, Florizel’s praise for Perdita seems to be much preferable to Polixenes’ vengeful desire to have 
her beauty disfigured. I argue, however, that these two responses are far more similar than they 
appear in that both are violent engagements with beauty. Furthermore, contrary to what critics 
                                                
1 This chapter has been revised from my article in Shakespeare ““With what’s unreal thou coactive art”: The 
Problem and Possibilities of Beauty in The Winter’s Tale” 9.1 (2013): 52-75.  
 
  75 
   
have said about Florizel redeeming the destructive effects of Leontes’ enraged mind, I contend 
that Florizel is inadvertently repeating Leontes’ mistakes. Working through similar moments of 
complex engagements with beauty leads me to suggest that the play does not end with the 
resolution of a romance but in a suspended repetitive movement of violence, a movement that 
displays not only the complexity of Shakespeare’s art, but of this thought.  
Repetition of Violent Response to Beauty: Polixenes, Florizel, Mamillius 
 
Act 4 scene 4 is set in the pastoral world of Bohemia. Perdita, the lost daughter of a king, 
is dressed up as the queen of the sheep-shearing festival, and Florizel, disguised as Doricles, is 
engaged in various declarations of love and praise for her. Initially, she appears a little hesitant 
with her adornments, with being, in her words, “Most goddesslike pranked up” (4.4.10). But 
Florizel, with the hyperbole of a young lover, compares himself to Jove, Neptune and Apollo, 
and insists that “Their transformations / were never for a piece of beauty rarer” (4.4.31-32). 
Perdita’s beauty prompts Florizel to search for precedents and parallels and he finds them. The 
classical allusions he employs, however, are to rape, bestiality and deception. They are, in a 
word, violent: “Jupiter / became a bull and bellowed; the green Neptune / a ram, and bleated; and 
the fire-robed god, / golden Apollo, a poor humble swain, / As I [Florizel disguised as Doricles] 
seem now” (4.4.27-31). In other words, Florizel’s passionate response to Perdita’s beauty comes 
packaged with cruel and deceptive desire. 
Polixenes, the royal father who does not want his son to wed a commoner, is far more 
overt in his violence toward Perdita’s beauty when he cannot dissuade Florizel from being 
betrothed to her. But first, while still in disguise, Polixenes addresses her as “a fair one” (4.4.78) 
and then comments to Camillo: 
This is the prettiest low-born lass that ever 
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Ran on the greensward. Nothing she does or seems 
But smacks of something greater than herself, 
Too noble for this place. (4.4.156-59) 
This high praise, where Polixenes perceives Perdita’s beauty and grace to be more fitting for a 
woman of a higher social station is replaced by a different response where he wants to destroy 
her beauty and see her reduced to a lower social station. The similarity between these two 
responses, however, is that in both, Polixenes perceives the presence or absence of beauty to be 
commensurate with higher or lower social status respectively. Polixenes then proceeds to 
objectify Perdita as a “fresh piece of excellent witchcraft,” an “enchantment,” a “knack” that 
cannot be married to his son: “I’ll have thy beauty scratched with briers and made more homely 
than thy state,” he threatens (4.4.424-25). For him, Perdita’s beauty at that moment in the play is 
not consonant with her status. She is, after all, only a shepherd’s daughter; the only way she can 
appear to be beautiful is through witchcraft. And once he has violently erased this beauty she 
will be reduced to her appropriate humble state as a shepherdess. In the absence of beauty, she 
will finally be fit for her social station. According to Polixenes, this kind of artificially created 
beauty can only function as a deception that beguiles Florizel. Ernest Schanzer points out in his 
gloss to these lines that “the imaginative impact of Polixenes’ cruel threats is very similar to that 
of Leontes’ raving. We need only to compare Leontes’ words to Antigonus, … with Polixenes’ 
threat to the old Shepherd and Perdita”2 (91-92).3 Indeed, Polixenes’  
                                                
2 Leontes rages 
Thou, traitor, hast set on thy wife to do this. 
My child? Away with’t! Even thou, that hast 
A heart so tender o’er it, take it hence 
And see it instantly consumed with fire. 
Even thou, none but thou. Take it up straight. 
Within this hour bring me word ‘tis done, 
And by good testimony, or I’ll seize thy life, 
With what thou else call’st then. If thou refuse 
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responses to Pedita’s beauty are invariably violent and it is no surprise that these appear to be 
repeating Leontes’ response to Antigonus, and also, as I later argue, his violent response to 
Hermione, his rage and accusations of adultery, that occur earlier in the play.  
It is perhaps the overt violence of both Polixenes and Leontes’ response that has led 
critics to elide the ethical violence in Florizel’s response.4 As Perdita is handing out flowers, 
Florizel responds to her beauty by breaking out into this paean:  
     What you do 
Still betters what is done. When you speak, sweet, 
I’d have you do it ever; when you sing, 
I’d had have you buy and sell so, so give alms, 
Pray so; and for the ord’ring your affairs, 
To sing them too. When you do dance, I wish you 
A wave o’th’ sea, that you might ever do 
Nothing but that—move still, still so, 
And own no other function. (4.4.135-43, emphasis added)  
 
Maurice Hunt calls Florizel’s praise of Perdita one of the most moving passages in all of 
Shakespeare (358) and comments, “Perdita’s graceful, ballet-like movements form a composite 
image of genuine welcome, a physical poem bewitching its admirers”(346). Hunt reads Florizel’s 
response to this beauty as a “love lyric” that is contrary to Leontes’ rapture (also referred to as 
                                                                                                                                                       
And wilt encounter with my wrath, say so.  
The bastard brains with these my proper hands 
Shall I dash out. (2.3.130-41)  
Polixenes: 
Thou, old traitor, 
I am sorry that by hanging thee I can 
But shorten thy life one week. And thou, fresh piece  
Of excellent witchcraft, who of force must know 
The royal fool thou cop’st with… 
I’ll have thy beauty scratch’s with briers and made 
More homely than thy state. (4.4.420-33) 
3 Schanzer reads the play as composed of two halves that contrast but also include a series of parallels. He further 
adds that this view is supported by Derek Traversi, who declares that Polixenes’ “brutality in separating the lovers, 
and more especially his ferocious attack upon Perdita’s beauty … form an exact complement to Leontes’ earlier 
behaviour” (qtd. in Schanzer 92). 
4 I use the term “ethical violence” here for the sake of clarity and to identify Florizel’s violent response with the 
Levinasian philosophical idea of violence that I discuss in the next section. As I explain, this kind of violence that 
Florizel partakes in is very different from inflicting physical pain or using aggressive force on a person. While it is 
different from the threats of physical abuse that Polixenes and Leontes utter, it is, nonetheless, violence.  
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Leontes’ “affection” speech)5 about Hermione’s adultery:6 “the parallel versification … 
encourages readers to think of Florizel’s lyric as rectifying, even redeeming, the destructive 
effects of Leontes’ rapture. In both cases, love and imagination join to create an intangible, 
which is illusory in Leontes’ case but transcendentally real in Florizel’s” (348).7 I argue, 
however, that the potential effect of Florizel’s love lyric in praise of Perdita’s beauty is, 
somewhat paradoxically, much closer to the effect of Leontes’ rant against Hermione.  
Leontes’ rage eventually leads to Hermione’s becoming a living statue or “her death, her 
image frozen as a statue” (Knapp 278);8 “Her blank, stony, painted state is an ironic relic of 
[Leontes’] violent misconstrual of her subjectivity, the poisoned knowing that is his doubt, the 
empty, faithless “certainty” about her infidelity that places her life ‘at the level of [his] 
                                                
5 Leontes’ rapture: 
     Sweet villain! 
Most dear’st! My Collop! Can thy dam?-may’t be?- 
Affection, thy intention stabs the centre. 
Thou dost make possible things not so held, 
Communicat’st with dreams-how can this be?- 
With what’s unreal thou coactive art, 
And fellow’st nothing. Then ’tis very credent 
Thou mayst co-join with something:’ and thou dost,  
And that beyond commission, and I find it, 
And that to the infection of my brains 
And hard’ning of my brows. (1.2.138-48) 
This infamous speech has been variously called deliberately incoherent, mysterious, difficult, to name a few. See 
Hallett Smith’s comprehensive “Leontes’ Affectio,” Shakespeare Quarterly 14 (1963): 163-66. 
6 Conversely, G. Wilson Knight makes a comparison with Florizel and Polixenes at this point: Florizel “would have 
her every action perpetuated, the thought recalling Polixenes’ recollection of himself and Leontes as ‘boy eternal’ 
(1.1.65)” (144). 
7 Hunt compares the identical numbering of The Riverside Shakespeare text, where Leontes’ “rapture” (1.2. 135-46) 
parallels Florizel’s lyric (4.4.135-46). Additionally, Hunt argues that Florizel’s request that Perdita be a wave of the 
sea that would “move still, still so, / And own no other function” is “the redemptive counterpart to Paulina’s barren 
utterance” (Paulina’s phrase “still winter/In storm perpetual” spoken during her malediction against Leontes) (346). 
8 For Leontes’ rapture/affection speech and its relation to the statue scene, see James A. Knapp’s “Visual and Ethical 
Truth in The Winter’s Tale.” Knapp agrees that Leontes’ jealous response is wrong but adds that in making this 
choice, Leontes is asserting his responsibility and that is what enables his future redemption in the statue scene. 
Using Levinas, Knapp reads these two moments—Leontes’ affection speech and his response to Hermione’s 
statue—as ethical moments that are more similar than is generally acknowledged. The article was later revised as a 
chapter in Knapp’s recent Image Ethics in Shakespeare and Spenser. 
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dreams’”(Gross 100).9 Even though Florizel intends no such violence, he does want Perdita to 
play statue on the pedestal he has created: Perdita’s beauty allegedly makes Florizel want to 
freeze her in a continuous, yet fixed, aesthetic motion. And while it can be argued that Florizel 
wants to submit to whatever action Perdita might perform—dance, sing, give alms—in 
demanding that she might “ever” do nothing and “own no other function” but “move still, still 
so,” he is placing her in what is paradoxically a continuous, yet fixed present—an oxymoronic 
dynamic stasis. To better understand how Perdita can be perceived as an animate statue and how 
Florizel desires to see Perdita “move still, still so,” it is worthwhile to briefly note Kenneth 
Gross’ compelling study of the moving statue in his analysis on ekphrasis in literature: 
These things cannot happen: a statue cannot move or speak; it cannot open its 
eyes, nod, or call out, cannot tell a story, dance, or do work; it cannot turn on the 
viewer, or run away, banishing its solidity and repose, shedding its silence. A 
statue is almost by definition a thing that stands still, and what we call its 
movement is at best a resonant figure of speech. Yet these things happen; we 
imagine them happening. Our language requires that they happen. The fantasy of 
a statue that comes to life is as central a fable as we have. The idea of motion or 
speech in an inanimate stone is an inescapable possibility, a concept of a sort so 
basic that we can hardly call it a metaphor …. The idea of the animate statue 
appears everywhere. (xi) 
 
Even though it is innocent, in effect, Florizel’s love lyric places Perdita in a strange temporal 
loop—an ad infinitum yet impossible moment. This temporal placement renders Perdita 
inaccessible and she becomes, in Hunt’s words, “an intangible” (358). Florizel’s desire to make 
the experience of beauty an infinite present tense does not take into account the inaccessible 
nature of Perdita’s beauty: the beauty of Perdita’s movement is not an object to be grasped and 
paused. Florizel, then, does not rectify the destructive results of Leontes’ rage; he instead 
inadvertently repeats them. 
                                                
9 Gross acknowledges that “any such ironic reading is complicated by the fact that the statue, even in its first 
emergence, reflects Hermione’s beauty and steadfastness, becoming an image of her survival and of the playworld’s 
wish for her restitution” (100).  
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This violent response to beauty is foreshadowed by another comparable moment in the 
play. If we consider Howard Felperin’s suggestion that this is a play “in which nearly every line 
is a comment on every other line” (240), that Mamillius is “Florizel’s alter ego” (235) and that 
the loss of Mamillius is somewhat restored in the figure of Florizel, then Mamillius’ innocent 
banter with the Ladies in Sicilia can be seen as foreshadowing Florizel’s response to Perdita’s 
beauty. Mamillius decides that he loves the Second Lady “better” than the First Lady and 
displays his knowledge of cosmetics and their use in defining conventions of beauty. He claims 
to have “learned it out of women’s faces” (2.1.14). Humphrey Tonkin comments, “We see him 
among the Ladies at the opening of Act 2, his naive but perhaps accurate comments about 
feminine beauty striking amused consternation into the hearts of those around him, in a benign 
and ironically comic enactment of the arbitrariness of Leontes’ jealousy that is about to engulf 
this little community” (36). Mamillius’ response resonates with Florizel’s not only because his 
character is dramatically linked to Florizel’s but also because both of their responses to beauty 
also parallel Leontes’ response. In staging these comparable,10 if not repetitive, violent responses 
to beauty Shakespeare is, I suggest, thinking through some rather complicated philosophical 
problems: namely, “beauty” elicits a powerful response from viewers but that response is fraught 
with violence. 
Beauty and the Ethical  
 
                                                
10 Strangely, in relation to these moments, Autolycus’ overt vulgar peddling is less troubling. The Servant observes 
about Autolycus’ trinkets: “Why, he sings ‘em over as they were gods or goddesses; you would think a smock were 
a she-angel, he so chants to the sleeve-hand and the work about the square on’t.” (4.4.208-11). Autolycus deifies 
inanimate objects, specifically objects that are used to enhance female beauty. At the same time, he also describes 
his trinkets as prosthesis, “Masks for faces, and for noses / … Pins and poking-sticks of steel, / What maids lack 
from head to heel” (4.4.222-28). Masks, gloves, coifs, pins and sticks of steel, all contribute to—enhance, complete 
and define—female beauty. Allegedly this beauty is something maids lack from head to heel!  
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One way to understand these early modern moments of violent responses to beauty is by 
examining beauty’s relationship to Otherness and “the ethical” in the Levinasian sense as we 
discussed in Chapter 2. To be clear, in this philosophical framework, violence does not mean 
physically hurting another person and ethics is not tied to what we generally understand as ethics 
or morality. To briefly remind ourselves, “the ethical” for Levinas is the responsibility of the 
subject/self/Same to this Other; it is the desire for a nonviolent engagement between the self and 
the Other. The crucial questions that emerge from this conception of the ethical are: How is an 
engagement with the Other possible without first grounding it in any notion of the self or the 
body? How is respect for or response to the Other possible without making it some version of the 
self/Same? These questions pose a dilemma because the self/Same invariably does violence to 
alterity. In other words, the self alters and compromises the Other’s exteriority or strangeness 
whenever it tries to engage with the Other; responding to the Other without violence is 
impossible. The Other places a demand or a call that the self cannot evade and cannot 
paradoxically fully meet because the Other is utterly beyond the self’s comprehension.  
Questions about Otherness are particularly pressing in the presence of beauty in the early 
modern period because as I have discussed in previous chapters, the subject of beauty was 
integral to ideas of being, selfhood and the divine: beauty was crucial to order, harmony, 
proportion and perfection in the human body and the world. The ethical is relevant here because 
beauty is—to use a word Leontes uses to describe the parity between “affection” (1.2.140) and 
the “unreal” (143)—“coactive” with the ethical. Leontes’ mad ravings in lines 130-48—
occurring moments after his “tremor cordis”—are notoriously difficult to interpret. The syntax 
and sudden breaks mimic the state of his mind. He seems to be talking about “affection” or 
strong passion but breaks off and begins again: “With what’s unreal thou coactive art, / And 
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fellow’st nothing. Then ’tis very credent  / Thou mayst co-join with something” (143-45). For 
this particular instance, the OED defines “coactive” as “taking place together.” My suggestion 
that beauty is “coactive” with the ethical underscores that moments of encounter with beauty are 
necessarily ethical in the Levinasian sense. And, while issues of ethical comportment arise in any 
interaction between the self and the Other, they are heightened in an encounter with beauty. 
Beauty, too, calls for a response; like the ethical, it initiates us into an awareness of the Other and 
identifies a desire for a nonviolent relationship with the Other, and can thus illuminate critical 
conversations on alterity. As I elaborate later, beauty and the ethical are, in turn, linked to a 
religious term that is very important in the play: grace. Like beauty and the ethical, grace too, 
identifies something absolutely Other that cannot be accessed voluntarily. 
Early Modern Perspectives on Beauty and Alterity  
 
An early modern reader would be familiar with similar notions of otherness and alterity 
through an understanding of the topical religious concept of grace, its transcendence and beauty. 
To be clear, even though I read Nehamas’ description of beauty “as the emblem of what we lack” 
(76), and Scarry’s call for a philosophical attention to beauty as an engagement with Levinas’ 
conception of the ethical, the Neoplatonic conception of beauty, the religious concept of grace 
and Levinas’ ethical are not synonymous; nonetheless, they are all linked because they all point 
to some notion of transcendence and Otherness. The complex reactions to beauty in The Winter’s 
Tale make it clear that Shakespeare is thinking through the nature of the response that beauty 
calls for, and this interest is reflected in another early modern text that also sheds light on this 
correspondence between beauty, grace and Otherness—Thomasso Buoni’s extensive discourse 
on beauty, Problemes of Beautie and all humane affections, which was first translated and 
published in English in 1606. The publication of a second edition more than a decade later in 
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1618 suggests the possibility of a continuing interest in the topic of beauty. This book offers an 
early modern perspective on the importance of beauty and the complex responses it generates.  
Buoni, a Luccan cleric, presents a largely Neoplatonic concept that initially echoes 
Castiglione’s more famous discussion of beauty in Book Four of The Book of the Courtier. 
According to Castiglione, it is physical beauty that first initiates the ascent on the ladder of love; 
sublimated passion then leads to the contemplative process that eventually leads to knowledge of 
the divine. Buoni similarly suggests that beauty can “direct the minde of man to the knowledge 
of the magnificence of our great God” (sig. B7r); “by a sweete kind of invitation [it] pricke[s] us 
forwarde to the knowledge of the originall fountaine of all good”(sig. B8r).11 For Buoni, 
however, beauty is not just physical attractiveness, although it is “especially apprehended by the 
sight” (sig. C4r); it exists entwined in a complex relationship with love, passion and grace. Buoni 
suggests that while beauty is the most visible and clear footprint of goodness that the mortal eye 
can discover, it is paradoxically inexpressible: “the beauties of Gods creatures cannot be 
considered of without wonder, without astonishment,” much as the beauty of visible natural 
phenomenon (like snowfall) “can never be expressed” (sig. B9v). Regardless of our attempts to 
articulate the nature of beauty, “we are but as it were stammering children in expressing the 
beauties of corporall things” (sig. B10r). 
In addition to the complexity of articulating the experience of beauty, Buoni suggests a 
fraught relationship—relevant to our reading of The Winter’s Tale—between beauty and art, 
what he calls “naturall Beauty” and “artificial Beauty” respectively: 
It was only Beauty that did first minister the occasion unto arte, to find out 
the knowledge of Carving, painting, building, to finde out the models, 
prospectives, and rich furniture of so many proud, and wonderful edifices: 
and from hence have our Poets taken occasion to celebrate not only naturall 
                                                
11 Buoni writes somewhat more in the vein of Montaigne: he proposes a problem and raises a question and then tries 
to answer it in various permutations and combinations, giving a series of options, each beginning with “perhaps.”  
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Beauty, but artificial: not only Beauty of the body, but of the minde too: 
into much that many times with the sweetness of their verse they leave the 
reader full of wonder & astonishment. (sig. B10v) 
Beauty provides the grounds or opportunity for art. While nature can be an example of the 
beauty of the body (“naturall beauty”), the existence of art (“artificial beauty”) is attributed to the 
beauty of the mind. The beauty of the mind is linked to the ability of creating art. Even though 
artificial beauty may be prompted by nature, and be contingent on it, Buoni seems to challenge 
the hierarchy between body and mind where mind is at a higher plane, and between natural and 
artificial where artificial is lower. 
However, while discussing Problem 6 “Wherefore doth Beauty always delight?” (sig. 
C5r), Buoni moves away from this position as he describes the possibility of the beauty of the 
mind as “incorporall Beauty”(sig. C6r). In keeping with the style of the entire book, Buoni’s aim 
here seems to be less to provide definitive solutions and more to offer suggestions and 
possibilities on issues related to beauty. In this Problem, the beauty of the mind or incorporeal 
beauty is a beauty that invites us to contemplation. The nature of incorporeal beauty is not 
explained, and all we know is that it is something that is “apprehended by the inward senses” 
(sig. C6r) and that it has to be in a combination with corporeal beauty to always delight. Later, 
when Buoni is discussing Problem 15, he provides a clue to the nature of this incorporeal beauty:  
[…] Beauty being in itselfe altogether earthly is little esteemed: but the 
grace thereof being a certaine celestiall beame, issuing from the bright 
Spheare of the Beauty of the minde, is dispersed through all the members of 
the body, and accompanieth them in all their motions, and therefore is 
deemed the first qualitie, necessarie to the framing of a compleat Beauty. 
(sig. D3r) 
Grace, which is described as a “celestial beam,” is essential to complete beauty. Buoni suggests 
“if to bodily Beauty, there be added that grace, which manifesteth it selfe in all the motions both 
of the bodie and of the minde, it presently worketh in every man an opinion, of perfect Beauty” 
  85 
   
(sigs. D3r-D4V). Clearly then the incorporeal beauty that can be apprehended only by “inward 
senses” is grace; it is what invites contemplation and is necessary for “perfect Beauty.” Grace, 
which cannot be perceived by “outward senses” at first, unless it is dispersed through motions of 
the body, is the “first qualitie” of a complete beauty. This creates a subtle hierarchy that gives 
primacy to the beauty of the mind over the beauty of the body.  
But at the same time, we recall that the beauty of the mind is also manifest through art 
(“artificial Beauty”). Thus, according to Buoni, both art that is corporeal and grace that is 
incorporeal are attributed to the beauty of the mind. As we read The Winter’s Tale, it will be 
important to remember that while both art and grace are ascribed to the mind, art is “artificial 
Beauty” and grace is the “first qualitie” of “compleat Beauty.” The question arises, if this 
seminal aspect of beauty, grace, cannot be perceived through outward senses, how are we to 
experience it and respond to this notion of incorporeal beauty? We can begin to work our way 
back from perceiving grace as it is dispersed through the motions of the body to grace as 
incorporeal beauty, but we will still only be engaging with or encountering something that 
remains immaterial, inexpressible and unknown. Furthermore, Buoni’s conception of incorporeal 
beauty as something that cannot be adequately either perceived or expressed resonates with 
Scarry’s idea that beauty directs our attention to “what is absent”  (109) as well as with 
Nehamas’ idea that beauty is “more like something calling me without showing exactly what it is 
calling me to” (78). To put this in other words, for Buoni, an encounter with “compleat Beauty” 
and grace is an encounter with a certain Otherness. Clearly then, early modern issues about 
engagements with beauty and its irreducibility have obvious resonances with contemporary 
conversations about ethics and alterity. 
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 To return, then, to Shakespeare: the playwright, I am arguing, is thinking through many 
of the issues later considered by Levinas, Scarry and Nehamas. To better see this “dramatic 
thought” at work it is useful to look at Leontes’ response to beauty in the beginning of the play. I 
argue that in his irrational rage against Hermione and his rejection of the Oracle, Leontes is 
dramatized as reacting against the very idea of beauty that is manifest in the person of Hermione, 
and later the Oracle. Patricia S. Gourlay has already made a convincing argument that “in her 
initial appearance Hermione is already identified for the first time with the highest of 
Neoplatonic qualities, grace” (378). Indeed, Hermione is constantly associated with grace and its 
derivatives: Polixenes addresses her as “Oh, my most scared lady” (1.2.76) and “gracious 
Queen” (1.2.458); Paulina calls her “gracious dam” (3.2.198); and Hermione herself playfully 
utters “Grace to boot!” (1.2.80) and “’Tis grace indeed” (105). In response to Leontes’ 
accusations, Hermione nobly replies, “This action I now go on/ is for my better grace” (2.1.122-
23), implying that her punishment with make her appear more gracious when she is proven to be 
blameless.  
To Gourlay’s identification of Hermione with Neoplatonic grace, I would add 
corresponding beauty. I base this argument in part on the early modern philosophical and 
theological correspondence between grace and beauty. In addition to that, reading Leontes’ 
initial violent reaction to Hermione as also being directed against beauty makes him more 
consistent with his predecessor, Greene’s Pandosto, who similarly responds violently to his 
wife’s beauty. When Pandosto (Leontes) is struck with jealousy, his very first response is 
directed toward Bellaria’s (Hermione’s) beauty: “… a certain melancholy passion entering the 
mind of Pandosto drave him into sundry and doubtful thoughts. First, he called to mind the 
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beauty of his wife Bellaria” (5, emphasis added). Similarly, Leontes’ response to Hermione is 
also a reaction against beauty. 
Another parallel to Leontes’ reaction against Hermione’s beauty can be found his 
response to the Oracle. I read this moment not only as a rejection of beauty but also a rejection of 
wonder and futurity. We get a glimpse into the nature of the Oracle in a brief exchange between 
Cleomenes and Dion. For Cleomenes, who is struck by the beauty of Delphi, “The climate’s 
delicate, the air most sweet, / Fertile the isle, the temple much surpassing / The common praise it 
bears” (3.1.1-3). Humphrey Tonkin correctly suggests that the Oracle has “a narrative of the 
future – a narrative that Hermione remains faithful to even as Leontes repudiates it. It is a 
narrative that comes from a distant country, a place of beauty and wonder and natural fertility as 
Cleomenes and Dion describe it” (35). Dion is “caught” (i.e. charmed) by “celestial habits” and 
the actions performed at Apollo’s temple: “O, the sacrifice! / How ceremonious, solemn, and 
unearthly / It was i’th’ off’ring!” (31.1.6-8). Dion describes the sacrifice as unearthly, as 
something he cannot quite articulate or understand. He can only remark at its strangeness and 
irreducibility.  
Cleomenes comes to a close approximation of a nonviolent response to Otherness in his 
reaction to the voice of the Oracle; he says that it “so surprised my sense / That I was nothing” 
(3.1.10-11). In other words, this moment of encounter with Otherness leads to a ceding of his 
self. He is not trying to reduce this experience of alterity by defining it in relation to his self.  His 
response is by way of a sacrifice of his self. Dion echoes both their hopes when he says, 
“gracious be the issue” (3.1.22). This also foreshadows Perdita’s eventual reunion with 
Hermione in its echo of Hermione’s declaration that on knowing “that the oracle / Gave hope” 
she had preserved herself “to see the issue” (5.3.128-29). Leontes of course, repudiates the 
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Oracle: “There is no truth at all i’th’ oracle. … This is mere falsehood” (3.2.139-40). In rejecting 
the Oracle, Leontes is simultaneously rejecting Hermione and Perdita (the baby) and all they that 
they stand for—beauty, grace and Otherness.12  
While Leontes’ responses are deliberately violent, both of Florizel’s responses have been 
inadvertently violent. He can only respond to Perdita’s beauty by taking control of it—first more 
overtly, through violent allusions and later, more subtly, by desiring her to become an animated 
statue, a work of art. This violent engagement, a violation of an ethical relationship, precludes 
the possibility of redemption. Considering all this, the play does not really allow for a nonviolent 
response to beauty, a response, following Scarry and Levinas, that does not disrupt the Otherness 
of the beautiful object, one that causes a radical decentring of the subject and initiates us into an 
awareness of something Other. It raises the question of how a response to beauty is possible 
without turning the beautiful person into art or an aesthetic object.   
Responses to Beauty in Pandosto and Garrick’s 1785 Adaptation of The Winter’s 
Tale  
 
Shakespeare is thinking through the nature of the response to beauty in a way that is 
markedly different from his predecessors and successors who have worked on similar subject 
material. Significantly, the struggle to respond to beauty is absent from Greene’s prose romance 
Pandosto, one of the sources for Shakespeare’s play: Dorastus (the Florizel figure) does not face 
the ekphrastic complexity that Florizel faces when he encounters Fawnia (the Perdita figure), and 
more importantly, the encounter with art and nature (in the form of the statue) that Leontes faces 
in Shakespeare is absent in Greene. And yet surprisingly, Pandosto has a much greater emphasis 
on Fawnia’s beauty than we have seen in Shakespeare and it is mostly articulated through 
                                                
12 See Walter S. H. Lim’s “Knowledge and Belief in The Winter’s Tale” where he reads Leontes’ rejection of the 
Oracle as a rejection of faith that is eventually corrected by his acceptance of the unknowable in the statue scene. 
  89 
   
Dorastus: she “seemed to be the goddess Flora herself for beauty” (38); “Dorastus thought her 
outward beauty was but a counterfeit to darken her inward qualities, wondering how so courtly 
behaviour could be found in so simple a cottage” (43); Dorastus “stood gazing with piercing 
looks on her surpassing beauty” (49). In one of the longer passages where Dorastus is dwelling 
on Fawnia’s beauty, he comes to a conclusion that resonates closely with the idea that beauty is a 
demand for a response: “Yea, but beauty must be obeyed because it is beauty, yet framed of the 
Gods to feed the eye, not to fetter the heart … I will, therefore, obey, because I must obey” (43). 
The reason that beauty must be “obeyed” or responded to simply because beauty is beauty is 
difficult to gloss. What is it that is so intrinsic to the concept of beauty that it defies explanation? 
The only thing that can be said for certain about beauty is that while it does not bind by way of 
emotion (“fetter the heart”), it has such a strong albeit curious hold on Dorastus that he “must” 
respond. The nature of this hold, of this compulsion, appears similar to the demand of the 
Levinasian Other for response. Perhaps then it is the Otherness of beauty that makes this 
demand; the Otherness of beauty and our inability ever to articulate it is what defines it. 
 To move from a precursor to a successor, David Garrick revived Shakespeare’s play with 
The winter's tale, or Florizel and Perdita. A dramatic pastoral, altered from Shakspeare in 1785. 
Interestingly, Garrick altered Florizel’s speech in this version. In its entirety it reads: 
What you do, 
Still betters what is done—when you speak, sweet, 
I’d have you do it ever; when you sing, 
I’d have you buy and sell so; so give alms; 
Pray, so; and for the ordering your affairs, 
To sing them too, and when you dance 
Like a smooth wave by gentlest winds heav’d up, 
So move you to the music’s dulcet breath, 
That I cou’d wish the motion were perpetual. (20) 
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The last four lines are different from Shakespeare’s play. Additionally, Shakespeare’s version 
includes four more lines, but these have been omitted in Garrick’s version. Garrick’s differs here:  
“[…] when you dance / Like a smooth wave by gentlest winds heav’d up, / So move you to the 
music’s dulcet breath, / That I cou’d with the motion were perpetual.” This altered speech praises 
Perdita’s beauty and her dance but the desire to transform her into an infinitely available 
experience that “owns no other function” is notably absent. Additionally, Florizel’s response is 
modified by “cou’d,” which implies more a possibility or a request than an absolute desire. 
Florizel’s response here is not problematic in the way it is in Shakespeare: there is no desire to 
make Perdita art or to witness her as an animated statue.  
While talking about revivals of the play in the 1750s, Maurice Hunt discusses the 
liberties that writers took “with Shakespeare’s script in order to erase many of the 
‘improbabilities’” (6). Garrick reduced the play to the last three acts and made several changes, 
including this one, to make the play more “probable”. In addition, a few songs were added to the 
sheep-shearing scene; two notable songs, sung by Perdita in response to the Old Shepherd’s 
request, are produced here to show how other “improbabilities”; in this case the complexity of art 
and nature, is erased by Garrick. Perdita sings: 
    II 
We harbour no passions, by luxury taught; 
We practise no arts, with hypocrisy fraught; 
What we think in our hearts, you may read in our eyes; 
For knowing no falsehood, we need no disguise.  
    III 
By mode and caprice are the city dames led,  
But we, as the children of nature, are bred; 
By her hand alone, we are painted and dress’d; 
For the roses will bloom, when there is peace in the breast.  
(21, emphasis added) 
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Coming soon after Florizel’s praise, Perdita is singing specifically about not practicing art, 
needing “no disguise,” even as she is emphasizing that it is by nature’s “hand alone” that she is 
“painted and dressed.” In essence, Garrick’s Perdita is making the same argument Shakespeare’s 
Polixenes makes to counter Perdita’s take on the famous exchange about gillyvors: “This is an 
art / Which does mend nature-change it rather; but / The art itself is nature” (4.4.95-97). 
Garrick’s Perdita rejects the practising of art by equating it to hypocrisy, falsehood and disguise, 
but like Shakespeare’s Polixenes she is also admitting to the goodness of nature’s art. For 
Shakespeare’s Perdita the gillyvors are “nature’s bastards” but in this song Perdita is legitimizing 
herself and other shepherdesses as “children of nature.” Garrick’s Perdita makes her stance more 
encompassing and effortlessly combines nature and (nature’s) art. Shakespeare’s Perdita 
however, even after Polixenes’ convincing argument, still rejects the gillyvors and refuses to 
plant them in her garden, thus denying any straightforward resolution or integration between art 
and nature. In Shakespeare’s play then, the categories of art and nature can be seen to persist as 
exclusive from each other, much as they do for Buoni. It can also be argued that even though the 
gap between these categories may appear to be bridged in the last scene, art and nature are not 
bound in easy reconciliation: Shakespeare’s plays take on this issue is much more nuanced and 
less definitive than Garrick’s adaptation, suggesting once again that Shakespeare is trying to 
work through this problem of a nonviolent response to beauty.  
Beauty, Dance, and Grace: Comparing The Winter’s Tale to The Faerie Queene 
 
Florizel’s encounter with beauty finds a much closer and interesting predecessor in Book 
VI of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, the book of Courtesy. When Calidore,13 being 
                                                
13 A.C. Hamilton, while glossing Calidore’s name as a composite of “beautiful+gift,” points out, “‘Beauty’ and ‘gift’ 
are key terms throughout Bk VI, culminating in a gift to Calidore: a vision of the graces who ‘to men all gifts of 
grace do graunt’ (x 15.4)” (603). 
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hosted by the shepherds, first sees Pastorella—who is like Perdita, also a king’s lost daughter, 
raised by shepherds—he is struck by her beauty and stands “gazing still” at her dance with the 
other lasses (Canto ix.11.9). Pastorella is described as “a fair damzell, which did weare a crowne 
/ Of sundry flowers, with silken ribbands tyde, / Yclad in home-made greene that her owne hands 
had dyed” (Canto ix.7.7-9). The visual image that these lines create must have not been too far 
off from how Perdita is introduced in the sheep-shearing scene. Like Perdita, Pastorella’s grace 
exceeds her station:  
 And smoothly sue she was full fayre of face, 
 And perfectly well shapt in euery lim, 
 Which she did more augment with modest grace, 
 And comely carriage of her count’nance trim.  
     (Canto ix.9.1-4) 
 
Calidore responds to Pastorella’s grace and beauty thus: 
 So stood he still long gazing thereupon,  
 Ne any will had thence to moue away, 
 Although his quest were farre afore him gon; 
But after he had fed, yet did he stay, 
And sate there still, vntill the flying day 
Was farre forth spent …. 
    (Canto ix.12) 
 
In his admiration of beauty, Calidore is caught at once in time past, present and future—all 
occurring at once in a moment of stillness—and he allows himself to move with the beauty he is 
witnessing. While Florizel seeks to impose his desire on Perdita and puts her in a temporal loop, 
Calidore responds to Pastorella’s beauty differently. He specifically does not pass judgment on 
this experience of beauty and he certainly does not try to interpret it; unlike Florizel, he is simply 
opening himself up to the experience of beauty in this paradoxical still present, not aspiring to 
know what it might bring. In other words, he gives himself over to this moment of beauty, to this 
experience of alterity.  
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A much more detailed and complex encounter with beauty occurs when Calidore 
witnesses the vision at Mount Acidale in Canto X; his response here suggests he is more of a 
counterpart to Florizel. He sees a hundred naked maidens “All raunged in a ring, and dauncing in 
delight” (11.9):  
 All they without were raunged in a ring, 
And daunced round; but in the midst of them 
Three other Ladies did both daunce and sing, 
The whilest the rest them round about did hemme, 
And like a girlond did in compasse stemme: 
And in the middest of those same three, was placed 
Another Damzell, as a precious gemme, 
Amidst a ring most richly well enchaced, 
That with her goodly presence all the rest much graced.  
     (Canto x.12) 
The Damzell, occupying Venus’ traditional place at the centre of the dancing Graces, reminds us 
of Pastorella surrounded by her shepherdesses. The Damzell is caught in a concentric circular 
movement “in compasse” and along with the Graces, appears like a flower, to the “stemme” that 
the naked maidens form. Lila Geller suggests, “She is like a gem set in a ring; the comparison is 
significantly one of artifice, of created beauty of setting” (269). However, Hamilton suggests that 
this is a moment when “nature becomes art, for she is enchaced, i.e. set as a jewel in a ring, 
adorned by the graces” (669, emphasis in the original). Much like Perdita who is partaking in 
both nature and art when she is dancing, the Damzell too is both in sync with nature and art at 
once. Surrounded by movements of dance, she seems to be a fixed, still point around which 
others revolve.  
Initially, Calidore responds to this “gift” of beauty with amazement: “Much wondred 
Calidore at this straunge sight, / … And standing long astonished in spright, / And rapt with 
pleasaunce” (17.1-4). But this is immediately replaced with a desire to know and interpret—
“Whether it were the traine of beuties Queene,/ Or Nymphes, or Faeries, or enchaunted show, / 
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With which his eyes mote haue deluded beene”—that leads to the destruction of the experience 
of beauty. He responds by “resoluing, what it was, to know, / Out of the wood he rose, and 
toward them did go” (8-9). Hamilton points out that Calidore is “not content with enjoying the 
vision, [and] is determined to know—its carnal sense in present” (670). He wants to grasp the 
knowledge of this experience of alterity. In other words, he wants to make meaning out of what 
he does not understand and is propelled by a desire to make this vision tangible. This a need to 
grasp physically knowledge of what he is seeing and to make meaning out of it, is similar to 
Florizel’s desire to interpret Perdita. In fact, in desiring to know whether what he saw was an 
“enchauted show,” Calidore also seems to be echoing Polixenes’ view of Perdita as an 
“enchantment.” Like Florizel and although less deliberately than Polixenes, Calidore’s response 
to the beautiful vision destroys it: “But soone as he appeared to their vew, / They vanisht all 
away out of his sight” (18.1-2). 
Calidore’s self-description of his violent response to the vision—“rashly sought that, 
which I mote not see” (20.2)—can be applied to Florizel’s response to Perdita and Leontes’s 
response to the image of alterity of Polixenes and Hermione together (Act 1) as well. The OED 
defines “mote” as “Expressing permission or possibility: was (or were) permitted to, might, 
could.” Calidore rashly sought that which he could not see (know), that which was not possible 
to see. Geller notes, “The disappearance of the Graces upon the approach of Calidore suggests 
that the vision of the graces is also such a sacred mystery” (272). The word “see” does not just 
imply sight, for Calidore has seen the vision. The vision itself is not impossible to see; what is 
impossible to see is the grace that produces the vision and the alterity and Otherness that informs 
it. Calidore has responded with a desire to control and define what he has encountered. In effect, 
this violent response erases the vision.  
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A rather angry Colin Clout instructs him on the improperness of his response. Colin 
Clout asks rhetorically about the Damzell, the fourth Mayd: “Who can aread, what creature mote 
she bee, / Whether a creature, or a goddesse graced / With heauenly gifts from heuen first 
enraced?” (25.3-5). “Aread” means “declare” and Colin Clout seems to be suggesting that the 
Damzell’s beauty cannot be defined or articulated. Like Pastorella, and also Perdita, the Damzell 
outshines the other shepherdesses and “exceed the rest of all her race” (26.6). The Graces 
“graced her so much to be another Grace” (26.9). She is a fourth Grace. Gerald Snare notes that 
the fourth Grace is a “summation of all the other three” and is used as an encyclopaedic symbol” 
(353). In other words, the fourth Grace or Damzell has all the attributes of the other Graces in 
her, and she also symbolizes what Snare calls, “the infolded image of the dance of the Graces” 
(352).14 
It is important to recall here that like Hermione, Perdita, who as Time puts it, has “grown 
in grace,” is emphatically associated with grace in the play. As I mentioned earlier, the religious 
term “grace” is linked to beauty and the Levinasian ethical because it too identifies an 
exteriority, an Otherness that cannot be grasped or reduced to the self. Furthermore, the concept 
of grace is crucial in The Winters Tale. Charles R. Forker notes:  
The word grace together with its derivatives appears at least a dozen times 
in the play. Therefore, in addition to the central concern of how divine grace 
may manifest itself through nature, while, in another sense, being opposed 
to nature in its baser or fallen aspect, the word also connects to other 
themes. Among these are nature versus nurture, or true gentleness in 
relation to genetic origin, class, and rearing, and physical beauty in relation 
to moral and spiritual radiance. (120) 
 
The concept of grace in its multiple meanings is linked to Perdita’s beauty, with several critics 
positing the first half of the play as a tragic vision brought about by the world of law that is 
                                                
14 Snare explains that the image is “infolded” due to the concentric circles created by the maidens, then the Graces, 
with the fourth Grace (possibly a Venus figure) at the center.  
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redeemed in the latter half by the world of grace—grace that is brought about through the figure 
of Perdita.15  
Hermione asserts that her desire to see her daughter allowed her to preserve herself for 
sixteen years. After her unveiling, she entreats the “gods” to “pour [their] graces” on Perdita’s 
head and says to her, “thou shalt hear that I, / Knowing by Paulina that the oracle / Gave hope 
thou wast in being, have preserved / Myself to see the issue” (5.3.126-29). Hermione has 
preserved herself to see this issue—both Perdita and the outcome of the play—both of which 
imply the presence of grace. M.M. Mahood however, notes: “Perdita is really unnecessary if we 
read The Winter’s Tale as a kind of Grace Abounding, and we are forced to ask why Shakespeare 
could not have symbolized the spiritual health of the lapsed and forgiven soul by a single figure 
like Dante’ Beatrice or Blake’s Jerusalem” (221), adding that “Perdita plays the role of Nature 
complementary to Hermione’s role of Grace” (222). While it is complicated to characterize 
Perdita as a Beatrice, the overlap between her and Hermione makes it equally difficult to 
demarcate her as only “Nature” or only “Grace.” To use Mahood’s formulation, Perdita plays 
both roles. Perhaps then Perdita’s beauty is the play’s answer to the question Forker poses about 
“how divine grace may manifest itself through nature” (120).  
Florizel’s response however, does not take into account this aspect of Perdita’s beauty. In 
response to Problem 15, Buoni suggests: 
Beauty without that grace, which is discovered, either in the tongue or in the 
motion of the body, seemeth the Beauty of an Image, drawen in dead 
coulours, or rather a figure which either in marble, or brass, layeth open the 
worthy actes of Hercules, or Achilles, without any motion of the members, 
so that it seemeth to be a dead Beauty in a live bodie. (D2v) 
 
                                                
15 See Ken Jackson’s “ ‘Grace to boot’: St. Paul, Messianic Time, and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” for an 
interesting account of grace and messianic time in the play, particularly his reading of Paul and the Corinthians 
based on which he reminds us how “the distinction between ‘law’ and ‘faith’ is nullified” (197). 
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Additionally, “Beauty without grace causeth every part and qualitie belonging there unto to 
languish” (D3r). Beauty devoid of grace is like “a dead beauty” that is comparable to a painting 
(“the Beauty of an Image, drawen in dead coulours”) or a sculpture (a figure in marble or brass). 
Florizel’s desire that Perdita be fixed in a continuous motion and “own no other function” can be 
read as a desire for her to become art. In the absence of grace, she is reduced to what Buoni 
would call only the “Beauty of the body” and thus an incomplete and lifeless beauty. And 
Florizel has been unable to respond nonviolently to the Otherness of Perdita’s beauty. He is not, 
pace Scarry, ceding his self in the presence of beauty.  
The Dance of the Graces 
 
Dance, along with music, was considered to be an imitation of the harmony of the 
universe. Ben Jonson, for instance, “employs the dance as an image of order, particularly the 
order of the heavens” in his masques (Meagher 82). The background against which Ben Jonson 
saw the dances of his masques is the background that Shakespeare and Spenser shared for the 
depiction of dance in their own work.16 John C. Meagher gives a detailed description of dance 
and music in the period and describes how “dance is also an image of love” (86) and is closely 
allied with beauty. He cites John Davies’ Orchestra, a Poem of Dancing (1596), as the locus 
classicus for the poetry of the dance. To dance is to “Imitate heau'n, whose beauties excellent / 
Are in continuall motion day and night, / And moue therby more wonder and delight” (12). The 
origins of dance are described thus: 
Dauncing (bright Lady) then began to be,  
When the first seedes whereof the world did spring  
                                                
16 Commenting on the importance of music and dance in the play, Northrop Frye reminds us, “Music also 
accompanies the revival of Hermione in the final scene of The Winter’s Tale. All the attention is absorbed in 
Hermione as she begins to move while music plays” (196). Frye adds, “[I]t is the dance [between Polixenes and 
Hermione] that most clearly expresses the pulsating energy of nature as it appears in The Winter’s Tale, an energy 
which communicates itself to the dialogue” (197). 
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The Fire, Ayre, Earth, and water did agree,  
By Loues perswasion, Natures mighty King,  
To learne their first disordred combating:  
And, in a daunce such measure to obserue,  
As all the world their motion should preserue.  
    (17) 
Dance movements convey the motion, order and beauty of the heavens. They represent a cosmic 
order and harmony of being.17 
The dance movements of the Graces at the summit of Mount Acidale convey two 
different orders of dance: 
Therefore they alwaies smoothly seeme to smile, 
That we likewise should mylde and gentle be, 
And also naked are, that without guile 
Or false dissemblaunce all them plaine may see, 
Simple and true from couert malice free: 
And eeke them selues so in their daunce they bore, 
That two of them still forward seem'd to bee,  
But one still towards shew'd her selfe afore; 
That good should from vs goe, then come in greater store. 
     (X.12, emphasis added) 
In the traditional order of the dance of the Graces, as depicted in Sandro Botticelli’s Primavera, 
one Grace has her back to the viewer and is facing the other two Graces who come towards the 
viewer (see Figure 9). Hamilton explains that this is what “forward” in Line 7 suggests. (The 
1596 edition reads ‘forward’.) Hamilton also points out, “some editors emend forward to 
‘froward’ 1611, an elision of ‘fromward’ (i.e. away from us), claiming that Spenser reverses the 
traditional order” (672, emphasis in original). In this case, two Graces would have their backs to 
the viewers and one would be facing them. Geller notes that the position of the Graces in this 
case is in agreement with Pico della Mirandola’s Commento (273).18 And it would be important 
                                                
17 Roy Strong, while discussing The Procession Picture (c.1600) in relation to Davies’ poem, comments: “… the 
idea of society as musically ordered, of political unity as musical harmony, of ritual and dance as physical 
expressions of such order, are commonplaces in Renaissance thought” (53). 
18 Pico notes, “Of the Graces one is painted looking toward us … The other two with their faces from us, seeming to 
return … What comes from God to us returns from us to God” (qtd. in Geller 273).  
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to remember that the context of Pico’s description of the Graces “is one in which the Graces are 
seen as unfolding from a Venus who is depicted as Ideal Beauty” (Geller 274). 
 
Figure 9: Detail of the Three Graces from Sandro Botticelli’s Primavera (c.1482).  
Source: Wikimedia Commons.  <http://commons.wikimedia.org>. 
 
Furthermore, while discussing the description of the Graces in Stanza 24 in Book VI, 
Catherine Bates talks about the ambiguity of how different readings of the word “then” 
transforms the meaning of the Graces’ motion from one of courteous reciprocity “into one of 
self-sacrifice, the giver expecting to get considerably less than he gave” (154). This is counter to 
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the traditional gloss on the dance of the Graces that expresses, as Hamilton notes, “the reciprocal 
movement of receiving and returning and then giving and receiving” (602). But to read the 
motion as suggesting self-sacrifice, without the expectation to receive more or even the same, 
seems to suggest a different possibility. Self-sacrifice in the presence of beauty does not imply 
self-obliteration.19 Rather, this formulation suggests giving over to the experience of beauty 
without expectation of a return in the shape of, for instance, meaning or gratification. Perhaps 
this reading of the dance of the Graces, this motion of the Graces, is the answer to how we can 
respond to beauty nonviolently.   
Playwright-Artist-Courtier Figure 
 
We should not forget, however, that it is Colin Clout who is describing this experience of 
beauty to Calidore after he has reprimanded him; Calidore himself has not seen this exact dance. 
He needs Colin Clout to explain the inexplicable and ineffable, just as Leontes needs a Paulina 
prompting him on how to respond to the image of the still moving beauty of Hermione—Paulina 
instructs him, “It is required / you do awake your faith” (5.3.94-95).20 Ultimately, for Calidore, 
too, it is the artist-persona who shapes his responses, a parallel perhaps to the playwright-artist 
figure, Paulina, who is shaping the audiences’ responses through the aesthetic.21 Significantly, 
Paulina is entirely Shakespeare’s creation. Green’s Pandosto had no Paulina, no Antigonus (a 
                                                
19 For a different perspective on beauty and self-sacrifice, see Collinges who vehemently disparages earthly and 
physical notions of beauty “whether naturall or artficiall, borrowd from the Painter or Taylor” (sig. 48), expounding 
the need to efface the self (and all its associations with the material world and its people) entirely to make oneself 
deserving of grace.  
20 See Gross (1992) who contends that Paulina is instructing not only the onlookers, but is also persuading and 
urging both Leontes and the statue (102-06). For a compelling reading of this scene as a response to iconoclasm, see 
Michael O’Connell’s 2000 The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early Modern England. See also Huston 
Diehl’s 1997 Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage: Protestantism and Popular Theater in Early Modern England 
on the relationship of forbidden spectacles and theatricality to Protestant reformed drama. Additionally, see Knapp 
who nuances O’Connell to argue that the scene is one of radical iconoclasm—one where Leontes’ ethical response 
to Hermione’s statue, a response of openness to the unknown without a desire to control it, occurs when he heeds 
Paulina’s call. 
21 For Paulina as artist, see Patricia S. Gourlay’s “‘O my most scared lady’: Female Metaphor in The Winters Tale.” 
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courtier) and no Autolycus (who poses as a courtier). In Shakespeare’s play, Paulina functions 
not only as an artist figure (like Prospero in The Tempest), but also as the courtier figure after the 
death of her husband, Antigonus.22  
While Paulina is not quite the courtier Castiglione describes in The Book of the Courtier, 
her function in the play bears a certain resemblance to the aspects of a courtier Castiglione has 
famously outlined. The ideal courtier needs to possess a certain sprezzatura, 
so as to conceal all art and make whatever is done or said appear to be 
without effort and almost without any thought about it. And … much grace 
comes of this: because everyone knows the difficulty of things that are rare 
and well done; wherefore facility in such things causes the greatest wonder 
… Therefore we may call that art true art which does not seem to be art. 
(32, emphasis added) 
Sprezzatura had been wrongly glossed as recklessness or nonchalance.23 Simply put, it is the art 
of making the difficult look easy or, in other words, the art of making art look natural. In 
addition to possessing this quality, the courtier should aspire toward beauty, as explicated in 
Book 4 through Pietro Bembo. An older courtier will be more adept at attaining the ideal of 
beauty since he can move beyond just the physical aspects of beauty, and an older courtier will 
also be better at advising the ruler. It is interesting to consider that Paulina as a courtier serves as 
an advisor to Leontes, uses sprezzatura in a unique way to make art look natural (or “true art”) 
and prompts Leontes to respond to its beauty. She “calls for music, music which will help change 
the nature of Hermione’s statue” (Crider 27). Grace and wonder accompany this moment when 
art is seemingly transformed into nature. Paulina is indeed the courtier par excellence (only the 
wrong gender). 
                                                
22 For the idea of Paulina as a courtier figure, I am indebted to a lecture given by Lawrence Rhu at the 2009 
Shakespeare Symposium “Shakespeare and the History of Philosophy” at the Newberry Library in Chicago.  
23 Thomas Hoby translates sprezzatura as “recklessness” in his 1561 translation of Castiglione’s work; incidentally, 
Hoby’s was the only 16th-century English translation. 
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In Shakespeare’s hands Paulina as a playwright-courtier figure offers a solution to the 
problem of responding to the Otherness of beauty without doing violence to it: the solution is the 
still moving statue coming to life. This comes after Leontes responds by opening himself up or 
giving himself over to the strangeness of this experience. Gross discusses how the animation of 
statues (statues coming to life) brings about a recovery and restitution, but also makes another 
significant observation: 
The basic point is perhaps simply that the animation of a statue is not purely 
liberating metamorphosis, a trope of release from death, an image of 
achieved mimetic work; the fantasy can entail a fall as well as a 
resurrection, both a release from enchantment and its perpetuation, both a 
transcendence and a descent. The fantasy seems in general to convey the 
idea of a made, constructed image becoming autonomous but also alien; if it 
suggests a redemptive gift, the restoration of a dead sign to use and relation, 
it may also suggest a kind of theft of life, as if something already 
autonomous was forced to yield to the demands of a life not proper to it. (9) 
 
Additionally, while discussing the statue scene and the “complexly ambivalent staging of a 
statue’s animation,” Gross cautions against “any too idealized reading of the final scene” (108).  
Indeed, by the end of the play, Leontes might be responding to Hermione’s “statue”—to its 
beauty and to it as art—but he has not done that with the live Hermione. Scott Crider too points 
out that Hermione’s first words when she stirs “remind us that the restoration is incomplete” 
(28). The animation of this statue is thus accompanied with the reminder that losses are 
unaccounted. To quote Gross’s thought-provoking summing up of the scene, “Finally, the 
enchantment of the scene is in the wilfulness of the fiction of disenchantment, the fantasy of the 
relinquishment of fantasy—the rebirth into a world in which possibly everything, possibly 
nothing, has changed” (109).  The possibility that nothing has changed is one worth considering. 
Perdita still remains, to borrow a phrase Hermione uses to describe herself in relation to Leontes, 
“in the level of [Florizel’s] dreams” (3.2.80) and Florizel has not been able to engage non-
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violently with her beauty. Like Perdita, the play remains suspended in a continuous repetition of 
the initial tragic and violent movement;24 this provokes us to reassess the theme of redemption, 
particularly at the conclusion of this romance.  
Indeed, Paulina prompts the audience on how to respond to the aesthetic, but the play 
does not offer an alternative to responding to beauty as anything but—to reinterpret a phrase 
from Leontes’ mad raptures—“coactive art”.25 Coactive not only means “taking place together,” 
it also means “of the nature of force or compulsion; coercive, compulsory” (OED). It is in the 
latter sense that I use it now to suggest that the responses to beauty forcibly perceive it as art. 
The play suggests that a nonviolent response to art might be possible (as Leontes does in the 
presence of Hermione’s ‘statue’) but a nonviolent response to an individual’s beauty is fraught 
with paradoxes and is near impossible to perform and stage. The concept of a nonviolent 
response to alterity works philosophically in Spenser and for Scarry; in the motion of the Graces, 
Spenser even offers us a clue on how to respond to beauty. But it is drama that lends itself 
uniquely to exploring the complexity and paradoxes of this issue, and helps tease out a plurality 
in our understanding and analysis. The question persists: if the ethical—ironically, much like 
Leontes’ “affection”—“fellow’st nothing” or is companioned with nothing else (no subject, no 
object) then how can a nonviolent response to beauty be performed? This issue is important 
because it presses us for a clearer philosophical distinction between beauty and the aesthetic, art 
                                                
24 The idea of suspension, and a continuous repetitive movement is particularly laden when we consider, as Inga-
Stina Ewbank reminds us, that Shakespeare “chose a story with the sub-title ‘The Triumph of Time’ and developed 
it in a fashion which suggest a deepening and enrichment, rather abandonment, of time-thinking” (139). 
Additionally, to see how the notion of time is confusing for the characters in the play, see Jackson’s “ ‘Grace to 
boot’: St. Paul, Messianic Time, and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale” where he explains the differences and 
similarities between chronological, virtual and actual time.  
25 (1.2.136-145) Shakespeare, however, is using the word “art” in the early modern sense sense: “are” in this 
passage: “with what’s unreal thou coactive art.”  See footnote 7 for full passage. 
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and nature; it is a distinction that, given the dominant presence of Neoplatonism and the 
emphasis on beauty in early modern literature, is crucial. More importantly perhaps, it informs us 
of the acute difficulties of responding non-violently to any concept of the Other.  
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Chapter 4 
The Other of Beauty Manifested: Beauty, Identity, and 
Otherness in Othello and Omkara 
 
The previous chapters of this dissertation offer an analysis of beauty in philosophical, 
theological, and literary discourses in the early modern period and have established the close 
relation between beauty and ethics. In this chapter I study Othello and Vishal Bhardwaj’s 2006 
Indian cinematic adaptation of the play, Omkara, to examine what the opposite or converse of 
beauty—its other—might be. Is it, as the film suggests, ugliness and unattractiveness, is it 
something that is marginalized by society, or is it a kind of cultural otherness? This examination 
sheds light on the intersubjective relation between beauty and “ugliness” that gives us insight 
into the relationship that lies at the heart of the philosophical notion of ethics—between the self 
and the Other. I use the filmic interpretation to illuminate Shakespeare’s play and to address 
some of the play’s old critical problems anew. Additionally, an attention to beauty and its 
ostensible opposite in the context of the play and the film helps us reassess the figure of Iago: 
rather than seeing Iago as a Vice figure, I propose that Iago is better viewed as a tragic 
philosopher figure who, in an encounter with beauty, gains insight into the nature of identity and 
selfhood. 
Religious, Social, and Philosophical Connotations of Beauty in Othello  
Beauty is presented and perceived in different ways in the play. Most obviously, it is 
associated with the figure of the fair Venetian, Desdemona: she is described as “a maid so tender, 
air, and happy” (1.2.67), a “most exquisite lady” (2.3.17), “most fresh and delicate creature” 
(2.3.20), as “perfection” (2.3.25), and as “so lovely fair” (4.2.70). In Desdemona, beauty is 
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certainly a physical attribute but her beauty also carries divine and philosophical connotations. 
This is most evident when she arrives on the shore of Cyprus and Cassio describes her thus: 
…a  maid   
That paragons description and wild fame,  
One that excels the quirks of blazoning pens,  
And in th’ essential vesture of creation  
Does tire the engineer. (2.1. 64-66)   
Bevington glosses these lines as, “and in her real, God-given, beauty, (she) defeats any attempt 
to praise her” (1166). The “essential vesture” or the essential clothing of creation refers to the 
naked body. Cassio is evoking a classic motif of beauty in the early modern period—of a naked 
Venus arriving on the shores of Cyprus, which is famously depicted in Titian’s Venus 
Anadyomene (c.1520) and Botticelli’s The Birth of Venus (1486). Cassio is painting a similar 
image of “the divine Desdemona” for who tempests, high seas, and howling winds, “having a 
sense of beauty, do omit / Their mortal nature” (2.1.70-75). In addition to these evocations of 
Venus Anadyomene (Venus rising from the waves), Desdemona is also viewed as Venus Armata 
(armed Venus) or a type of Venus Victrix (victorious Venus) who symbolizes military victory 
that is evident in Othello’s greeting, “Oh, my fair warrior!” (2.1.192) as she arrives on the shores 
of Cyprus.   
Along with being affined to Venus and being a phenomenal representation of beauty, 
Desdemona is also depicted as a Marian figure—a figure of chastity, holiness, and divine beauty.  
Continuing his praise, Cassio speaks of Desdemona as if he was speaking of the Virgin Mary 
herself and creates a memorable image: 
Let her have your knees. 
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Hail to thee, lady! And the grace of heaven 
Before, behind thee, and on every hand  
Enwheel thee round! (2.1.86-89) 
The play contains several other references to Desdemona as a Marian figure. She is described as 
having “so blest a disposition” (2.3.314) and as “heavenly true” (5.3.140); she is compared to 
“votarist” (4.2.195) and she acts as an intercessor for Cassio to convince Othello to pardon him. 
Desdemona’s handkerchief is embroidered with strawberries, which is an emblem of the Virgin 
Mary as well as Venus;1 it is a description that is not in the source text of Cinthio, so it would 
appear that Shakespeare added this particular detail to emphasize Desdemona’s connection with 
both. Desdemona’s beauty is at once earthly and divine and evokes the pagan and amorous 
Venus as well as the holy and chaste Mary.  
It is important here to recall that for early moderns, Venus, the goddess of beauty and 
love, was symbolic of Humanitas—of disciplines that study the human condition.  In his letter to 
Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco, Marsilio Ficino writes about why a painting of Venus should viewed 
often and compares Venus to Humanity: 
For Humanity (Humanitas) herself is a nymph of excellent comeliness born of 
heaven and more than others beloved by God all highest. Her soul and mind are 
Love and Charity, her eyes Dignity and Magnanimity, the hands Liberality and 
Magnificence, the feet Comeliness and Modesty. The whole then, is Temperance 
and Honesty, Charm and Splendour. Oh, what exquisite beauty! How beautiful to 
behold. (Ficino's 1576 Opera Omnia, qtd. in Gombrich 42) 
 
Beauty, as represented through Venus, mattered for the same reason Humanitas did: it prompted 
and enabled an understanding of the human condition. Beauty became the symbol and source of 
                                                
1 See Lawrence J. Ross’ “The Meaning of Strawberries in Shakespeare,” which discusses the contradictory 
emblematic meanings of the embroidered strawberries. Ross examines how strawberries were associated with the 
Virgin Mary and the Child and also with righteousness and hypocrisy. See also, Farah Karim-Cooper’s Cosmetics in 
Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama (2006), which reads the red and white colors of the handkerchief as signifying 
the “Anglo-European feminine ideal” that is identified with Desdemona. (170)  
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humanistic inquiry that invited early moderns to explore everything related to being and beyond. 
In the play too, as I describe, beauty prompts inquiry into what it means to be human and 
facilitates knowledge of the self and its relationship to the Other.   
A similar idea of beauty emerges in the way Iago perceives Cassio. In his last soliloquy 
in the play, just after he instigates Roderigo to attack Cassio, Iago says, “If Cassio do remain, / 
He hath a daily beauty in his life / That makes me ugly” (5.1.18-20). What kind of beauty is this 
daily beauty and how does it make Iago ugly? We know that Cassio is young and is usually 
depicted as being good-looking in various stage and film adaptations. He is described as an 
engaging and a “proper man” (1.3.394) who is charming and well liked by women. If Iago is 
talking merely about physical beauty and attractiveness, then how does this particular trait in 
Cassio make Iago ugly? It cannot simply be an inversely proportional relation between physical 
beauty and ugliness; surely this “daily beauty” is more than physical beauty. Beauty, after all, as 
Thomas Jeamson’s 1665 Artificiall embellishments or arts best directions: How to Preserve 
Beauty or Procure it informs us, was deemed essential to be a part of society and for purposes of 
social mobility. Othello promoted Cassio over Iago, so Cassio’s promotion has stopped Iago’s 
social ascent. In this respect, Cassio’s beauty can be understood as is his social success and 
Iago’s lack of this same success marks him as ugly.   
Additionally, according to Jeamson, beauty enables people to become better versions of 
their selves. Ugliness is described as a “hideous Hagge,” as a disease, and people who do not 
have beauty are not fit to be a part of human society (sig. A4r). The implication for Iago is then 
also that since he is made ugly by Cassio’s beauty, he is also, as a result, unfit for society and is 
consequently alienated. That Cassio’s beauty has made Iago a metaphorical “Hagge” also 
implies an undermining of Iago’s masculine identity, an unsexing or emasculating of Iago. 
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Indeed, this would support Iago’s suspicions of Cassio as a sexual rival: “For I fear Cassio with 
my nightcap too” (2.1.309). Cassio’s beauty is thus a plausible cause for Iago’s jealousy: it has 
supplanted his position in society and it has also undermined his manhood, both of which are 
markers of his identity.  
Beauty, Identity, and Selfhood: Cassio’s Truth as Iago’s Fiction  
 
Sam Wood examines this connection between beauty and identity from a different angle. 
For Wood, beauty rightly becomes a placeholder for the idea of identity and also belonging. He 
begins by posing the question, “what it is about Cassio’s beauty that makes Iago ugly?” (par. 8, 
emphasis mine) He posits, “the degree to which Cassio seems to belong to his context and 
himself, of Cassio’s notion of home, and of Iago’s perception of Cassio as a “proper man” 
(1.3.391)” (par. 20). Wood goes on to contrast Cassio’s “daily beauty,” that is, his sense of 
belonging to himself, with Iago and Othello’s inability to belong. Unlike Iago, as I later show, 
who seems to be aware of the instability of any idea of a self, Cassio has a complete picture of 
what constitutes his being—his “place” in society.  
It is perhaps no coincidence that Cassio is a Florentine. Francesco Bocchi, in his 
encomium Bellezze della citta di fiorenza (The Beauties of the City of Florence), describes the 
beauty of Florence and Florentines, and argues for beauty as a civic asset, something that defines 
the wholeness and integrity of its people. Cassio’s sense of belonging, or his sense of being 
comfortable with his social and cultural identity is in no small part due to the fact that he is 
Florentine. John W. Draper discusses how Cassio “reflects Florentine elegance in speech and 
manner…a true gentleman, in both speech and action” (291). Iago, a Venetian, talks of Cassio 
disparagingly not only because of personal dislike but also because of, Draper argues, “the 
provincial animosity between the Italian city-states” (290). Draper points out that as a Florentine, 
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Cassio must have been trained in mathematics like the other Florentine officers for a new 
military approach that involved guns and building fortifications against them. This is precisely 
why Iago sneers at him for being “a great mathematician … a bookish theoric, / Wherein the 
togaed consuls can propose / as masterly as he. Mere prattle without practice / Is all his 
soldiership” (1.1.20, 25-7) This is also a reason why Othello promotes Cassio over the more old-
fashioned, albeit more experienced, Iago.  Unlike the displaced Iago, Cassio is comfortable in his 
identity as a Florentine in the world—he knows where he comes from and he knows how he is 
going to fit it. His “daily beauty” then defines Cassio not only for himself but also for others like 
Iago, whose cultural identity, just like Othello’s is never fully clear.2 
Cassio, then, is exactly the man Iago claims to have never encountered: “I never found 
man that knew how to love himself” (1.3.317-18).3 Cassio loves himself and is best described as 
being comfortable in his own skin. Woods argues that Cassio 
seems to have overcome any sense of fictionality by becoming the face of his 
society and culture in a way that Iago and Othello have not. Cassio is coherent 
with his context and, perhaps more crucially, seems quite at home in that context, 
giving no sign of any discrepancy between an interior self and external self. (par. 
24) 
This is not to say that because Cassio conflates what Wood calls “his interior and external self,” 
his character is in any way inferior. Cassio becomes one way of looking at and shaping identity, 
one that sees his self as a sum total of social status, and his geographical and historical context. 
Iago, on the other hand, questions these markers and maker of identity: he “sees the very idea of 
                                                
2 On the possibility of Iago being Spanish and/ or Jewish see Paula Blanks’ Shakespeare and the Mismeasure of 
Renaissance Man where she points out that Iago not only has a Spanish name but is also speaking Spanish and she 
refers to his screaming “Diablo!” when he pretends to break up the brawl between Cassio and Roderigo (2.3.155) 
(100). Also see Eric Griffin’s “Unsainting James: or, Othello and the Spanish Spirits of the Globe.”  
3 Iago speaks these lines in response to Roderigo’s despair over Desdemona’s marriage to Othello.  
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home, the origin of any essential being, to be a fiction, because he realizes that any home is no 
more than a collection of stories that gives a person identity” (Woods, par. 24).  
Another question that arises is how an encounter with beauty facilitates Iago’s realization 
about selfhood and identity. One way of understanding how beauty functions as a facilitator for 
knowledge is to turn to Immanuel Kant’s ideas about beauty and aesthetic judgment (see 
Appendix A). Aesthetic judgment for Kant is called “reflective” because it does not relate 
directly to the object but to the state of mind that is experienced as pleasure or displeasure. In 
Iago’s case, this would mean that he is less concerned about Cassio, his looks, and his social 
ascent, but more with what this encounter with beauty triggers off in his own mind. Aesthetic 
value lies in the bodily responses and judgments of taste of those individuals who experience the 
thing of beauty (the work of art or something in nature), rather than in the thing of beauty itself 
(in this case, Cassio). The main emphasis of Kant’s aesthetics is not on creativity or the 
production of the beautiful thing but on its reception and the experience of contemplation. Kant 
sees the beautiful not as qualities of an object but as that which would catalyze judgment; thus a 
lake (Kant’s example) is beautiful not because beauty is an intrinsic quality of the lake (or 
Cassio) but because of the experience that is produced at the sight of this lake. Beauty is thus not 
for beauty’s sake, but something is judged beautiful because of what it could do to and for the 
human being or the subject (Iago). This response to beauty is inherently contemplative and 
subjective. It occasions a moment of distancing not just from the object and the world, but also 
from what Kant calls agreeable and pleasure and thus, sensual desire. Aesthetic judgment also 
occasions a distancing from the self, in that this moment is intensely self- reflective: I am 
capable of experiencing and thinking that the lake is beautiful; I can understand the relation of 
my faculties to the world, and I can understand my limitations and the possibility of transcending 
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these very limitations. It becomes a moment of a kind of self-awareness, a realization of what 
constitutes subjecthood and subjectivity. For Iago, this moment of acute introspection becomes 
also a meditation on the fluidity of selfhood and, as I later argue when I return to a discussion of 
Shakespeare’s play, the limitation of the self and of knowledge in the face of an unknowable 
alterity.   
Forever Othering: Shifting Identities in Omkara  
 
At this juncture it is worthwhile to look at the Indian film adaptation Omkara (2006) 
because even as the film depicts Iago and Othello as not adequately complete and not wholly 
defined, it challenges, much like Iago, the notion of an essential being; it posits instead the fluid 
nature of the self and its relation to the other, and underscores the impossibility of a fixed 
determinate identity. The film is set in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh in a politically 
charged, violent, and rural landscape. It is directed by Vishal Bhardwaj who is has also 
composed the music and written the screenplay for this Shakespearean adaptation (his second 
after the 2004 Maqbool that was an adaptation of Macbeth). This is important to mention 
because even though the film is in Khariboli (Khari= “stiff”; boli=”speak”)--a regional dialect of 
Hindi that is spoken in the rural areas surrounding Delhi that helps set up a distinctly visceral and 
gritty backdrop and carries connotations of being unrefined and rustic—the dialogues and the 
songs contain very deliberately nuanced meanings that, in addition to echoing the original 
Shakespearean poetry, also help parse out and enhance several of the themes in Othello.  
The Othello figure is a gang leader named Omkara “Omi” Shukla (played by Ajay 
Devgan) who is a crucial player in the political mafia that uses violence to further a powerful 
politician’s (Bhaisahab, played by Naseerudin Shah) bid at elections. Lalita Pandit Hogan has 
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written in depth about the religious significance of the names in Omkara—linking the Othello, 
Iago, and Cassio figures with the Hindu Trinity of Shiva (the Destroyer), Brahma (the Creator), 
and Vishnu (the Preserver)—to highlight the cultural and historical significance of the adaptation 
in the Indian context.4 For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus on the literal meaning of the 
names in Omkara.  In Hindi “Omkara” is a name of God that can be translated as “I am,” “I 
exist,” or “I am existence.” “Omkara” also carries the implication of “making articulate,” or “to 
make manifest.” I contend that these meanings strongly resonate throughout this film adaptation 
as the important characters struggle with the quintessential questions of selfhood and autonomy, 
existence, and being a part of society.  
While Omkara enjoys respect, verging on reverence, his illegitimate birth is derogatorily 
harkened to throughout the film. Not only was he an illegitimate child, a harami as he is called, 
but he is derided even more because his mother belonged to a lower caste—she worked as a 
maid in his father’s household and is referred to as a kanjari, a prostitute. As a result, even 
though Omkara carries a Brahmin last name, Shukla, he is viewed as a mixed caste mongrel, 
often referred to derogatorily as adha Brahmin, a half or incomplete Brahmin. This description 
implies not just an undesirable social status but also a kind of undesirable intrinsic value in him. 
Within the Vedic Hindu caste system, a system of social stratification that is still prevalent in 
India, Brahmins were considered to belong to the highest caste. Member of this caste were 
stereotypically attributed with positive qualities such as wisdom, even-temperedness, devotion to 
God and learning. Other castes were similarly attributed with other traits and functions. The 
lowest caste, Shudra, is the caste that was traditionally assigned to the serve all the other castes. 
Then there is the category of Dalits that is out of the caste system: these were socially ostracized 
                                                
4 See Hogan’s “The Sacred and the Profane in Omkara: Vishal Bhardwaj’s Hindi Adaptation of Othello.” Image & 
Narrative.  
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people who were considered to be, as the traditional name suggests, “Untouchables” and impure. 
They were marginalized and assigned “impure” tasks such as cleaning sewers and toilets. Even 
touching them was considered to be a kind of pollution of the body that would require a complex 
process of purification. They were not just socially inferior but also regarded as lesser human 
beings fit to be placed only outside of society and physically outside the village boundaries. 
Omkara’s mother could have been either a Shudra or a Dalit. Either way, Omkara’s parentage is 
fraught with negative connotations.  
Omkara is a sort of misfit in an otherwise traditionally organized and structured society; 
he is figured as someone or rather as something unnatural because his father’s upper caste and 
his mother’s lower caste should not have mingled to produce an offspring. Omkara is neither 
strictly an upper-caste Brahmin nor does he belong to the lower and consequently, baser caste. 
The underlying fear of caste pollution echoes Iago’s insinuations about Othello and Desdemona 
in Shakespeare’s play when he tells Brabantio that “an old black ram / Is tupping your white 
ewe” (1.1.90-91). The pure Brahmin caste is polluted by his very existence; the entire caste 
system, which forms the base of society, is defiled and undermined because of this incomplete 
Brahmin. He just does not fit into a neat category, and as result, even though he is the figure of 
authority in his village, there is always ambivalence about his actual status. 
These concerns are visible in Omkara’s purposeful depiction as the darkest skinned 
person in the film. Omkara is made to look especially darker and older than the actor playing the 
role, Ajay Devgan, therein also keeping with the depiction of Othello in Shakespeare’s play (see 
Figure 10). Within his village community too (the Cyprus equivalent), he stands out as a kala 
kauwa (“black crow”) and amavas ki raat (“moonless or darkest night” also carrying the 
connotation of being an ill-omened or sinister night). The title song of the film, which has a 
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celebratory and paean-like quality about it, describes Omkara’s grim ferocity in specific animal 
imagery—his eyes are like wasps, his tongue is like a snake’s lunge. He is both man and beast, 
and his beast-like ferocity and anger are precisely what render him a very effective warrior and 
enable him to function as an important part of this society.  
 
Figure 10: Ajay Devgan as Omkara and Kareena Kapoor as Dolly 
Source: BBC. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/shropshire/content/image_galleries/omkara_gallery.shtml?9>. 
 
The Iago figure, Ishwar “Langda” Tyagi, similarly stands out visually, albeit for a 
different reasons. The word Ishwar means God, in the specific sense of God being the supreme 
controller or highest being, and this meaning is only reinforced by his desire to control every 
event and every person around him. Hogan accurately equates him with Brahma, the Creator. 
The word Langda means lame or limp, and this character walks with a very pronounced limp and 
is almost always referred to by this name. His physical appearance is very much reminiscent of 
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the deformed titular character from Richard III. In addition to being depicted with this deformity, 
Landga is physically grotesque and often menacing, with an unkempt appearance and hideously 
decaying teeth. See image below which is taken from a screenshot from the film at the moment 
when Langda gets his hands on the ornamental waist-belt (the handkerchief equivalent): 
 
Figure 11: Screenshot of a menacing Langda (Iago) 
Source: Screenshot from the film Omkara 
 
This depiction of the Iago figure as physically repulsive and menacing is not new. Marvin 
Rosenberg discusses a stage adaptation where an attempt was made to present Iago “as a fiend in 
human form”: “I have seen something of the sort tried in a performance wherein Iago appeared 
as an ugly, twisted, gnomelike creature, clinging like a dirty shadow to Othello” (150). In the 
film, Langda’s unattractiveness is conflated with his deformity and his deformity is conflated 
with his identity. Much like Omkara, but for different reasons, Landga too is perceived as other, 
as different from the norm. 
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Both Omkara and Landga are in sharp visual contrast to Dolly, the Desdemona figure. 
Dolly is the lightest skinned person in the film, and people around her remark on her beauty and 
fair skin quite often. This visual contrast between Omkara and Dolly would be immediately 
evident to Indian viewers given the obsession with and especially the recent debates about skin-
whitening products and cultural ideals of beauty.5 Throughout the film, this contrast is 
highlighted by way of lighting and juxtaposing Omakra with darkness and Dolly with light (See 
Figure 10). 6   
Additionally, Dolly is further contrasted both visually and verbally with the dusky and 
uneducated Emilia and Bianca figures. Dolly is rich, educated, and speaks in a refined dialect 
and even her apparel throughout the film is of a different regional style than what is worn around 
the village.  Like Omkara and Langda, Dolly too is singled out because of how she looks. On her 
arrival at Omkara’s village, a village elder remarks, albeit complimentarily, that she is alien to 
that community and does not belong there. Dolly’s beauty defines her and indicates her upper-
class status and is a distinct marker of her urban identity. This very beauty that defines her also 
makes her an other within this community.  
Similarly, the Cassio figure too does not quite fit in this community. His name in the film 
is Kesu “Firangi” Upadhyaya. Firangi means foreigner, outsider; rang means “color,” fi-rang 
means “other color.” Like his Shakespeare counterpart, the Florentine Cassio who is a foreigner 
in Venetian society, Kesu Firangi is also a foreigner and is perceived as such. He is the only 
person apart from Dolly who has a college education. He can speak in English—which is 
                                                
5 The most recent skin whitening debate in India was kicked off by a tweet (Twitter post) about skin-whitening by 
economist Rupa Subramanya. In her subsequent piece “Is Fairer Skin Really ‘Better’?” that appeared in The Wall 
Street Journal-India, Subramanya summarizes several studies done by economists that suggest a directly 
proportional relation between lighter skin color and economic and social advancement not only in developing 
countries but also countries such as the United States.  
6 See Hogan (2010) for a detailed account of black versus white in the film. 
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considered to be a sign of upward social mobility and cultural superiority—and is the only 
person along with Dolly who can sing “Happy Birthday.” In fact, it is pointed out that his 
English language skills are superior to even Dolly’s when he teaches her how to sing and 
correctly pronounce the lyrics to Stevie Wonder’s song “I just called to say I love you.” His attire 
and mannerisms are also markedly Western. Firangi is singled out from the village community 
because of these characteristics, but these are also the very reasons why he is chosen as 
Omkara’s lieutenant over Langda: he would be able to capture the educated youth vote during 
elections and prove to be an asset in Omkara’s election in that particular political domain. Thus, 
as in the case of Dolly, the very thing that defines Firangi’s identity becomes the thing that leads 
to his being marked as other. Firangi’s youth, attractiveness, education, and foreignness are also 
precisely what abet Omkara’s jealousy.   
I suggest that all of these characters, Omkara and Langda as well as Dolly and Firangi, 
are othered in the film by the very characteristics that define them and give them an identity with 
which they negotiate their existence and function within the community. Another way to look at 
this is to say that none of their characteristics is depicted as the dominant norm. Beauty and 
attractiveness epitomized in the Desdemona figure and Cassio figure, and their corollary as seen 
in the dark, older Othello and the deformed Iago figure, are all markers of their identity but also 
the very reasons for their marginalization and depiction as other. Like Omkara, who is an adha 
Brahman, Langda, Dolly and Firangi too are perceived as adha or half and therefore incomplete. 
The other of beauty, once defined as unattractiveness and deformity, has the same status as 
beauty within the village community. The status of the other of beauty and beauty itself is 
interchangeable in so far as both are deviations from some imaginary norm.  
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This interchangeability is metaphorically represented in the lasting image of the play and 
of the film as well: the reverse gender pieta image where Othello holds the dead “sacrificed” 
(5.2.69) Desdemona in his arms. In the film, Omkara actually sings a lullaby to the dead Dolly, 
designed to make her wake up rather than fall asleep—calling her a gudiya which literally means 
a child’s doll or a girl child and is also a translation of her name Dolly. The image is made more 
compelling by the red bridal dress and adornments that Dolly is wearing and the completely 
white groom’s attire that Omkara is wearing. Dolly is at once, wife and child, and Omkara is at 
once the groom but also a paternal figure singing the lullaby. In the play, Desdemona, once the 
Marian figure, now lies sacrificed, a Christ-like death, in Othello’s arms. Othello, who once 
thought that he was God’s instrument, is now described as “the blacker devil” (5.5.135) by 
Emilia. Identities and categories of defining them are blurred and not constant. What we see in 
the film and in this lasting image from the play then is that there is a continuous displacement of 
identity.  
Beauty, Elusiveness, and the Lack of Sovereign Self 
 
In Shakespeare’s play, Iago hits on this idea about the fluidity and even fiction of identity 
when faced with Cassio’s “daily beauty.” Cassio’s “daily beauty” is his blissful unawareness of 
the complexity of being; as Wood points out, his self is constituted by what others think of him 
(other people, that is) and his status and place in society. Iago realizes that he was wrong in his 
declaration of independent self-fashioning to Roderigo: “ ’Tis in ourselves that we are thus or / 
thus.” (1.3.322-23). Iago cannot be wholly defined or complete if he is alone because he, just like 
Cassio and everyone else, cannot exist entirely apart from other people. He needs others around 
to construct his social and cultural identity (as lieutenant, as friend, or even as diabolic enemy), 
variable as it may be.  Above all, Iago realizes, unlike Cassio, that the self is more than a 
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collection of quantifiable facts about social and cultural identity; not only is any idea of the self 
and identity not stable but the self is also not autonomous. And this is unacceptable to him.    
While I agree with Wood that Iago “feels himself to have no essential being” (par. 25), I 
take this argument a step further—using the Levinasian-Derridean notion of the Other—and 
suggest that in addition to this lack of an “essential being,” Iago’s realization is specifically about 
the utter and complete dependence of the self on something Other to be—something that is 
elusive, that cannot be seen and cannot fully be articulated. Iago’s self-description to Roderigo at 
the beginning of the play, “I am not what I am” (1.1.67)—a corruption of the God’s response to 
Moses, “I am what I am” (Exodus 3.14)— thus becomes true in more ways than he intended it. 
In the face of Cassio’s beauty, Iago is jolted into seeing that any idea of the self, any assertion of 
his self, his identity, is contingent first on an Other that cannot be articulated.  In a play where 
the vocabulary and metaphors of the flesh and sex abound and much rests on the demand for 
ocular proof (Othello’s repeated demands to Iago to show him proof of Desdemona’s adultery, 
for instance), Iago is the only one who sees precisely that which cannot be seen. Cassio’s 
visible beauty makes Iago acutely aware of the lack of an independent self that is not contingent 
on anyone or anything else. Cassio’s beauty is then, to use philosopher Alexander Nehamas’ 
description of beauty, “the emblem of what we [and in this case, Iago] lack” (76).  
Nehamas’ description of beauty “as the emblem of what we lack” and as “a call to look 
attentively at the world and see how little we see” (76, 131), helps get to the heart of the matter 
of what challenges Iago.  Following Stendhal, Nehamas defines beauty as only a promise of 
happiness. Beauty is a promise of a future that is unknown, which may or may not bring 
happiness; nonetheless, the hope and promise for something yet to come always accompanies 
beauty. “Beauty always remains a bit of a mystery, forever a step beyond anything I can say 
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about it, more like something calling me without showing exactly what it is calling me to” (78). 
In other words, beauty is something that inspires toward an ideal that we cannot quite grasp or 
articulate the moment we experience it. This ideal might be love, divinity, truth, and it is also 
entirely possible that this is an ideal that is not. That is to say that beauty does not guarantee truth 
or divinity; it offers a possibility beyond the self that may or may not be realized. Iago is left 
grappling with this very possibility beyond the self, an Otherness that cannot be realized. 
Perhaps then Iago is aware that there is an unseen alterity that actually constitutes the 
self. He can control and get rid of people, laws, and customs, but how is he to rid himself of this 
Otherness? I read Iago’s final lines, “Demand me nothing. What you know, you know. / From 
this time forth I never will speak word” (5.2.311-12), as his final gesture of resistance par 
excellence. It is a refusal to respond with openness to the Other. Through his silence, perhaps 
Iago is attempting to resist the demands of the Other. The realization that he cannot exist without 
the Other and his consequent resistance to respond with openness, I believe, are Iago’s true 
tragedy.  
Existence, Knowledge, and the Pursuit of Infinity 
 
In the film, Langda’s (Iago) final dialogue is a telling meditation on nature of being, of 
the human condition. It occurs after Omkara has smothered Dolly and is told by Indu (Emilia) 
that she stole the ornamental waistband (the handkerchief substitute in the film) for Langda. 
Langda walks into Omkara’s bedroom and drives Indu away. As Omkara slowly walks toward 
Langda with a gun in his hand, Langda gropes for explanations saying that Indu is lying and is 
probably sleeping with Kesu (Cassio). Then he utters emotionally and entreatingly, “[I] believe 
you to be more than/in excess of/beyond God, that’s why…” (arrey bhagwan se zyada apko 
manu, is liye…) and his voice trials off; his countenance suddenly changes as if he realizes 
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something and he becomes stony-faced. I find this moment to be comparable to Iago’s last 
soliloquy in the play when he comments on Cassio’s beauty and becomes aware of something 
beyond his self, the otherness that constitutes him. In the play, it is an encounter with beauty that, 
as I have argued, triggers off the realization that the self is not autonomous and is dependent on 
an unknowable Otherness to be. In the film, this realization occurs at the moment when Iago 
unwittingly declares that he considers Omkara to be more than or beyond God. 
 This spontaneous admission by an Iago at his wit’s end begs the question: What can be 
more than or beyond or in excess of God? Considering the multiple literal meanings of the name 
Omkara (“to make manifest or articulate,” “I exist,” “I am Existence”), Langda’s believing 
Omkara to be in excess of God could imply that for him existence precedes God or Otherness.  
Within the context of Hinduism, Omkara is the also the enunciation of the first, the primordial 
sound Om and hence the meaning “to make manifest or articulate.” Om is the necessary pre-
requisite for the phenomenal world to be articulated. It is difficult to pinpoint Langda’s theology 
because it appears to be a complex mix of different strains of Vedanta Hindu philosophy--
sometimes Advaita Vendanta (non-dualistic, monistic), sometimes Dvaita (espousing a dualism 
that is very different from the Western Cartesian dualism), and sometimes Vishishtadvaita. The 
theology in the film is worthy of a full length study but for the purposes of this chapter—since I 
am not attempting to interpret the film in terms of Hindu theology or reading the play through 
Hindu thought—it would be sufficient to say that Langda’s last few words communicate a deep 
and deliberate engagement with existence, the nature of being, and the processes of the self and 
alterity, all of which becomes evident in the film in the next few seconds. These concerns that 
are central to Western thought are precisely what this filmic interpretation helps us reassess.  
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 Langda’s breaking off of his sentence after “that’s why” and the immediate change in his 
expression is telling. The usually talkative and animate Langda is suddenly appears to be 
catatonic and is rendered laconic. It is as if that at that moment, he ceases to be himself. After a 
few seconds, Langda says in a dull, lifeless monotone, “Aap jo jaante ho bas wohi jano; mere 
sach mein aur mere jhooth mein [pause] mein ab koi farak nahin hega.” This can mean one of 
two things: he could either be saying a) “what you know is all you know” suggesting that 
Omkara’s knowledge is incomplete, or b) what you know is enough for you to know, with the 
implication that Omkara should not attempt to know more. The second half of the dialogue after 
the semicolon is similarly nuanced and is open to two interpretations: a) there is no difference 
between my truth and my lie now, and b) between my truth and my lie [pause] I now don’t make 
a difference. The first meaning of the sentence would be the one that people unfamiliar with 
Shakespeare’s play would hear. The word for “in” and “me” in this dialect is phonetically 
similar, thus the repetition of “mein,” one before and one after the pause. It is hard to imagine 
that an excellent and deliberate craftsman like Bhardwaj—director, composer, and screenwriter 
of this film—who very familiar with Shakespeare would have let an additional “mein” in the 
dialogue unless it was to suggest the second meaning of the sentence. This is to say that it is 
more likely that Bhardwaj, through Langda, is underscoring the theme of existence and the desire 
to understand being in the film. In saying that he now does not make any difference, Langda is 
not only saying that he cannot or does not differentiate between his truth and fiction, thereby 
highlighting the contingent nature of all knowledge, but he is also matter-of-factly stating that his 
existence now makes no difference. His self is not unique and it is not autonomous, his entire 
existence is predicated on something he cannot control, let alone articulate: his identity is built 
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on an indeterminate set of categories, his self has limitations, and his knowledge of his self and 
the nature of being is similarly limited and will never be complete. 
This is reinforced within a couple of seconds as Omkara puts the gun to Langda’s 
forehead and Langda closes his eyes as if relieved and implores, “Mark/shoot my forehead” 
(Dag do mattha).  His last words are, “liberate me” (mukti kar do meri). The word mukti means 
freedom and in Hindu philosophy it denotes moksha, that is, freedom of the consciousness or the 
soul from the endless cycles of reincarnation and being. Langda genuinely does want his life to 
end but not because he is remorseful for the havoc he has caused. He displays no feelings of 
guilt. Rather, his desire to have his life ended stems from his realization that he cannot exist as an 
independent, sovereign self. While Iago tries to resist the demands of the Other through his 
silence, Langda wants to disengage from the Other by ending his self. 
But Omkara’s response to him points to the futility of Langda’s resistance and his final 
attempt to escape his self and the Other. Omkara replies, echoing Langda’s existential futility, 
“[we will] get freed from the body, but [we will] never get freed from this consciousness; no 
you, no I” (Sarir se to mukti mil jayegi, magar atma se kadi mukti nahin hone wal; na tu na 
main). Atma or atman in Hindu philosophy refers to a primordial self or an observing spirit; it is 
a non-physical notion of the self, denoting a primeval, eternal individual, for lack of a better 
word, essence that has always existed and continues to exist despite the several physical 
manifestations and incarnations it undergoes or ‘sees’ through the passage of time. Atma also 
carries connotations of conscience and consciousness, as something that is both within the body 
and exists apart from it. Omkara’s concluding words in this final dialogue, “no you, no I” can 
imply, “neither you nor I [will get freed from this consciousness]” and that would make sense in 
the context of the preceding words and the reference to of the Hindu belief in the cycle of 
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reincarnation and eventual release from it. But if that were the case, the words should have been 
“na teri, na meri”=“not yours nor mine” (and not “na tu, na main”=“no you, no I”). This leads 
me to contend that Omakra’s statement means “there is no you, there is no I” or/and “neither you 
nor I matter,” suggesting that that there is no distinction between the Omkara and Langda 
(between their two selves) and that neither of their individual identities matters. The implication 
here is that all that matters is the Otherness that constitutes them and it is something that neither 
of them can fully understand. Surendranath Dasgupta translates mukti as “emancipation” and 
points out that mukti is “a state of pure and infinite knowledge (anantajnana) and infinite 
perception (anantadarshana)” (207). The implication of what Omkara is saying is that neither 
Langda nor he will ever be able to reach that stage of pure and infinite knowledge, or absolute 
freedom from the Other. 
I suggest that this is Omkara’s response to the unknown Other. He is not attempting to 
escape his responsibility; he is answering to the demands of the Other with respect and openness. 
By ceding his self and giving himself over to the Other, Omkara is in a way redeeming himself. 
He is less of a tragic figure than Langda because at the end he has accepted his responsibility and 
is opening himself to the possibility of the unknown. True to the literal meaning of his name, “to 
articulate,” Omkara is articulating his response by ceding his self and also accepting the 
impossibility of ever fully knowing the Other. Langda, on the other hand, remains to be an 
existentially tragic figure in his refusal to accept that he cannot escape the demand of the Other.  
In an attempt to rehabilitate Iago, Tucker Brooke compares him to Hamlet arguing that 
they are the nearest in birth and the most subtle. Perhaps Iago is a tragic hero and perhaps it is no 
coincidence then that where Hamlet ponders about man as, “the beauty of the world” but also as 
“the quintessence of dust” (2.2.308-9), Iago finds, in an encounter with beauty, that his self is 
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truly nothing. Like Hamlet, Iago too is a philosopher figure. Hamlet’s soliloquies can broadly be 
said to be meditations on the human condition, the nature of human beings, and the meaning of 
life. Iago’s soliloquies are more of an affirmation of what he has done or will do to test the 
possibilities of the human condition. Iago is then acting throughout Othello on what Hamlet 
contemplates and tries to convince himself of in his final soliloquy:  
What is a man,   
If his chief good and market of his time  
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more. 
Sure he that made us with such large discourse, 
Looking before and after, gave us not 
That capability and godlike reason 
To fust in us unused. (4.4.34-40)  
 
Hamlet is pondering about what it means to be human. If humans merely eat and sleep and attend 
to bodily and material needs, they are a little more than animals. Hamlet argues that the infinite 
faculties of the mind—the capacity to look to the past and the future and assimilate knowledge 
and use reason to understand our humanity—are meant to be used. Hamlet is advocating a 
serious consideration of the human condition and what defines us as human beings.  
Where Hamlet advocates, Iago does. Throughout Othello Iago can be seen as pushing the 
boundaries of knowledge and truth, societal norms and relationships, and as exploring and 
resisting the limitations of being human. He is not going let his capabilities and power of 
reasoning “fust in him unused” (“grow moldy”): he is propelled by a desire to know, to know 
about his self and to know about the Otherness that constitutes him.  He soliloquizes trying to 
understand his own motives, explaining his plans, and reveals the working of his fraught mind. 
He is, above all, a human being grappling with his own humanity and refusing to accept the 
limitations of his selfhood, constantly reaching for, to paraphrase and translate Langda’s view of 
Omakra, what is beyond infinity. 
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A great Renaissance hero expressed an idea of beauty that indicates how pervasive this 
preoccupation with a possibility beyond the self was for writers of the period. As unlikely a 
spokesperson for beauty as Tamburlaine might be, it is Christopher Marlowe’s protagonist who 
articulates the elusiveness of beauty precisely:  
      What is beauty, saith my sufferings, then? 
  If all the pens that ever poets held 
  Had fed the feeling of their masters’ thoughts, 
  And every sweetness that inspired their hearts, 
  Their minds, and muses on admired themes; 
  If all the heavenly quintessence they still 
  From their immortal flowers of poesy, 
  Wherein as in a mirror we perceive 
 The highest reaches of a human wit; 
 If these had made one poem’s period, 
 And all combin’d in beauty’s worthiness, 
 Yet should there hover in their restless heads 
  One thought, one grace, one wonder, at the least, 
 Which into words no virtue can digest. (1 Tamburlaine the Great 5.1.160-73) 
 
Stephen Greenblatt offers an interesting perspective on this speech, suggesting that it is 
Tamburlaine “who gives the whole problem of reaching a desired end its clearest formal 
expression in Marlowe: beauty, like all the goals pursued by the playwright’s heroes, always 
hovers just beyond the reach of human thought and expression” (218). Greenblatt rightly 
contends that “the problem of elusiveness is one of the major preoccupations of Renaissance 
thinkers” and argues that while this topical issue deeply influenced Marlowe, “he subtly shifts 
the emphasis from the infinity that draws men beyond what they possess to the problem of the 
human will, the difficulty men experience in truly wanting anything” (emphasis mine, 218). I 
contend that for Shakespeare too, beauty “hovers just beyond the reach of human thought and 
expression,” and in Othello, just as in The Winter’s Tale and Henry VIII, the emphasis is 
precisely on “the infinity that draws men beyond.” Omkara shows us that it is this infinity, this 
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elusive reach beyond the grasp, this complete Otherness that an encounter with beauty prompts 
and that Iago is forced to face. 
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Conclusion 
 
Early modern literature abounds in references to beauty. However, in the past few 
decades, discussions of beauty have been sidelined in part due to the influence of approaches 
such as cultural materialism and new historicism; as a result, beauty often gets viewed as some 
kind of ideological mist that distracts us from ethical issues. By taking beauty as seriously as 
early modern thinkers did, my research underscores the importance of beauty in early modern 
literary criticism and reassesses the critical relationship between beauty and ethics. My study 
posits Shakespeare as philosopher of beauty and reinterprets several literary works, thereby 
challenging traditionally accepted criticism on these works.  
This dissertation begins by addressing the centrality of the topic of beauty in humanist 
discourses and literary works of the early modern period and argues that beauty was a critical 
way through which early modern culture defined itself. Beauty instigates an inquiry into the 
nature of being human and the self and its relationship with the other—that, as I have shown, is 
the matter of ethics. Chapter 2 examines the nature of the experience of beauty and concludes 
and explains how an encounter with beauty is necessarily ethical and places a call on us to 
respond. A careful analysis of Henry VIII or All is True shows how beauty is in conversation 
with ethics in the play. Here, I also introduce the Levinasian-Derridean concept of ethics and 
Otherness, and discuss beauty in relation to notions selfhood. Chapter 3 explores the dynamics of 
a response to beauty in various literary works and studies the correlation between Neoplatonism, 
Protestant grace, and the Levinasian “ethical”. I elucidate the potential for ethical violence 
inherent in responses to beauty and show that these responses to beauty are fraught with 
difficulties and necessarily involve a consideration of the self’s relation to the other. The final 
chapter continues this examination of the nature of beauty and its connection to selfhood by 
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taking a look at the other or the ostensible opposite of beauty. My analysis of Othello and 
Omkara returns to the opening chapter in its assertion that for early modern thinkers, beauty is 
being. I explore the interchangeable nature of beauty and its other, the fluidness of selfhood, and 
the pursuit of the elusive otherness that beauty instigates. My examination of a contemporary 
Hindi cinematic adaptation of a Shakespearean play not only illuminates traditional critical 
concerns of the play anew but also shows how issues relevant to the early modern European 
world of the play are relevant and pressing in a postcolonial, contemporary world. The subject of 
beauty and ethics traverses time and space: it is critical and indispensible to a better 
understanding of our selfhood, our relationships, and the limitations and potential of our 
knowledge.  
My study has been focused on beauty but there is a lot of work that remains to be done on 
this topic as well as the allied topic of aesthetics in the field of Shakespeare studies. Recently, a 
renewed interest in aesthetics in the form of a few journal articles and a couple of books is seen 
emerging in this field: Hugh Grady has explored the concept of  “impure aesthetics”; Joel Stolkin 
has examined what he calls “sinister aesthetics” in Richard III; Richard Wilson has written about 
Shakespeare and the hijab, using the idea of the veiling of an Indian beauty in relation to secrecy 
and the silk trade; and Stephen Greenblatt has a chapter on Shakespearean beauty marks in 
Shakespeare’s Freedom. Indeed, this is a start.  
Additionally, my dissertation contributes to the discussion of ethics in early modern 
methodology that is already underway— the “turn to religion”—that argues for a dynamic 
relationship between drama, in particular, and religion and religious culture of the period. It is 
becoming increasingly clear, however, that that ethical position derives from a religious respect 
for the otherness of God. Understanding this connection of religion to ethics helps us understand 
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the “return” of the religious and our own ethical stance. Ethics and religion, too, have been 
ignored by New Historicism, which tends to see any discussion of such topics as ideological 
mystification of some kind. By ignoring the religious interest in alterity as its grounds, New 
Historicism has also left undeveloped any possible engagement with immaterial “abstractions” 
associated with religion; as a result, concepts of beauty and transcendence, for instance, are 
deemed ahistorical or simply irrelevant to social texts. Indeed, as I have shown in my 
dissertation, given the dominant presence of Neo-Platonism and theological aesthetics in early 
modern literature, this kind of a compartmentalization is reductive. 
An under-discussed topic like beauty serves as a useful if provocative segue into the 
subject of ethics and religion. My dissertation presents beauty as a way to enhance the 
conversation on alterity in early modern studies. The subject of beauty offers us an aperture to 
talk also about political theology and ontotheology in the early modern period. As I have shown, 
positioning the topic of beauty within this critical interest in alterity opens up the possibility for 
discussions of similar topics sidelined by New Historicism. Furthermore, an attention to beauty 
also gives an opportunity to examine New Historicism’s denial of its philosophical basis and its 
limitations as a critical mode.  
Admittedly, the scope of my study is limited by the particular critical and theoretical 
paradigm I have used to uncover and establish a relationship between beauty and ethics in early 
modern literary works.  The paradigm of Levinasian ethics, while most compelling to me 
theoretically and philosophically, is not the only lens through which the topic of beauty and 
ethics in Shakespeare and his contemporaries can be examined.  
Throughout my research, I have discovered that the definitions and connotations of 
beauty are varied and often contradictory. Standards of beauty keep changing, as do the practices 
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and methods of beautifying and beautification. The pursuit of beauty, however, remains constant. 
Whether denigrated and commodified, or deified and glorified, the striving toward an idea of 
beauty remains. In the works I have examined, an encounter with beauty propels us, like 
Omkara, to look beyond the self, to try to grasp to a notion of otherness and to know more than.  
Further considerations of the importance of beauty and ethics in Shakespeare and his 
fellow thinkers, will undoubtedly lead to a clearer and more nuanced understanding of the early 
modern world and its self-definition and will also help us better understand our own place in our 
contemporary world. 
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APPENDIX A: FULL DIALOGUE FROM EL COSTUME DELLE DONNE 
 
Phi.  La prima fia i capegli, s’ io non vario, 
 e poi la mano, & per la terza pone 
 la gamba: a questo so che non contratio.    51   
 
Di. Queste mi piacen, ch’ an vera ragione; 
 ma le tre curti seguie incontenenti 
quai’ sono, per veder se le consone.   54 
 
Phi.  La prima, vo’ che sappi, sono i denti; 
 la seconda l’ orecchie; & le mamelle 
che sian la terza vo’ che te contenti.   57 
 
Di.  Queste tre cose son ben vere e belle; 
ma qual’ son le tre larghe fa ch’io intenda, 
che in me fai grizzar tutta la pelle!   63 
 
Phi.  La prima larga, a cio che si conprenda, 
Egli è la fronte, & la seconda il pettto; 
La terza I fianchi che ‘l traverso stenda.  61 
 
Di.  Tu dici il vero in fine, & hai ben letto; 
 ma le tre strette come se figura? 
chè ‘n questo forsi haro qualche diletto.  66 
 
Phi. La prima stretta è dove è la ointura; 
l’altra le cosse; la terza fia quella  
dove ogni dolce pose la natura.   69 
 
Di.  Questa terza per nome non si appella, 
ma credo che sia rara…. Ma di’ pure, 
qual’ son quelle grosse che la fan bella?     72 
 
Phi.  Le tre grosse, pero con sue misure, 
sono le trezze, e poi le braze appresso, 
da poi le cosse, morbide e non dure.   75 
 
Di. Tu tocchi ben, per Dio, questo processo, 
che le cosse sian grosse e insieme strette; 
ma qual son le suttil? dille adesso!   78 
 
Phi.  Le tre suttile, ben pero corrette, 
son li capigli in prima, e poi le dita,  
la terza i labri, che son cose elette.   81 
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Di.  Stab ben; tu tochi ben, dio te dia vita!; 
hor su, a le tre tonde hora procede: 
fin qui m’hai satisfatto alla pulita.   84 
 
Phi.  El collo in prima, e le braze succeed; 
de dreto poi tra la schena e le cosse 
quelle due grosse pome con che siede.  87 
 
Di.  T’ho inteso, quelle pome non hanno osse: 
le croppe tonde fanno il bel cavallo! 
Tre piccole saper vorria che fosse.   90 
 
Phi.  Io tel diro, perché al ver non callo: 
la bocca, il mento, il pié son le tre cose 
che vogliono esser piccol, s’io non fallo.  93 
 
Di.  E ver per certo, e son ben gratiose 
queste tre parte; hor su, va’ drieto bene, 
che le tre bianche non me sia nascose.  96 
 
Phi.  La bianchezza a tre parte si conviene: 
de sopra agli altri i denti, e poi la gola; 
terza é la man che bella mantiene.   99   
 
Di.  Per mia fe tu di’ il vero, e questa sola 
gran gratia porge; hor séguita, e dechiara 
 qual’ son quelle tre rosse, & col dir vola.  102 
 
Phi.  Le gotte prima, che fia cosa chiara; 
le labre appresso, e poi le due cerese 
che ponta de la tette se ripara.   105 
 
Di:  Questo son parte molto bene intese; 
ma le tre negre non posso comprendere 
se tu con dirlo non mel fai palese.   108 
 
Phi.  Ancora queste ti voglio distendere: 
i cigli in prima, e gli occhi la sconda; 
la terza tu dovresti da te intendere….  111 
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APPENDIX B: DIDCUSSION OF CASTIGLIONE AND KANT 
I see Castiglione’s conception of love and beauty intersect with Immanuel Kant’s 
discussion of “the ideal of beauty” and his ideas on sensory and contemplative pleasure as laid 
out in his theorization of beauty in The Critique of Judgment (1790), a work that has greatly 
influenced perceptions of beauty, aesthetics, and subjectivity in philosophy and literature. Kant’s 
text not only to shows the influence of Platonism (and Neoplatonism) on its ideas of beauty, but 
his notions of subjectivity and beauty inform themes of otherness, knowledge and sensory 
perception that I develop in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 Kant points out that “the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, an idea 
which everyone must generate within himself…Idea properly means a rational concept, and ideal 
the presentation of an individual being as adequate to an idea” (79-80). Furthermore, Kant 
contends: 
[t]he ideal of the beautiful … must be expected solely in the human figure. Now the 
ideal in this figure consists in the expression of the moral; apart from the moral the object 
would not be liked universally and moreover positively…these moral ideas must be 
connected, in the idea of the morally good: goodness of souls, or purity, or fortitude, or 
serenity, etc. (84) 
 
 But this kind of judgment is not entirely a judgment of taste. It needs the “visible expression” of 
these moral ideas and these can be taken in only through experience, yet the sensual desire 
should not be mixed with “the liking for its object, while yet making us take great interest in it.” 
This kind of judgment is thus not purely aesthetic either. 
Pleasure is fundamental to the aesthetic; it is the basis of the judgment. Kant divides 
pleasure into three types. The first kind of pleasure is called the agreeable or the pleasant. Here 
personal gratification of the individual body through sensual stimulation is primary without a 
contemplative or cognitive aspect.  The second kind of pleasure is tied with the notion of the 
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good. Here the pleasure realized is not in the experience of sensual gratification but is its end; in 
other words, there is a utilitarian purpose to this kind of pleasure that is the good. What can be 
called the aesthetic is really the third form of pleasure. Here, too, as in the case of the first 
pleasure, the body and sensory perceptions are involved but not to the end of gratification of 
appetite. Significantly, in this kind of pleasure there is not interest in the object—the subject is 
always disinterested in the judgment of taste. The important thing is the sensual experience of the 
object.  This pleasure of beauty is disinterested because we do not care for the lake qua lake; we 
are not getting some kind of appetitive or sensual gratification of desire directly because of the 
lake. Thus, in passing a judgment of taste we disregard the utility of the lake (it provides a 
natural habitat for species of fish of the verge of extinction) and its relation or significance to 
another person or to ourselves but the utility, or the purposiveness of the lake becomes important 
later in the third moment where the imagination constructs a subjective purposiveness without 
purpose in freeplay with the understanding. Senses are, of course, invariably involved because 
without senses we would not be able to see the lake and the senses play a role in that the 
imagination later connects the “manifold of intuition” with the understanding. But once this 
catalyst is set, the lake itself (and so also, I contend, our senses and body) becomes secondary. In 
other words, mere sensation is transformed into aesthetic experience that marshals cognitive 
responses vis-à-vis freeplay. This pleasure thus comes from enjoying the free play of faculties 
and not by satisfying bodily desire. 
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APPENDIX C: 
 
Figure 12:  Titian’s Venus Urbino (c.1538) 
Source: Wikimedia Commons.  <http://commons.wikimedia.org>. 
 
 
Figure 13: Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus (c.1510) 
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Source: Wikimedia Commons.  <http://commons.wikimedia.org>. 
 
Titian’s painting itself was inspired by Giorgione’s Sleeping Venus. The Venus in Sleeping 
Venus is much closer to Fuseli’s depiction of Katharine. Fuseli’s Katharine has the other arm 
raised and other leg folded. She is, of course, also clothed, albeit in somewhat diaphanous 
clothes like the personages. To be clear, I am not suggesting that Katharine is Venus. But, 
juxtaposing these images renders visible the close correspondence between the eroticism and 
depiction of beauty of these paintings, and the spiritual ecstasy that Katharine seems to be 
experiencing in Fuseli’s painting and, I argue, in the play. 
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APPENDIX D: EMBODIED RESPONSE IN ALL IS TRUE 
 
Another instance of an embodied response within the play is represented as a narrated miracle 
through the collective body of the women at Anne’s coronation. The Third Gentleman narrates:  
Such joy  
I never saw before. Great-bellied women,  
That had not half a week to go, like rams  
In the old time of war, would shake the press,  
And make 'em reel before 'em. No man living  
Could say 'This is my wife' there; all were woven  
So strangely in one piece. 
 (4.1. 75-81) 
 
The Third Gentleman is narrating this to both the other gentlemen and to the audience. The 
audience is to imagine what he is describing and believe it to be true. It is seemingly comic and 
absurd but serves to reiterate the possibility of openness to what such an event will bring and 
also the miraculous and momentous nature of the birth yet to come. It is also simultaneously a 
celebratory moment of regeneration and procreation but also ironic in that the child that will be 
born will be a female. One of the reasons Henry gives for divorcing Katharine is precisely 
because she gave birth to children that either died or were female and that was a sign of 
judgment of a power greater than him. Going by that paradigm, Elizabeth as a female should be 
comparable to a dead child who cannot possibly be a real heir to the throne. At this time there is 
no assignable cause as to why she should be proclaimed as the future monarch at that moment. 
And yet it is this has to happen. Elizabeth dies a virgin queen without an heir. And it is precisely 
this lack that has lead to James’s claim to the throne despite Henry’s will. The miraculous 
gesture ironically beckons a moment yet to come, even beyond Elizabeth’s birth. The big-bellied 
women are thus seen as bodily responding and opening up to the impossible possibility of the 
unknown and unknowable. Within the play this fantastical response is not staged. This moment 
too thus makes a demand of faith on the audience.  
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APPENDIX E: RELIGIOUS VISION, KNOWLEDGE, AND SAINT PAUL 
 
Katharine’s vision suggests the complex relationship between seeing and knowing and religious 
revelation and knowledge; a discussion on the nature of religious experience is relevant here. 
Anston Bosman uses the example of Mary Magdalene to discuss the power of visual image to 
evoke devotion; he examines how her tears facilitate seeing Christ’s resurrection and uses that to 
explain how Katharine’s vision opens her eyes to “spiritual clairvoyance” (474).1 While I fully 
agree with Bosman, I would like to complicate the idea of ‘seeing a vision’ by pointing to 
another Biblical instance, one that is more pertinent to my analysis of the play— Saint Paul’s 
experience of resurrected Christ. It would be worthwhile to take a look at the Acts and the 
Epistles of Saint Paul to explore the relationship between a seeing a vision and the idea of God, 
and their paradoxical revelation and necessary invisibility that renders them paradoxically 
inaccessible and yet approachable. 
The incident of Paul’s conversion from a persecutor to an apostle of Christianity happens 
on the way to Damascus. A “great light” suddenly envelops him and a then voice speaks to him. 
A significant aspect of this incident is that while the light is first seen, it also results in 
temporarily blinding Paul. The blinding does not happen to those who were accompanying him; 
they are the ones who help him reach Damascus. Paul’s experience, much like Katharine’s 
vision, happens in absolute secrecy. Everyone accompanying Paul sees the light (not the vision) 
and yet their sensory experiences are significantly different.  Only Paul hears the voice of Jesus 
that speaks to him and to which he responds; it remains unheard by others: “And they that were 
                                                
1 Bosman makes a very strong case for “seeing tears” in the play- “the gaze as mediated by tears [that] enables the 
definitive revelations of truth’” (470). He argues that the “truth” can be seen in the “show” not by the eyes, but by 
eyes that weep. Weeping eyes, he accurately observes, are figured as womanly traits in this play. But these are not 
associated with weakness, but as proof of truth.   Drawing upon Andrew Marvell’s “Eyes and Tears,” Bosman 
discusses tears as the subject that see and the object that is seen (471). They are seen both by the characters and the 
audience. 
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with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid; but they heard not the voice of him that spake to 
me” (KJV Acts 22:9). This is thus both a sensory event and one that is extra-sensory; the 
interaction between Jesus and Paul is not entirely visual and happens at a level that cannot be 
explicated exactly. Paul receives his “sight” from Ananias who tells him: “The God of our 
ancestors designated you to know his will, to see the Righteous One, and to hear the sound of his 
voice for you will be his witness before all to what you have seen and heard” (Acts 22:14-15, 
italics mine). This complicates the idea of revelation. It is aural and yet strongly suggests a 
notion of visuality since Paul sees the Righteous One, i.e. Jesus. The concept of witnessing is 
crucial in here and appears to lend authenticity to the whole experience. This idea is reinforced 
when in his defense before Agrippa, Paul recounts the same experience of conversion calling it a 
“heavenly vision” where Jesus spoke thus: “for this purpose I have appeared to you, to appoint 
you a minister and a witness not only to the things which you have seen, but also to the things in 
which I will appear to you “ (Acts 26:16, italics mine). This is meant to establish Paul as a 
witness and lends credence to his experience of the revelation and the vision of Christ.  
There is, however, no effort to make the distinction between the actual sighting of Christ 
and the idea of divine vision as a metaphoric insight into Truth. Considering it is both, this 
revelation still inhabits a complicated sphere: it is neither wholly aural nor wholly visual; it has 
to blind in order for Paul to see; and it is possibly an image of the spirit of the resurrected Christ 
that Paul equates with (having seen) Jesus. E.P. Sanders makes a strong case in pointing out that 
for Paul  “the resurrection was of a spiritual body, not a physical body, not flesh and blood” (29). 
The very idea of an image of a spirit or the sighting of the invisible seems incomprehensible.  
However, it is precisely this inability to experience this event, directly by a human that 
gives it the profound status it has. It attests to the nature of God that is beyond the parameters of 
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human senses and thought. Alain Badiou correctly identifies this event (for Paul) as the Truth 
Event even though it is a “fable” (4). It occurs in a non-space and outside time. The experience 
itself can be defined only in privatives, allegories or oxymorons and constructions like “invisible 
light”. God is simultaneously revealed and yet hidden, just as light in itself cannot be seen but is 
that which enables sight. Yet God can be experienced only indirectly, manifested in the spirit of 
the human-divine.  The idea of God will invariably be anthropomorphized in some way in efforts 
to understand it. Even though it is rarely admitted, the element of this kind of paganism is thus 
inherent in this conception of God that is accessed through the vision of resurrected Christ.   
 Paul is to use this vision and idea of the resurrected Christ as the foundation of his 
Christian theology. His legitimacy and authenticity as an apostle and preacher is to rest on his 
having seen Christ: “have I not seen Jesus our Lord?” (1 Cor 9:1); God “called me by his grace, 
To reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen (Gal 1:15-16). The 
paradoxical and fantastical nature of this foundation is the necessary condition of its existence 
and it is what makes it a success. It is not to be accessible through rationality and reason. Badiou 
refers to it as “the moment of the real” or St. Paul’s Truth-Event where “the figures in distinction 
of discourse are terminated” (Saint Paul 57) because the space of the real is instated in a 
happening that is illusory. While Badiou is referring specifically to the division of the subject in 
reference to the Jews and Greeks, this idea can also be appropriated to arrive at some concept of 
Truth that is akin to God. By locating Truth in this realm, it is implied that Truth is similarly 
inaccessible directly and lies beyond human grasp. This Truth, similar to the Christ-event is pure. 
It is the universal and it is a declaration; Badiou points out Paul’s procedure: “if there has been 
an event” and  “truth consists of declaring it and then being faithful to this declaration” (14). But 
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the moment Truth is seized, it will cease to be Truth much in the same way that the moment we 
try to visualize God, God ceases to exist. 
Trying to avoid falling into the nihilism that Badiou reads in Nietzsche, the problem that 
arises for us is that if the Truth is invisible and cannot be brought into the world without 
becoming untruth, then what is our notion of ethics based on? It cannot be based on simply the 
law as derived from the politico-legal system because certain ethics, as in the case of Henry’s 
prick of conscience, lie outside its purview.  Pauline truth rises above human rationality to the 
realm of the universal precisely to avoid and efface such interrogations that almost get subsumed 
in its discourse. According to Badiou’s reading of Paul, “a truth is a concentrated and serious 
procedure, which must never enter into competition with established opinions” (15). The 
implication is serious: we cannot get to it. In this very incapacitation, Truth and God exist. These 
concepts seem to exist beyond the scope of philosophy and the discourse of wisdom.  
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Early modern literature abounds in references to beauty. However, in the past few 
decades, discussions of beauty have been sidelined in part due to the influence of approaches 
such as cultural materialism and new historicism; as a result, beauty often gets viewed as some 
kind of ideological mist that distracts us from ethical issues. By taking beauty as seriously as 
early modern thinkers did, my research underscores the importance of beauty in early modern 
literary criticism and reassesses the critical relationship between beauty and ethics. My study 
posits Shakespeare as philosopher of beauty and reinterprets several literary works, thereby 
challenging traditionally accepted criticism on these works.  
This dissertation begins by addressing the centrality of the topic of beauty in humanist 
discourses and literary works of the early modern period and argues that beauty was a critical 
way through which early modern culture defined itself. Beauty instigates an inquiry into the 
nature of being human and the self and its relationship with the other—that, as I have shown, is 
the matter of ethics. Chapter 2 examines the nature of the experience of beauty and concludes 
and explains how an encounter with beauty is necessarily ethical and places a call on us to 
respond. Here, I also introduce the Levinasian-Derridean concept of ethics and Otherness, and 
156 
   
discuss beauty in relation to notions selfhood. Chapter 3 explores the dynamics of a response to 
beauty in various literary works and studies the correlation between Neoplatonism, Protestant 
grace, and the Levinasian “ethical”. I elucidate the potential for ethical violence inherent in 
responses to beauty and show that these responses to beauty are fraught with difficulties and 
necessarily involve a consideration of the self’s relation to the other. The final chapter continues 
this examination of the nature of beauty and its connection to selfhood by taking a look at the 
other or the ostensible opposite of beauty. My analysis of Othello and Omkara returns to the 
opening chapter in its assertion that for early modern thinkers, beauty is being. I explore the 
interchangeable nature of beauty and its other, the fluidness of selfhood, and the pursuit of the 
elusive otherness that beauty instigates. My examination of a contemporary Hindi cinematic 
adaptation of a Shakespearean play not only illuminates traditional critical concerns of the play 
anew but also shows how issues relevant to the early modern European world of the play are 
relevant and pressing in a postcolonial, contemporary world. The subject of beauty and ethics 
traverses time and space: it is critical and indispensible to a better understanding of our selfhood, 
our relationships, and the limitations and potential of our knowledge.  
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country, India, to pursue university education. I earned my BA in English (Honours), MA in 
English (Gold Medalist), and MPhil in English at Delhi University. My plan had always been to 
follow in my father’s footsteps, join the Foreign Service, and become a diplomat who would 
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my MA, I cleared the National Eligibility Test (for lectureship) administered by the University 
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good on my credentials when I was a diplomat. I was one of less than a dozen students in the 
country who cleared the exam and the interview and got accepted.  
I was in a prestigious MPhil program and now that I had my lectureship certificate, I 
could teach at any Indian university and make some money while preparing for the civil services 
exams. I was an impatient 22 year old the first day I taught and I had no idea what was in store 
for me. The combination of learning how to teach literature and really having to push myself 
intellectually in my MPhil classes annoyed me to no end. It also challenged me. My students and 
teachers thought I was rather good and liked me, but I felt like a fraud, like I would never truly 
be prepared. And that is really when I decided to pursue a career in academics. For me, being a 
scholar and a teacher meant acknowledging, much to my chagrin, that I would never ever know 
everything about everything, I would always be ignorant of many things, and I would constantly 
be learning, always challenging and questioning what I already knew. 
My coming to the US and joining the WSU PhD program was serendipitous, a 
combination of my parents being posted to Chicago, a boy I really liked (now, my husband) who 
matched at a medical residency program in Michigan, and the Detroit city bus running straight 
from my house to the English Department.  I had the magnificent fortune of taking courses with 
Ken Jackson and James Knapp at the same time: I became an early modernist and decided to stay 
at WSU and in the US. This PhD is one of the most challenging and fulfilling projects I have 
ever undertaken. I have had opportunities to share and discuss my work with brilliant scholars at 
national conferences and have published two articles, one in a peer-reviewed journal and the 
other in an international anthology. I have already started work on and presented parts of my 
second project on North Indian devotional poetry. More than anything else, this PhD has taught 
me humility, discipline, the value of collaboration, and a need to engage truly and deeply with a 
subject matter.  
While I have since tempered my impatience ever so slightly, some old habits die hard and 
I still want to change the world for the better. Only now, I hope to do it as an educator, even as I 
myself remain a lifelong learner.   
